diff options
| author | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2006-06-29 20:11:25 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2006-06-30 14:11:47 -0700 |
| commit | 3820c3f3e41786322c0bb225b9c77b8deff869d1 (patch) | |
| tree | a422ad9d119950af2d139849fe24e935ad9f0a22 | |
| parent | 598736c55622f7ea65b98f93c825ff95c433877c (diff) | |
[TCP]: Reset gso_segs if packet is dodgy
I wasn't paranoid enough in verifying GSO information. A bogus gso_segs
could upset drivers as much as a bogus header would. Let's reset it in
the per-protocol gso_segment functions.
I didn't verify gso_size because that can be verified by the source of
the dodgy packets.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 0336422c88a..0bb0ac96d67 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2166,13 +2166,19 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features) if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, thlen)) goto out; - segs = NULL; - if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) - goto out; - oldlen = (u16)~skb->len; __skb_pull(skb, thlen); + if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) { + /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */ + int mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; + + skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = (skb->len + mss - 1) / mss; + + segs = NULL; + goto out; + } + segs = skb_segment(skb, features); if (IS_ERR(segs)) goto out; |