[MAC80211]: rework hardware crypto flags

This patch reworks the various hardware crypto related
flags to make them more local, i.e. put them with each
key or each packet instead of into the hw struct.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

5 files changed, 42 insertions, 82 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/rtl8187_dev.c b/drivers/net/wireless/rtl8187_dev.c
index 9db9ece31b4..7dbf11e30db 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/rtl8187_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rtl8187_dev.c
@@ -605,8 +605,7 @@ static int __devinit rtl8187_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	priv->modes[1].channels = priv->channels;
 	priv->mode = IEEE80211_IF_TYPE_MGMT;
 	dev->flags = IEEE80211_HW_HOST_BROADCAST_PS_BUFFERING |
-		     IEEE80211_HW_RX_INCLUDES_FCS |
-		     IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV;
+		     IEEE80211_HW_RX_INCLUDES_FCS;
 	dev->extra_tx_headroom = sizeof(struct rtl8187_tx_hdr);
 	dev->queues = 1;
 	dev->max_rssi = 65;
diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h
index fcb7e3f9c66..9137579c12a 100644
--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
+++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_status {
 #define RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR	(1<<0)
 #define RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED	(1<<1)
 #define RX_FLAG_RADIOTAP	(1<<2)
+#define RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED	(1<<3)
+#define RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED	(1<<4)
 	int flag;
 };
 
@@ -402,6 +404,16 @@ typedef enum {
  * that situation it should reject that key.
  */
 #define IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA	(1<<0)
+/*
+ * This flag should be set by the driver if it requires
+ * IV generation in software for this key.
+ */
+#define IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV	(1<<1)
+/*
+ * This flag should be set by the driver if it requires
+ * MMIC generation in software for this key.
+ */
+#define IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC (1<<2)
 
 struct ieee80211_key_conf {
 	/*
@@ -465,17 +477,7 @@ struct ieee80211_hw {
 	 */
 #define IEEE80211_HW_HOST_GEN_BEACON_TEMPLATE (1<<1)
 
-	/*
-	 * Some devices handle decryption internally and do not
-	 * indicate whether the frame was encrypted (unencrypted frames
-	 * will be dropped by the hardware, unless specifically allowed
-	 * through.)
-	 * It is permissible to not handle all encrypted frames and fall
-	 * back to software encryption; however, if this flag is set
-	 * unencrypted frames must be dropped unless the driver is told
-	 * otherwise via the set_ieee8021x() callback.
-	 */
-#define IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP (1<<2)
+/* hole at 2 */
 
 	/* Whether RX frames passed to ieee80211_rx() include FCS in the end */
 #define IEEE80211_HW_RX_INCLUDES_FCS (1<<3)
@@ -488,32 +490,13 @@ struct ieee80211_hw {
 	 * can fetch them with ieee80211_get_buffered_bc(). */
 #define IEEE80211_HW_HOST_BROADCAST_PS_BUFFERING (1<<4)
 
-	/*
-	 * This flag is only relevant if hardware encryption is used.
-	 * If set, it has two meanings:
-	 *  1) the IV and ICV are present in received frames that have
-	 *     been decrypted (unless IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP is
-	 *     also set)
-	 *  2) on transmission, the IV should be generated in software.
-	 *
-	 * Please let us know if you *don't* use this flag, the stack would
-	 * really like to be able to get the IV to keep key statistics
-	 * accurate.
-	 */
-#define IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV (1<<5)
+/* hole at 5 */
 
 /* hole at 6 */
 
 /* hole at 7 */
 
-	/*
-	 * Some devices handle Michael MIC internally and do not include MIC in
-	 * the received packets passed up. This flag must be set for such
-	 * devices. The 'encryption' frame control bit is expected to be still
-	 * set in the IEEE 802.11 header with this option unlike with the
-	 * IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP flag.
-	 */
-#define IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_STRIPS_MIC (1<<8)
+/* hole at 8 */
 
 	/* Device is capable of performing full monitor mode even during
 	 * normal operation. */
@@ -527,8 +510,6 @@ struct ieee80211_hw {
 	 * specified in the device's EEPROM */
 #define IEEE80211_HW_DEFAULT_REG_DOMAIN_CONFIGURED (1<<11)
 
-	/* calculate Michael MIC for an MSDU when doing hwcrypto */
-#define IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_INCLUDE_MMIC (1<<12)
 	/* Do TKIP phase1 key mixing in stack to support cards only do
 	 * phase2 key mixing when doing hwcrypto */
 #define IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_REQ_PHASE1_KEY (1<<13)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 8c6e2908921..28b8b6af4c4 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_load_key(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		 * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key
 		 * the hardware used if this flag is set?
 		 */
-		if (!(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV))
+		if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+		    (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
 			return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
 		hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(rx->fc);
@@ -534,8 +535,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_wep_weak_iv_detection(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
 	/* Check for weak IVs, if hwaccel did not remove IV from the frame */
-	if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) ||
-	    !(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
+	if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) ||
+	    !(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
 		if (ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(rx->skb, rx->key))
 			rx->sta->wep_weak_iv_count++;
 
@@ -559,15 +560,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
 	}
 
-	if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) ||
-	    !(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) {
+	if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 		if (ieee80211_wep_decrypt(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key)) {
 			if (net_ratelimit())
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: RX WEP frame, decrypt "
 				       "failed\n", rx->dev->name);
 			return TXRX_DROP;
 		}
-	} else if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) {
+	} else if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
 		ieee80211_wep_remove_iv(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key);
 		/* remove ICV */
 		skb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - 4);
@@ -898,13 +898,10 @@ static ieee80211_txrx_result
 ieee80211_rx_h_drop_unencrypted(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Pass through unencrypted frames if the hardware might have
-	 * decrypted them already without telling us, but that can only
-	 * be true if we either didn't find a key or the found key is
-	 * uploaded to the hardware.
+	 * Pass through unencrypted frames if the hardware has
+	 * decrypted them already.
 	 */
-	if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP) &&
-	    (!rx->key || (rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)))
+	if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
 		return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
 	/* Drop unencrypted frames if key is set. */
@@ -1212,8 +1209,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_michael_mic_report(struct net_device *dev,
 		goto ignore;
 	}
 
-	if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) &&
-	    rx->sdata->type == IEEE80211_IF_TYPE_AP && keyidx) {
+	if (rx->sdata->type == IEEE80211_IF_TYPE_AP && keyidx) {
 		/* AP with Pairwise keys support should never receive Michael
 		 * MIC errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved
 		 * for group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 08d221674bc..e2ae1e1fcc7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -545,9 +545,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			return -1;
 	} else {
 		tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
-		if (tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) {
-			if (ieee80211_wep_add_iv(tx->local, skb, tx->key) ==
-			    NULL)
+		if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) {
+			if (!ieee80211_wep_add_iv(tx->local, skb, tx->key))
 				return -1;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 775f89e42a4..a23531cef5b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
 
 	if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
 	    !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_FRAGMENTED) &&
-	    !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_INCLUDE_MMIC) &&
+	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&
 	    !wpa_test) {
 		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC
 		 */
@@ -138,26 +138,13 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 	/*
 	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it
 	 */
-	if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_STRIPS_MIC)
+	if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
 		return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
 	if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP ||
 	    !(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
 		return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
-	if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-	    (rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) {
-		if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) {
-			if (skb->len < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
-				return TXRX_DROP;
-		}
-		/* Need to verify Michael MIC sometimes in software even when
-		 * hwaccel is used. Atheros ar5212: fragmented frames and QoS
-		 * frames. */
-		if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_FRAGMENTED) && !wpa_test)
-			goto remove_mic;
-	}
-
 	if (ieee80211_get_hdr_info(skb, &sa, &da, &qos_tid, &data, &data_len)
 	    || data_len < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
@@ -184,7 +171,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
 	}
 
- remove_mic:
 	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 
@@ -287,7 +273,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
 	ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx);
 
 	if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
-	    !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) &&
+	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
 	    !wpa_test) {
 		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */
 		tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
@@ -330,11 +316,13 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 	if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
 
-	if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-	    (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) {
-		if (!(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) {
-			/* Hardware takes care of all processing, including
-			 * replay protection, so no need to continue here. */
+	if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+		if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) {
+			/*
+			 * Hardware took care of all processing, including
+			 * replay protection, and stripped the ICV/IV so
+			 * we cannot do any checks here.
+			 */
 			return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 		}
 
@@ -538,7 +526,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
 	ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx);
 
 	if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
-	    !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) {
+	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
 		/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
 		 * header or MIC fields */
 		tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
@@ -585,8 +573,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
 
 	if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-	    (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
-	    !(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV))
+	    (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
 		return TXRX_CONTINUE;
 
 	(void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
@@ -605,10 +592,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
 		return TXRX_DROP;
 	}
 
-	if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-	    (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) {
-		/* hwaccel has already decrypted frame and verified MIC */
-	} else {
+	if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 		u8 *scratch, *b_0, *aad;
 
 		scratch = key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf;