[PATCH] FUSE - device functions

This adds the FUSE device handling functions.

This contains the following files:

 o dev.c
    - fuse device operations (read, write, release, poll)
    - registers misc device
    - support for sending requests to userspace

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

1 files changed, 341 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..83f96cf5696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+Definitions
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Userspace filesystem:
+
+  A filesystem in which data and metadata are provided by an ordinary
+  userspace process.  The filesystem can be accessed normally through
+  the kernel interface.
+
+Filesystem daemon:
+
+  The process(es) providing the data and metadata of the filesystem.
+
+Non-privileged mount (or user mount):
+
+  A userspace filesystem mounted by a non-privileged (non-root) user.
+  The filesystem daemon is running with the privileges of the mounting
+  user.  NOTE: this is not the same as mounts allowed with the "user"
+  option in /etc/fstab, which is not discussed here.
+
+Mount owner:
+
+  The user who does the mounting.
+
+User:
+
+  The user who is performing filesystem operations.
+
+What is FUSE?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+FUSE is a userspace filesystem framework.  It consists of a kernel
+module (fuse.ko), a userspace library (libfuse.*) and a mount utility
+(fusermount).
+
+One of the most important features of FUSE is allowing secure,
+non-privileged mounts.  This opens up new possibilities for the use of
+filesystems.  A good example is sshfs: a secure network filesystem
+using the sftp protocol.
+
+The userspace library and utilities are available from the FUSE
+homepage:
+
+  http://fuse.sourceforge.net/
+
+Mount options
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+'fd=N'
+
+  The file descriptor to use for communication between the userspace
+  filesystem and the kernel.  The file descriptor must have been
+  obtained by opening the FUSE device ('/dev/fuse').
+
+'rootmode=M'
+
+  The file mode of the filesystem's root in octal representation.
+
+'user_id=N'
+
+  The numeric user id of the mount owner.
+
+'group_id=N'
+
+  The numeric group id of the mount owner.
+
+'default_permissions'
+
+  By default FUSE doesn't check file access permissions, the
+  filesystem is free to implement it's access policy or leave it to
+  the underlying file access mechanism (e.g. in case of network
+  filesystems).  This option enables permission checking, restricting
+  access based on file mode.  This is option is usually useful
+  together with the 'allow_other' mount option.
+
+'allow_other'
+
+  This option overrides the security measure restricting file access
+  to the user mounting the filesystem.  This option is by default only
+  allowed to root, but this restriction can be removed with a
+  (userspace) configuration option.
+
+'kernel_cache'
+
+  This option disables flushing the cache of the file contents on
+  every open().  This should only be enabled on filesystems, where the
+  file data is never changed externally (not through the mounted FUSE
+  filesystem).  Thus it is not suitable for network filesystems and
+  other "intermediate" filesystems.
+
+  NOTE: if this option is not specified (and neither 'direct_io') data
+  is still cached after the open(), so a read() system call will not
+  always initiate a read operation.
+
+'direct_io'
+
+  This option disables the use of page cache (file content cache) in
+  the kernel for this filesystem.  This has several affects:
+
+     - Each read() or write() system call will initiate one or more
+       read or write operations, data will not be cached in the
+       kernel.
+
+     - The return value of the read() and write() system calls will
+       correspond to the return values of the read and write
+       operations.  This is useful for example if the file size is not
+       known in advance (before reading it).
+
+'max_read=N'
+
+  With this option the maximum size of read operations can be set.
+  The default is infinite.  Note that the size of read requests is
+  limited anyway to 32 pages (which is 128kbyte on i386).
+
+How do non-privileged mounts work?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Since the mount() system call is a privileged operation, a helper
+program (fusermount) is needed, which is installed setuid root.
+
+The implication of providing non-privileged mounts is that the mount
+owner must not be able to use this capability to compromise the
+system.  Obvious requirements arising from this are:
+
+ A) mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the
+    help of the mounted filesystem
+
+ B) mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from
+    other users' and the super user's processes
+
+ C) mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in
+    other users' or the super user's processes
+
+How are requirements fulfilled?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ A) The mount owner could gain elevated privileges by either:
+
+     1) creating a filesystem containing a device file, then opening
+	this device
+
+     2) creating a filesystem containing a suid or sgid application,
+	then executing this application
+
+    The solution is not to allow opening device files and ignore
+    setuid and setgid bits when executing programs.  To ensure this
+    fusermount always adds "nosuid" and "nodev" to the mount options
+    for non-privileged mounts.
+
+ B) If another user is accessing files or directories in the
+    filesystem, the filesystem daemon serving requests can record the
+    exact sequence and timing of operations performed.  This
+    information is otherwise inaccessible to the mount owner, so this
+    counts as an information leak.
+
+    The solution to this problem will be presented in point 2) of C).
+
+ C) There are several ways in which the mount owner can induce
+    undesired behavior in other users' processes, such as:
+
+     1) mounting a filesystem over a file or directory which the mount
+        owner could otherwise not be able to modify (or could only
+        make limited modifications).
+
+        This is solved in fusermount, by checking the access
+        permissions on the mountpoint and only allowing the mount if
+        the mount owner can do unlimited modification (has write
+        access to the mountpoint, and mountpoint is not a "sticky"
+        directory)
+
+     2) Even if 1) is solved the mount owner can change the behavior
+        of other users' processes.
+
+         i) It can slow down or indefinitely delay the execution of a
+           filesystem operation creating a DoS against the user or the
+           whole system.  For example a suid application locking a
+           system file, and then accessing a file on the mount owner's
+           filesystem could be stopped, and thus causing the system
+           file to be locked forever.
+
+         ii) It can present files or directories of unlimited length, or
+           directory structures of unlimited depth, possibly causing a
+           system process to eat up diskspace, memory or other
+           resources, again causing DoS.
+
+	The solution to this as well as B) is not to allow processes
+	to access the filesystem, which could otherwise not be
+	monitored or manipulated by the mount owner.  Since if the
+	mount owner can ptrace a process, it can do all of the above
+	without using a FUSE mount, the same criteria as used in
+	ptrace can be used to check if a process is allowed to access
+	the filesystem or not.
+
+	Note that the ptrace check is not strictly necessary to
+	prevent B/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
+	privilege to send signal to the process accessing the
+	filesystem, since SIGSTOP can be used to get a similar effect.
+
+I think these limitations are unacceptable?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+If a sysadmin trusts the users enough, or can ensure through other
+measures, that system processes will never enter non-privileged
+mounts, it can relax the last limitation with a "user_allow_other"
+config option.  If this config option is set, the mounting user can
+add the "allow_other" mount option which disables the check for other
+users' processes.
+
+Kernel - userspace interface
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The following diagram shows how a filesystem operation (in this
+example unlink) is performed in FUSE.
+
+NOTE: everything in this description is greatly simplified
+
+ |  "rm /mnt/fuse/file"               |  FUSE filesystem daemon
+ |                                    |
+ |                                    |  >sys_read()
+ |                                    |    >fuse_dev_read()
+ |                                    |      >request_wait()
+ |                                    |        [sleep on fc->waitq]
+ |                                    |
+ |  >sys_unlink()                     |
+ |    >fuse_unlink()                  |
+ |      [get request from             |
+ |       fc->unused_list]             |
+ |      >request_send()               |
+ |        [queue req on fc->pending]  |
+ |        [wake up fc->waitq]         |        [woken up]
+ |        >request_wait_answer()      |
+ |          [sleep on req->waitq]     |
+ |                                    |      <request_wait()
+ |                                    |      [remove req from fc->pending]
+ |                                    |      [copy req to read buffer]
+ |                                    |      [add req to fc->processing]
+ |                                    |    <fuse_dev_read()
+ |                                    |  <sys_read()
+ |                                    |
+ |                                    |  [perform unlink]
+ |                                    |
+ |                                    |  >sys_write()
+ |                                    |    >fuse_dev_write()
+ |                                    |      [look up req in fc->processing]
+ |                                    |      [remove from fc->processing]
+ |                                    |      [copy write buffer to req]
+ |          [woken up]                |      [wake up req->waitq]
+ |                                    |    <fuse_dev_write()
+ |                                    |  <sys_write()
+ |        <request_wait_answer()      |
+ |      <request_send()               |
+ |      [add request to               |
+ |       fc->unused_list]             |
+ |    <fuse_unlink()                  |
+ |  <sys_unlink()                     |
+
+There are a couple of ways in which to deadlock a FUSE filesystem.
+Since we are talking about unprivileged userspace programs,
+something must be done about these.
+
+Scenario 1 -  Simple deadlock
+-----------------------------
+
+ |  "rm /mnt/fuse/file"               |  FUSE filesystem daemon
+ |                                    |
+ |  >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file")     |
+ |    [acquire inode semaphore        |
+ |     for "file"]                    |
+ |    >fuse_unlink()                  |
+ |      [sleep on req->waitq]         |
+ |                                    |  <sys_read()
+ |                                    |  >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file")
+ |                                    |    [acquire inode semaphore
+ |                                    |     for "file"]
+ |                                    |    *DEADLOCK*
+
+The solution for this is to allow requests to be interrupted while
+they are in userspace:
+
+ |      [interrupted by signal]       |
+ |    <fuse_unlink()                  |
+ |    [release semaphore]             |    [semaphore acquired]
+ |  <sys_unlink()                     |
+ |                                    |    >fuse_unlink()
+ |                                    |      [queue req on fc->pending]
+ |                                    |      [wake up fc->waitq]
+ |                                    |      [sleep on req->waitq]
+
+If the filesystem daemon was single threaded, this will stop here,
+since there's no other thread to dequeue and execute the request.
+In this case the solution is to kill the FUSE daemon as well.  If
+there are multiple serving threads, you just have to kill them as
+long as any remain.
+
+Moral: a filesystem which deadlocks, can soon find itself dead.
+
+Scenario 2 - Tricky deadlock
+----------------------------
+
+This one needs a carefully crafted filesystem.  It's a variation on
+the above, only the call back to the filesystem is not explicit,
+but is caused by a pagefault.
+
+ |  Kamikaze filesystem thread 1      |  Kamikaze filesystem thread 2
+ |                                    |
+ |  [fd = open("/mnt/fuse/file")]     |  [request served normally]
+ |  [mmap fd to 'addr']               |
+ |  [close fd]                        |  [FLUSH triggers 'magic' flag]
+ |  [read a byte from addr]           |
+ |    >do_page_fault()                |
+ |      [find or create page]         |
+ |      [lock page]                   |
+ |      >fuse_readpage()              |
+ |         [queue READ request]       |
+ |         [sleep on req->waitq]      |
+ |                                    |  [read request to buffer]
+ |                                    |  [create reply header before addr]
+ |                                    |  >sys_write(addr - headerlength)
+ |                                    |    >fuse_dev_write()
+ |                                    |      [look up req in fc->processing]
+ |                                    |      [remove from fc->processing]
+ |                                    |      [copy write buffer to req]
+ |                                    |        >do_page_fault()
+ |                                    |           [find or create page]
+ |                                    |           [lock page]
+ |                                    |           * DEADLOCK *
+
+Solution is again to let the the request be interrupted (not
+elaborated further).
+
+An additional problem is that while the write buffer is being
+copied to the request, the request must not be interrupted.  This
+is because the destination address of the copy may not be valid
+after the request is interrupted.
+
+This is solved with doing the copy atomically, and allowing
+interruption while the page(s) belonging to the write buffer are
+faulted with get_user_pages().  The 'req->locked' flag indicates
+when the copy is taking place, and interruption is delayed until
+this flag is unset.
+