Staging: rt28x0: updates from vendor's V2.1.0.0 drivers

Port changes from:

* 2009_0420_RT2860_Linux_STA_V2.1.0.0
* 2009_0302_RT2870_Linux_STA_v2.1.0.0
* 2009_0525_RT3070_Linux_STA_v2.1.1.0

to in-kernel drivers.


From the RT2860 driver release note:

[2.1.0.0]
1. New generation schema for multiple OS porting
2. Fixed Ad-hoc ping failed in noisy environment. (Probe Response has too
    many retry packet then cause "not enough space in MgmtRing")
3. Fixed WPA(2)PSK issue when group cipher of AP is WEP40 or WEP104.
4. Modified iwpriv ra0 get_site_survey:
	In scan list result: Security shows "NONE" when AP is OPEN/NONE,
	shows "WEP" when AP is OPEN/WEP or SHARED/WEP, shows
	"WPAPSK(WPA2PSK)/TKIP(AES)" when AP is WPAPSK(WPA2PSK)/TKIP(AES)
	shows "WPA(WPA2)/TKIP(AES)" when AP is WPA(WPA2)/TKIP(AES)
5. Support kthread.
6. Add New A band channel list region 15 contains the whole channels in
   the A band region 4 and the new CE channel 167,169,171,173
7. Add New IEEE802.11r functionality.
8. Fixed WPA2-Enterprise failed when AP reboot or turn off then turn on.
9. Fixed STA cannot connect to 11B only AP when the setting of is PHY_11GN.


From the RT2870 driver release note:

[V2.1.0.0]
1. New generation schema for multiple OS porting.
2. Fixed Ad-hoc ping failed in noisy environment. (Probe Response has too
   many retry packet then cause "not enough space in MgmtRing").
3. Fixed WPS failed with D-Link DIR-628 in 5GHz.
4. Change FastRoaming in DAT file to AutoRoaming.
5. Support kthread.
6. Add New A band channel list region 15 contains the whole channels in
   the A band region and the new CE channel 167,169,171,173.
7. New IEEE802.11r functionality.


From the RT3070 driver release note:

Version V2.1.1.0
       1. Linux kernel 2.6.29 support.
       2. Fix eFuse write from BIN file bug.

Version 2.1.0.0
       1. New generation schema for multiple OS porting
       2. Fixed Ad-hoc ping failed in noisy environment.
       3. Modified iwpriv ra0 get_site_survey:
       4. Change FastRoaming in DAT file to AutoRoaming.
       5. Support kthread.
       6. New IEEE802.11r functionality.


Tested with RT2860 and RT3070 chipsets.

Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

1 files changed, 2352 insertions, 76 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c b/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
index 2de29fde2c4..5af78b84118 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
@@ -52,9 +52,1209 @@ UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4]        = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04};
 UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4]   = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
 UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4]   	= {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
 UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_WEP104[4]   = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05};
-// MSA OUI
-UCHAR   	OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4]    = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05};		// Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
-UCHAR   	OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4]   	= {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06};		// Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+
+
+
+static VOID	ConstructEapolKeyData(
+	IN	PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
+	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyWepStatus,
+	IN	UCHAR			keyDescVer,
+	IN	UCHAR			MsgType,
+	IN	UCHAR			DefaultKeyIdx,
+	IN	UCHAR			*GTK,
+	IN	UCHAR			*RSNIE,
+	IN	UCHAR			RSNIE_LEN,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg);
+
+static VOID	CalculateMIC(
+	IN	UCHAR			KeyDescVer,
+	IN	UCHAR			*PTK,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem);
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        association state machine init, including state transition and timer init
+    Parameters:
+        S - pointer to the association state machine
+    ==========================================================================
+ */
+VOID WpaStateMachineInit(
+    IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+    IN  STATE_MACHINE *S,
+    OUT STATE_MACHINE_FUNC Trans[])
+{
+    StateMachineInit(S, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC *)Trans, MAX_WPA_PTK_STATE, MAX_WPA_MSG, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)Drop, WPA_PTK, WPA_MACHINE_BASE);
+
+    StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPPacket, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPPacketAction);
+    StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLStart, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLStartAction);
+    StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLLogoff, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLLogoffAction);
+    StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLKey, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLKeyAction);
+    StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLASFAlert, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction);
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        this is state machine function.
+        When receiving EAP packets which is  for 802.1x authentication use.
+        Not use in PSK case
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+       Start 4-way HS when rcv EAPOL_START which may create by our driver in assoc.c
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+    MAC_TABLE_ENTRY     *pEntry;
+    PHEADER_802_11      pHeader;
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLStartAction ===> \n"));
+
+    pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+    //For normaol PSK, we enqueue an EAPOL-Start command to trigger the process.
+    if (Elem->MsgLen == 6)
+        pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, Elem->Msg);
+    else
+    {
+        pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+    }
+
+    if (pEntry)
+    {
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" PortSecured(%d), WpaState(%d), AuthMode(%d), PMKID_CacheIdx(%d) \n", pEntry->PortSecured, pEntry->WpaState, pEntry->AuthMode, pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx));
+
+        if ((pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED)
+			&& (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+            && ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) || ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) && (pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx != ENTRY_NOT_FOUND))))
+        {
+            pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilter8021xWEP;
+            pEntry->WpaState = AS_INITPSK;
+            pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED;
+            NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, sizeof(pEntry->R_Counter));
+            pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+
+            WPAStart4WayHS(pAd, pEntry, PEER_MSG1_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        This is state machine function.
+        When receiving EAPOL packets which is  for 802.1x key management.
+        Use both in WPA, and WPAPSK case.
+        In this function, further dispatch to different functions according to the received packet.  3 categories are :
+          1.  normal 4-way pairwisekey and 2-way groupkey handshake
+          2.  MIC error (Countermeasures attack)  report packet from STA.
+          3.  Request for pairwise/group key update from STA
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+    MAC_TABLE_ENTRY     *pEntry;
+    PHEADER_802_11      pHeader;
+    PEAPOL_PACKET       pEapol_packet;
+	KEY_INFO			peerKeyInfo;
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLKeyAction ===>\n"));
+
+    pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+    pEapol_packet = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+
+	NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, sizeof(peerKeyInfo));
+	NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO));
+
+	hex_dump("Received Eapol frame", (unsigned char *)pEapol_packet, (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H));
+
+	*((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo));
+
+    do
+    {
+        pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+
+		if (!pEntry || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+            break;
+
+		if (pEntry->AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+				break;
+
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPoL-Key frame from STA %02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X\n", PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr)));
+
+        if (((pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER) && (pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER2)) ||
+			((pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA1_KEY_DESC) && (pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA2_KEY_DESC)))
+        {
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter does not match with WPA rule\n"));
+            break;
+        }
+
+		// The value 1 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+		// neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.
+		if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_TKIP))
+        {
+	        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(TKIP) \n"));
+	    break;
+	}
+		// The value 2 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+		// either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.
+	else if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_AES))
+	{
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(AES) \n"));
+		break;
+	}
+
+		// Check if this STA is in class 3 state and the WPA state is started
+        if ((pEntry->Sst == SST_ASSOC) && (pEntry->WpaState >= AS_INITPSK))
+        {
+			// Check the Key Ack (bit 7) of the Key Information to determine the Authenticator
+			// or not.
+			// An EAPOL-Key frame that is sent by the Supplicant in response to an EAPOL-
+			// Key frame from the Authenticator must not have the Ack bit set.
+			if (peerKeyInfo.KeyAck == 1)
+			{
+				// The frame is snet by Authenticator.
+				// So the Supplicant side shall handle this.
+
+				if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+					(peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY))
+				{
+					// Process 1. the message 1 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+					//			  EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+					//		   2. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA
+					//			  EAPOL-Key(0,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+					if (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 0)
+			PeerPairMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+	                else
+	                PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+				}
+				else if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1) &&
+						 (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1) &&
+						 (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+						 (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0))
+				{
+					// Process 1. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+					//			  EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+					//		   2. the message 1 of group KS in WPA or WPA2
+					//			  EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,Key RSC,0, MIC,GTK[N])
+					if (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+						PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+					else
+						PeerGroupMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				// The frame is snet by Supplicant.
+				// So the Authenticator side shall handle this.
+				if ((peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+						 (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) &&
+						 (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1))
+				{
+					if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+					{
+						// EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,Data)
+						// Process 1. message 2 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+						//		   2. message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA
+						if (CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen) == 0)
+						{
+							PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+			}
+						else
+						{
+							PeerPairMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+						}
+					}
+					else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+					{
+						// EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,P,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+						// Process message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+						PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+					}
+					else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == GROUPKEY)
+					{
+						// EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+						// Process message 2 of Group key HS in WPA or WPA2
+						PeerGroupMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11], (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11));
+					}
+				}
+			}
+        }
+    }while(FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine	Description:
+		Copy frame from waiting queue into relative ring buffer and set
+	appropriate ASIC register to kick hardware encryption before really
+	sent out to air.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd		Pointer	to our adapter
+		PNDIS_PACKET	Pointer to outgoing Ndis frame
+		NumberOfFrag	Number of fragment required
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID    RTMPToWirelessSta(
+    IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER		pAd,
+    IN  PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
+    IN  PUCHAR			pHeader802_3,
+    IN  UINT			HdrLen,
+    IN  PUCHAR			pData,
+    IN  UINT			DataLen,
+    IN	BOOLEAN				bClearFrame)
+{
+    PNDIS_PACKET    pPacket;
+    NDIS_STATUS     Status;
+
+	if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+		return;
+
+    do {
+		// build a NDIS packet
+		Status = RTMPAllocateNdisPacket(pAd, &pPacket, pHeader802_3, HdrLen, pData, DataLen);
+		if (Status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+		break;
+
+
+			if (bClearFrame)
+				RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 1);
+			else
+				RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 0);
+		{
+			RTMP_SET_PACKET_SOURCE(pPacket, PKTSRC_NDIS);
+
+			RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, MAIN_MBSSID);	// set a default value
+			if(pEntry->apidx != 0)
+			RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, pEntry->apidx);
+
+		RTMP_SET_PACKET_WCID(pPacket, (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid);
+			RTMP_SET_PACKET_MOREDATA(pPacket, FALSE);
+		}
+
+		{
+		    // send out the packet
+	        Status = STASendPacket(pAd, pPacket);
+	    if (Status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+			{
+				UCHAR   Index;
+
+				// Dequeue one frame from TxSwQueue0..3 queue and process it
+				// There are three place calling dequeue for TX ring.
+				// 1. Here, right after queueing the frame.
+				// 2. At the end of TxRingTxDone service routine.
+				// 3. Upon NDIS call RTMPSendPackets
+				if((!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_BSS_SCAN_IN_PROGRESS)) &&
+					(!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS)))
+				{
+					for(Index = 0; Index < 5; Index ++)
+						if(pAd->TxSwQueue[Index].Number > 0)
+							RTMPDeQueuePacket(pAd, FALSE, Index, MAX_TX_PROCESS);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+    } while (FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        This is a function to initilize 4-way handshake
+
+    Return:
+
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart4WayHS(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN ULONG			TimeInterval)
+{
+    UCHAR           Header802_3[14];
+    EAPOL_PACKET	EAPOLPKT;
+	PUINT8			pBssid = NULL;
+	UCHAR			group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart4WayHS\n"));
+
+	if (RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS | fRTMP_ADAPTER_HALT_IN_PROGRESS))
+	{
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : The interface is closed...\n"));
+		return;
+	}
+
+
+	if (pBssid == NULL)
+	{
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : No corresponding Authenticator.\n"));
+		return;
+    }
+
+	// Check the status
+    if ((pEntry->WpaState > AS_PTKSTART) || (pEntry->WpaState < AS_INITPMK))
+    {
+        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : Not expect calling\n"));
+        return;
+    }
+
+
+	// Increment replay counter by 1
+	ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+	// Randomly generate ANonce
+	GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pBssid, pEntry->ANonce);
+
+	// Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 1
+	// EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+	NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+	ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+					  group_cipher,
+					  EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1,
+					  0,					// Default key index
+					  pEntry->ANonce,
+					  NULL,					// TxRSC
+					  NULL,					// GTK
+					  NULL,					// RSNIE
+					  0,					// RSNIE length
+					  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+
+	// Make outgoing frame
+    MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+    RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3,
+					  LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+					  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+					  (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+	// Trigger Retry Timer
+    RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, TimeInterval);
+
+	// Update State
+    pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKSTART;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart4WayHS: send Msg1 of 4-way \n"));
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Process Pairwise key Msg-1 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg-2
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			Pointer	to our adapter
+		Elem		Message body
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg1Action(
+	IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+	UCHAR				PTK[80];
+	UCHAR               Header802_3[14];
+	PEAPOL_PACKET		pMsg1;
+	UINT			MsgLen;
+	EAPOL_PACKET		EAPOLPKT;
+	PUINT8				pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+	PUINT8				pmk_ptr = NULL;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+	PUINT8				rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+	UCHAR				rsnie_len = 0;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg1Action \n"));
+
+	if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+		return;
+
+    if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+        return;
+
+	{
+		pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+		pmk_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.PMK;
+		group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+		rsnie_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+		rsnie_len = pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+	}
+
+	// Store the received frame
+	pMsg1 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+	MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+	// Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 1 - Replay Counter
+	if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg1, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE)
+		return;
+
+	// Store Replay counter, it will use to verify message 3 and construct message 2
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg1->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+	// Store ANonce
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg1->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+	// Generate random SNonce
+	GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pCurrentAddr, pEntry->SNonce);
+
+	{
+	    // Calculate PTK(ANonce, SNonce)
+	    WpaDerivePTK(pAd,
+				pmk_ptr,
+				pEntry->ANonce,
+					pEntry->Addr,
+					pEntry->SNonce,
+					pCurrentAddr,
+				    PTK,
+				    LEN_PTK);
+
+		// Save key to PTK entry
+		NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+	}
+
+	// Update WpaState
+	pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+	// Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 2
+	//  EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,DataKD_M2)
+	NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+	ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+					  group_cipher,
+					  EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2,
+					  0,				// DefaultKeyIdx
+					  pEntry->SNonce,
+					  NULL,				// TxRsc
+					  NULL,				// GTK
+					  (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr,
+					  rsnie_len,
+					  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+	// Make outgoing frame
+	MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+
+	RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+					  Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+					  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg1Action: send Msg2 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        When receiving the second packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg2Action(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+	UCHAR				PTK[80];
+    BOOLEAN             Cancelled;
+    PHEADER_802_11      pHeader;
+	EAPOL_PACKET        EAPOLPKT;
+	PEAPOL_PACKET       pMsg2;
+	UINT			MsgLen;
+    UCHAR               Header802_3[LENGTH_802_3];
+	UCHAR				TxTsc[6];
+	PUINT8				pBssid = NULL;
+	PUINT8				pmk_ptr = NULL;
+	PUINT8				gtk_ptr = NULL;
+	UCHAR				default_key = 0;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+	PUINT8				rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+	UCHAR				rsnie_len = 0;
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg2Action \n"));
+
+    if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+        return;
+
+    if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+        return;
+
+    // check Entry in valid State
+    if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+        return;
+
+
+
+    // pointer to 802.11 header
+	pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+	// skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+	pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+	MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+	// Store SNonce
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->SNonce, pMsg2->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+	{
+		// Derive PTK
+		WpaDerivePTK(pAd,
+					(UCHAR *)pmk_ptr,
+					pEntry->ANonce,			// ANONCE
+					(UCHAR *)pBssid,
+					pEntry->SNonce,			// SNONCE
+					pEntry->Addr,
+					PTK,
+					LEN_PTK);
+
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+	}
+
+	// Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+	if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE)
+		return;
+
+    do
+    {
+        // delete retry timer
+		RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+		// Change state
+        pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+		// Increment replay counter by 1
+		ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+		// Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 3
+		NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+		ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+						  group_cipher,
+						  EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3,
+						  default_key,
+						  pEntry->ANonce,
+						  TxTsc,
+						  (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr,
+						  (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr,
+						  rsnie_len,
+						  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+        // Make outgoing frame
+        MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+        RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+						  (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+						  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+						  (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+        pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG3_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+		RTMPSetTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+
+		// Update State
+        pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+    }while(FALSE);
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg2Action: send Msg3 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Process Pairwise key Msg 3 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg 4
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd	Pointer	to our adapter
+		Elem		Message body
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg3Action(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+	PHEADER_802_11		pHeader;
+	UCHAR               Header802_3[14];
+	EAPOL_PACKET		EAPOLPKT;
+	PEAPOL_PACKET		pMsg3;
+	UINT			MsgLen;
+	PUINT8				pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg3Action \n"));
+
+	if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+		return;
+
+    if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+		return;
+
+	{
+		pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+		group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+
+	}
+
+	// Record 802.11 header & the received EAPOL packet Msg3
+	pHeader	= (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+	pMsg3 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+	MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+	// Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 3 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+	if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg3, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3, pEntry) == FALSE)
+		return;
+
+	// Save Replay counter, it will use construct message 4
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg3->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+	// Double check ANonce
+	if (!NdisEqualMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg3->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE))
+	{
+		return;
+	}
+
+	// Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 4
+	NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+	ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+					  group_cipher,
+					  EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4,
+					  0,					// group key index not used in message 4
+					  NULL,					// Nonce not used in message 4
+					  NULL,					// TxRSC not used in message 4
+					  NULL,					// GTK not used in message 4
+					  NULL,					// RSN IE not used in message 4
+					  0,
+					  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+	// Update WpaState
+	pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+
+	// Update pairwise key
+	{
+		PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+		pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][0];
+
+		NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.PTK, pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK);
+
+		// Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+		NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+		pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+	    NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48+LEN_TKIP_RXMICK], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+		// Decide its ChiperAlg
+		if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+		else if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+		else
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+
+		// Update these related information to MAC_TABLE_ENTRY
+		pEntry = &pAd->MacTab.Content[BSSID_WCID];
+		NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48+LEN_TKIP_RXMICK], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+		pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = pSharedKey->CipherAlg;
+
+		// Update pairwise key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+		AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+							  BSS0,
+							  0,
+							  pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+							  pSharedKey->Key,
+							  pSharedKey->TxMic,
+							  pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+		// Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+		RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+								  BSS0,
+								  0,
+								  pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+								  pEntry);
+
+	}
+
+	// open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+	if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK ||
+		pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2)
+	{
+		pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+		pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+		STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+	    // Indicate Connected for GUI
+	    pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerPairMsg3Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+									GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+									GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+									GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	}
+
+	// Init 802.3 header and send out
+	MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+	RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+					  Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+					  (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+					  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg3Action: send Msg4 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        When receiving the last packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+        Initilize 2-way groupkey handshake following.
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg4Action(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+	PEAPOL_PACKET		pMsg4;
+    PHEADER_802_11      pHeader;
+    UINT		MsgLen;
+    BOOLEAN             Cancelled;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg4Action\n"));
+
+    do
+    {
+        if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+            break;
+
+        if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2 ) )
+            break;
+
+        if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING)
+            break;
+
+
+        // pointer to 802.11 header
+        pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+		// skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+		pMsg4 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+		MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+        // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 4 - Replay Counter, MIC
+		if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg4, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, pEntry) == FALSE)
+			break;
+
+        // 3. uses the MLME.SETKEYS.request to configure PTK into MAC
+        NdisZeroMemory(&pEntry->PairwiseKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+
+		// reset IVEIV in Asic
+		AsicUpdateWCIDIVEIV(pAd, pEntry->Aid, 1, 0);
+
+        pEntry->PairwiseKey.KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+        NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pEntry->PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+        NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_RXMICK_OFFSET], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+        NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_TXMICK_OFFSET], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+		// Set pairwise key to Asic
+        {
+            pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+            if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+                pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+            else if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+                pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+
+			// Add Pair-wise key to Asic
+            AsicAddPairwiseKeyEntry(
+                pAd,
+                pEntry->Addr,
+                (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid,
+                &pEntry->PairwiseKey);
+
+			// update WCID attribute table and IVEIV table for this entry
+			RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(
+				pAd,
+				pEntry->apidx,
+				0,
+				pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg,
+				pEntry);
+        }
+
+        // 4. upgrade state
+        pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+        pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+		pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+
+
+		if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 ||
+			pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)
+		{
+			pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+			RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+
+			// send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+	        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+									pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+									pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+									group_cipher,
+									GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		// 5. init Group 2-way handshake if necessary.
+	        WPAStart2WayGroupHS(pAd, pEntry);
+
+		pEntry->ReTryCounter = GROUP_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+			RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+		}
+    }while(FALSE);
+
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        This is a function to send the first packet of 2-way groupkey handshake
+    Return:
+
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart2WayGroupHS(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry)
+{
+    UCHAR               Header802_3[14];
+	UCHAR				TxTsc[6];
+    EAPOL_PACKET	EAPOLPKT;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+	UCHAR				default_key = 0;
+	PUINT8				gnonce_ptr = NULL;
+	PUINT8				gtk_ptr = NULL;
+	PUINT8				pBssid = NULL;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart2WayGroupHS\n"));
+
+    if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+        return;
+
+
+    do
+    {
+        // Increment replay counter by 1
+		ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+		// Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 1
+		NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+		ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+						  group_cipher,
+						  EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1,
+						  default_key,
+						  (UCHAR *)gnonce_ptr,
+						  TxTsc,
+						  (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr,
+						  NULL,
+						  0,
+						  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+		// Make outgoing frame
+        MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+        RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+						  Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+						  (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+						  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, FALSE);
+
+
+
+    }while (FALSE);
+
+    DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart2WayGroupHS : send out Group Message 1 \n"));
+
+    return;
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Process Group key 2-way handshaking
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd	Pointer	to our adapter
+		Elem		Message body
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	PeerGroupMsg1Action(
+	IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM  *Elem)
+{
+    UCHAR               Header802_3[14];
+	EAPOL_PACKET		EAPOLPKT;
+	PEAPOL_PACKET		pGroup;
+	UINT			MsgLen;
+	BOOLEAN             Cancelled;
+	UCHAR				default_key = 0;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+	PUINT8				pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg1Action \n"));
+
+	if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+        return;
+
+	{
+		pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+		group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+		default_key = pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId;
+	}
+
+	// Process Group Message 1 frame. skip 802.11 header(24) & LLC_SNAP header(8)
+	pGroup = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+	MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+	// Sanity Check peer group message 1 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+	if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pGroup, MsgLen, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE)
+		return;
+
+	// delete retry timer
+	RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+	// Save Replay counter, it will use to construct message 2
+	NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+	// Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 2
+	NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+	ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+					  group_cipher,
+					  EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2,
+					  default_key,
+					  NULL,					// Nonce not used
+					  NULL,					// TxRSC not used
+					  NULL,					// GTK not used
+					  NULL,					// RSN IE not used
+					  0,
+					  &EAPOLPKT);
+
+    // open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+	pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+	pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+	STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+    // Indicate Connected for GUI
+    pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerGroupMsg1Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+									GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+									GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+									GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+
+	// init header and Fill Packet and send Msg 2 to authenticator
+	MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+	RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+					  Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+					  (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+					  CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, FALSE);
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerGroupMsg1Action: sned group message 2\n"));
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        When receiving the last packet of 2-way groupkey handshake.
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerGroupMsg2Action(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY  *pEntry,
+    IN VOID             *Msg,
+    IN UINT             MsgLen)
+{
+    UINT		Len;
+    PUCHAR		pData;
+    BOOLEAN		Cancelled;
+	PEAPOL_PACKET       pMsg2;
+	UCHAR				group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg2Action \n"));
+
+    do
+    {
+        if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+            break;
+
+        if (MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+            break;
+
+        if (pEntry->WpaState != AS_PTKINITDONE)
+            break;
+
+
+        pData = (PUCHAR)Msg;
+		pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) (pData + LENGTH_802_1_H);
+        Len = MsgLen - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+		// Sanity Check peer group message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC
+		if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, Len, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE)
+            break;
+
+        // 3.  upgrade state
+
+		RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+        pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+
+		if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+		{
+			// send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+										pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+										pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+										group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			// send wireless event - for set key done WPA
+			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA1_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA1, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+										pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+										pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+										group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+		}
+    }while(FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Classify WPA EAP message type
+
+	Arguments:
+		EAPType		Value of EAP message type
+		MsgType		Internal Message definition for MLME state machine
+
+	Return Value:
+		TRUE		Found appropriate message type
+		FALSE		No appropriate message type
+
+	IRQL = DISPATCH_LEVEL
+
+	Note:
+		All these constants are defined in wpa.h
+		For supplicant, there is only EAPOL Key message avaliable
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN	WpaMsgTypeSubst(
+	IN	UCHAR	EAPType,
+	OUT	INT		*MsgType)
+{
+	switch (EAPType)
+	{
+		case EAPPacket:
+			*MsgType = MT2_EAPPacket;
+			break;
+		case EAPOLStart:
+			*MsgType = MT2_EAPOLStart;
+			break;
+		case EAPOLLogoff:
+			*MsgType = MT2_EAPOLLogoff;
+			break;
+		case EAPOLKey:
+			*MsgType = MT2_EAPOLKey;
+			break;
+		case EAPOLASFAlert:
+			*MsgType = MT2_EAPOLASFAlert;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
 
 /*
 	========================================================================
@@ -126,7 +1326,7 @@ VOID	PRF(
 	// Then concatenate to last result
 	for	(i = 0;	i <	(len + 19) / 20; i++)
 	{
-		HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len,	key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
+		HMAC_SHA1(key, key_len, input, total_len, &output[currentindex], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		currentindex +=	20;
 
 		// update the last octet
@@ -136,6 +1336,61 @@ VOID	PRF(
 }
 
 /*
+* F(P, S, c, i) = U1 xor U2 xor ... Uc
+* U1 = PRF(P, S || Int(i))
+* U2 = PRF(P, U1)
+* Uc = PRF(P, Uc-1)
+*/
+
+static void F(char *password, unsigned char *ssid, int ssidlength, int iterations, int count, unsigned char *output)
+{
+    unsigned char digest[36], digest1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+    int i, j;
+
+    /* U1 = PRF(P, S || int(i)) */
+    memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidlength);
+    digest[ssidlength] = (unsigned char)((count>>24) & 0xff);
+    digest[ssidlength+1] = (unsigned char)((count>>16) & 0xff);
+    digest[ssidlength+2] = (unsigned char)((count>>8) & 0xff);
+    digest[ssidlength+3] = (unsigned char)(count & 0xff);
+    HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password), digest, ssidlength+4, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+
+    /* output = U1 */
+    memcpy(output, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+    for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++)
+    {
+        /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
+        HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password), digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+        memcpy(digest1, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+        /* output = output xor Un */
+        for (j = 0; j < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
+        {
+            output[j] ^= digest[j];
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+* password - ascii string up to 63 characters in length
+* ssid - octet string up to 32 octets
+* ssidlength - length of ssid in octets
+* output must be 40 octets in length and outputs 256 bits of key
+*/
+int PasswordHash(PSTRING password, PUCHAR ssid, INT ssidlength, PUCHAR output)
+{
+    if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32))
+        return 0;
+
+    F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output);
+    F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2, &output[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
 	========================================================================
 
 	Routine Description:
@@ -143,7 +1398,7 @@ VOID	PRF(
 		It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
 
 	Arguments:
-		pAd 	-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+		pAd	-	pointer to our pAdapter context
 		PMK		-	pointer to PMK
 		ANonce	-	pointer to ANonce
 		AA		-	pointer to Authenticator Address
@@ -159,7 +1414,7 @@ VOID	PRF(
 
 	========================================================================
 */
-VOID WpaCountPTK(
+VOID WpaDerivePTK(
 	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
 	IN	UCHAR	*PMK,
 	IN	UCHAR	*ANonce,
@@ -290,8 +1545,8 @@ VOID	GenRandom(
 
 	Arguments:
 		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
-    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
-    	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
 		bMixCipher	-	a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
 						cipher are the same or not
 
@@ -301,7 +1556,7 @@ VOID	GenRandom(
 
 	========================================================================
 */
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(
 	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
 	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
 	IN	UINT			WepStatus,
@@ -324,7 +1579,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 
         switch (WepStatus)
         {
-        	// TKIP mode
+		// TKIP mode
             case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
                 NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
                 pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
@@ -351,11 +1606,11 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 				// Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
 				if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
 				{
-                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+			NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
 					// Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
 					if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
 					{
-                		NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+				NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
 						PairwiseCnt = 2;
 					}
 				}
@@ -374,7 +1629,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 			(pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
 			(pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
 		{
-			UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+			UINT	GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
 			switch(GroupCipher)
 			{
 				case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
@@ -427,11 +1682,11 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 				// Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
 				if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
 				{
-                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+			NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
 					// Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
 					if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
 					{
-                		NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+				NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
 						PairwiseCnt = 2;
 					}
 				}
@@ -450,7 +1705,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 			(pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
 			(pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
 		{
-			UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+			UINT	GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
 			switch(GroupCipher)
 			{
 				case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
@@ -477,8 +1732,8 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 
 	Arguments:
 		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
-    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
-    	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
+	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
 		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
 
 	Return Value:
@@ -487,7 +1742,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
 
 	========================================================================
 */
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(
 	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
 	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
 	IN	UINT			AuthMode,
@@ -496,25 +1751,29 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
 	OUT	UCHAR			*rsn_len)
 {
 	RSNIE_AUTH		*pRsnie_auth;
+	UCHAR			AkmCnt = 1;		// default as 1
 
 	pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
 
 	// decide WPA2 or WPA1
 	if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
 	{
+
 		switch (AuthMode)
         {
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
-                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
-                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
+			NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
                 break;
 
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
-                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
-                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
+			NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
                 break;
+			default:
+				AkmCnt = 0;
+				break;
+
         }
 	}
 	else
@@ -523,26 +1782,28 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
         {
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
-                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
                 NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
                 break;
 
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
             case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
-                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
                 NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
                 break;
 
 			case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
-                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
                 NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
                 break;
+			default:
+				AkmCnt = 0;
+				break;
         }
 	}
 
+	pRsnie_auth->acount = AkmCnt;
 	pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
 
-	(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH);	// update current RSNIE length
+	// update current RSNIE length
+	(*rsn_len) += (sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (AkmCnt - 1)));
 
 }
 
@@ -555,7 +1816,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
 
 	Arguments:
 		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
-    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
 		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
 
 	Return Value:
@@ -564,7 +1825,7 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
 
 	========================================================================
 */
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(
 	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
 	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
 	IN	UCHAR			apidx,
@@ -595,8 +1856,8 @@ static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
 
 	Arguments:
 		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
-    	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
-    	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
+	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
 		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
 
 	Return Value:
@@ -612,7 +1873,7 @@ VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
 	IN	UCHAR			apidx)
 {
 	PUCHAR		pRsnIe = NULL;			// primary RSNIE
-	UCHAR 		*rsnielen_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the primary RSNIE
+	UCHAR		*rsnielen_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the primary RSNIE
 	UCHAR		*rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the secondary RSNIE
 	UCHAR		PrimaryRsnie;
 	BOOLEAN		bMixCipher = FALSE;	// indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
@@ -667,13 +1928,13 @@ VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
 	{
 		// Build the primary RSNIE
 		// 1. insert cipher suite
-		RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+		RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
 
 		// 2. insert AKM
-		RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+		RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
 
 		// 3. insert capability
-		RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+		RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
 	}
 
 	// 4. update the RSNIE length
@@ -693,12 +1954,12 @@ VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
 		pAd				-	pointer to our pAdapter context
 		pEntry			-	pointer to active entry
 		pData			-	the received frame
-		DataByteCount 	-	the received frame's length
+		DataByteCount	-	the received frame's length
 		FromWhichBSSID	-	indicate the interface index
 
     Return:
-         TRUE 			-	This frame is EAP frame
-         FALSE 			-	otherwise
+         TRUE			-	This frame is EAP frame
+         FALSE			-	otherwise
     ==========================================================================
 */
 BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
@@ -741,7 +2002,7 @@ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
             DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
 			if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
             {
-            	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
                 RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
                 pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
             }
@@ -764,73 +2025,1088 @@ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
 }
 
 /*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+		Report the EAP message type
+
+	Arguments:
+		msg		-	EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
+					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
+					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
+
+    Return:
+         message type string
+
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+PSTRING GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
+{
+    if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+        return "Pairwise Message 1";
+    else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+        return "Pairwise Message 2";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+        return "Pairwise Message 3";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
+        return "Pairwise Message 4";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+        return "Group Message 1";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+        return "Group Message 2";
+    else
+	return "Invalid Message";
+}
+
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+    Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
+
+	Arguments:
+
+	Return Value:
+
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN  PUCHAR          pData,
+	IN  UCHAR           DataLen,
+	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*Offset)
+{
+	PUCHAR              pVIE;
+	UCHAR               len;
+	PEID_STRUCT         pEid;
+	BOOLEAN				result = FALSE;
+
+	pVIE = pData;
+	len	 = DataLen;
+	*Offset = 0;
+
+	while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
+	{
+		pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
+		// WPA RSN IE
+		if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
+		{
+			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+				(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+				(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
+			{
+					result = TRUE;
+			}
+
+			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		}
+		// WPA2 RSN IE
+		else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
+		{
+			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+				(pEid->Eid == pEntry->RSN_IE[0]) &&
+				((pEid->Len + 2) >= pEntry->RSNIE_Len) &&
+				(NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, &pEntry->RSN_IE[2], pEntry->RSNIE_Len - 2)))
+			{
+
+					result = TRUE;
+			}
+
+			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		len  -= (pEid->Len + 2);
+	}
+
+
+	return result;
+
+}
+
+/*
 	========================================================================
 
 	Routine Description:
-		Misc function to decrypt AES body
+    Parse KEYDATA field.  KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
+    GTK  is encaptulated in KDE format at  p.83 802.11i D10
 
 	Arguments:
 
 	Return Value:
 
 	Note:
-		This function references to	RFC	3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
+        802.11i D10
 
 	========================================================================
 */
-VOID	AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
-	IN	UCHAR	*key,
-	OUT	UCHAR	*plaintext,
-	IN	UCHAR    c_len,
-	IN	UCHAR	*ciphertext)
+BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN  PUCHAR          pKeyData,
+	IN  UCHAR           KeyDataLen,
+	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyIndex,
+	IN	UCHAR			MsgType,
+	IN	BOOLEAN			bWPA2,
+	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
+{
+    PKDE_ENCAP          pKDE = NULL;
+    PUCHAR              pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
+    UCHAR               KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
+    UCHAR               GTKLEN = 0;
+	UCHAR				DefaultIdx = 0;
+	UCHAR				skip_offset;
+
+	// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+    {
+		// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
+		if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
+		{
+			// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
+			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
+			hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
+			hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
 
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+		{
+			if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+			{
+				WpaShowAllsuite(pMyKeyData, skip_offset);
+
+				// skip RSN IE
+				pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
+				KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
+				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
+			}
+			else
+				return TRUE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
+	//hex_dump("remain data", pMyKeyData, KeyDataLength);
+
+
+	// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
+	if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+		if (KeyDataLength >= 8)	// KDE format exclude GTK length
+	{
+		pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
+
+
+			DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
+
+			// Sanity check - KED length
+			if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+			// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
+			GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
+			if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
+	{
+				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
+			return FALSE;
+			}
+
+	}
+		else
+	{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
+	        return FALSE;
+	}
+
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
+		// skip it
+		pMyKeyData += 8;
+		KeyDataLength -= 8;
+
+	}
+	else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+	{
+		DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
+	}
+
+	// Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
+	if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
+    {
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+        return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	{
+		PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+		// set key material, TxMic and RxMic
+		NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.GTK, pMyKeyData, 32);
+		pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId = DefaultIdx;
+
+		pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId];
+
+		// Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+		NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+		pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+		NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, pAd->StaCfg.GTK, LEN_TKIP_EK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[16], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+		NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[24], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+		// Update Shared Key CipherAlg
+		pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+		if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+		else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+		else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP64;
+		else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled)
+			pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP128;
+
+
+		// Update group key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+		AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+							  BSS0,
+							  pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+							  pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+							  pSharedKey->Key,
+							  pSharedKey->TxMic,
+							  pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+		// Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+		RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+								  BSS0,
+								  pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+								  pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+								  NULL);
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
+		Its format is below,
+
+		+--------------------+
+		| Protocol Version	 |  1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Protocol Type		 |	1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Body Length		 |  2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Descriptor Type	 |	1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Information    |	2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Length	     |  1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Repaly Counter |	8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Nonce		     |  32 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key IV			 |  16 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key RSC			 |  8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key ID or Reserved |	8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key MIC			 |	16 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Data Length	 |	2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Data			 |	n octets
+		+--------------------+
+
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			Pointer	to our adapter
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	ConstructEapolMsg(
+	IN	PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
+    IN	UCHAR				GroupKeyWepStatus,
+    IN	UCHAR				MsgType,
+    IN	UCHAR				DefaultKeyIdx,
+	IN	UCHAR				*KeyNonce,
+	IN	UCHAR				*TxRSC,
+	IN	UCHAR				*GTK,
+	IN	UCHAR				*RSNIE,
+	IN	UCHAR				RSNIE_Len,
+    OUT PEAPOL_PACKET       pMsg)
 {
-	UCHAR       A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
-	UCHAR       xor;
-	INT         i, j;
-	aes_context aesctx;
-	UCHAR       *R;
-	INT         num_blocks = c_len/8;	// unit:64bits
+	BOOLEAN	bWPA2 = FALSE;
+	UCHAR	KeyDescVer;
+
+	// Choose WPA2 or not
+	if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+		(pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+		bWPA2 = TRUE;
+
+    // Init Packet and Fill header
+    pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
+    pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
+
+	// Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
+	SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG);
+
+	// Fill in EAPoL descriptor
+	if (bWPA2)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
+	else
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
+
+	// Key Descriptor Version (bits 0-2) specifies the key descriptor version type
+	{
+		// Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
+		// When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
+		KeyDescVer = (((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) ||
+					(GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
+	}
+
+	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer = KeyDescVer;
+
+	// Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
+	if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
+				else
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
+
+	// Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
+	if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
+
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
+
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
+
+	if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
+
+	if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) ||
+		(!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+					{
+	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
+					}
+
+	if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) ||
+		(MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+				{
+        pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
+				}
+
+	// key Information element has done.
+	*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
+
+	// Fill in Key Length
+		{
+		if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+			{
+			// the length of group key cipher
+			pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+			// the length of pairwise key cipher
+			pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Fill in replay counter
+    NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+	// Fill Key Nonce field
+	// ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
+	// SNonce : pairwise_msg2
+	// GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
+	if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
+	NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+	// Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
+	if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+					{
+		// Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+        pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
+				}
+
+    // Fill Key RSC field
+    // It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+				{
+        NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
+				}
+
+	// Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
+    NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+	ConstructEapolKeyData(pEntry,
+						  GroupKeyWepStatus,
+						  KeyDescVer,
+						  MsgType,
+						  DefaultKeyIdx,
+						  GTK,
+						  RSNIE,
+						  RSNIE_Len,
+						  pMsg);
+
+	// Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
+	if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+			{
+		CalculateMIC(KeyDescVer, pEntry->PTK, pMsg);
+		}
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("	     Body length = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len)));
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("	     Key length  = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength)));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			Pointer	to our adapter
+		Elem		Message body
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	ConstructEapolKeyData(
+	IN	PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
+	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyWepStatus,
+	IN	UCHAR			keyDescVer,
+	IN	UCHAR			MsgType,
+	IN	UCHAR			DefaultKeyIdx,
+	IN	UCHAR			*GTK,
+	IN	UCHAR			*RSNIE,
+	IN	UCHAR			RSNIE_LEN,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg)
+{
+	UCHAR		*mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
+	UCHAR       ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
+	ULONG		data_offset;
+	BOOLEAN		bWPA2Capable = FALSE;
+	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd = pEntry->pAd;
+	BOOLEAN		GTK_Included = FALSE;
+
+	// Choose WPA2 or not
+	if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+		(pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+		bWPA2Capable = TRUE;
+
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 ||
+		MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 ||
+		MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+		return;
+
+	// allocate memory pool
+	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
+
+    if (mpool == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
+	Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
+	/* Key_Data Len = 512 */
+	Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
+
+	NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
+	SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, 0);
+	data_offset = 0;
+
+	// Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
+	if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
+	{
+		PUINT8	pmkid_ptr = NULL;
+		UINT8	pmkid_len = 0;
+
+
+		RTMPInsertRSNIE(&Key_Data[data_offset],
+						&data_offset,
+						RSNIE,
+						RSNIE_LEN,
+						pmkid_ptr,
+						pmkid_len);
+	}
+
+
+	// Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
+	if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+        {
+		// Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004  Figure-43w and Table-20h
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
 
+		if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+		{
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+		}
+
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
+
+		// GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004  Figure-43x
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00;	// Reserved Byte
+
+		data_offset += 8;
+	}
+
+
+	// Encapsulate GTK
+	// Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+		// Fill in GTK
+		if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+		{
+			NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
+			data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
+			data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
+		}
+
+		GTK_Included = TRUE;
+	}
+
+
+	// This whole key-data field shall be encrypted if a GTK is included.
+	// Encrypt the data material in key data field with KEK
+	if (GTK_Included)
+	{
+		//hex_dump("GTK_Included", Key_Data, data_offset);
+
+		if (
+			(keyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES))
+		{
+			UCHAR	remainder = 0;
+			UCHAR	pad_len = 0;
+
+			// Key Descriptor Version 2 or 3: AES key wrap, defined in IETF RFC 3394,
+			// shall be used to encrypt the Key Data field using the KEK field from
+			// the derived PTK.
+
+			// If the Key Data field uses the NIST AES key wrap, then the Key Data field
+			// shall be padded before encrypting if the key data length is less than 16
+			// octets or if it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending
+			// a single octet 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets.
+			if ((remainder = data_offset & 0x07) != 0)
+			{
+				INT		i;
+
+				pad_len = (8 - remainder);
+				Key_Data[data_offset] = 0xDD;
+				for (i = 1; i < pad_len; i++)
+					Key_Data[data_offset + i] = 0;
+
+				data_offset += pad_len;
+        }
+
+			AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&pEntry->PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
+            // AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
+            data_offset += 8;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+			/*	Key Descriptor Version 1: ARC4 is used to encrypt the Key Data field
+				using the KEK field from the derived PTK. */
+
+			// PREPARE Encrypted  "Key DATA" field.  (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
+			// put TxTsc in Key RSC field
+			pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32;   //Init crc32.
+
+			// ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
+			NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+			NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &pEntry->PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
+			ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey));  //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
+			pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
+			WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
+		}
+
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
+        }
+	else
+	{
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
+	}
+
+	// Update key data length field and total body length
+	SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, data_offset);
+	INC_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, data_offset);
+
+	os_free_mem(NULL, mpool);
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+	PeerWepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID	CalculateMIC(
+	IN	UCHAR			KeyDescVer,
+	IN	UCHAR			*PTK,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg)
+{
+    UCHAR   *OutBuffer;
+	ULONG	FrameLen = 0;
+	UCHAR	mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
+	UCHAR	digest[80];
 
-	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
+	// allocate memory for MIC calculation
+	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
 
-	if (R == NULL)
+    if (OutBuffer == NULL)
     {
-        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
-        return;
-    } /* End of if */
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
+		return;
+    }
+
+	// make a frame for calculating MIC.
+    MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer,		&FrameLen,
+                      CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len) + 4,	pMsg,
+                      END_OF_ARGS);
 
-	// Initialize
-	NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
-	//Input plaintext
-	for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
+	NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
+
+	// Calculate MIC
+    if (KeyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES)
+	{
+		HMAC_SHA1(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer,  FrameLen, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+	}
+	else
 	{
-		R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
+		HMAC_MD5(PTK,  LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 
-	rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+	// store the calculated MIC
+	NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
 
-	for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
+	os_free_mem(NULL, OutBuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+	PeerWepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+
+	Return Value:
+		NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS		-	decryption successful
+		NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE		-	decryption failure
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+NDIS_STATUS	RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
+    IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN	RX_BLK							*pRxBlk,
+	IN  NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS	GroupCipher,
+	IN  PCIPHER_KEY						pShard_key)
+{
+	PRXWI_STRUC			pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
+
+
+
+	// handle WEP decryption
+	if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
 	{
-		for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
 		{
-			xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
-			NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
-			BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
-			NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
-			rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
-			NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
-			NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
+
+			//Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
 		}
+		else
+			{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+	// handle TKIP decryption
+	else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+	{
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
+		{
+
+			//Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+			}
 	}
+	// handle AES decryption
+	else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+	{
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
+		{
 
-	// OUTPUT
-	for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
+			//8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+	else
 	{
-		plaintext[i] = R[i];
+		// give up this frame
+		return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
 	}
 
+	return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+
+PUINT8	GetSuiteFromRSNIE(
+		IN	PUINT8	rsnie,
+		IN	UINT	rsnie_len,
+		IN	UINT8	type,
+		OUT	UINT8	*count)
+{
+	PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+	INT			len;
+	PUINT8		pBuf;
+	INT			offset = 0;
+	PRSNIE_AUTH	pAkm;
+	UINT16		acount;
+	BOOLEAN		isWPA2 = FALSE;
+
+	pEid = (PEID_STRUCT)rsnie;
+	len = rsnie_len - 2;	// exclude IE and length
+	pBuf = (PUINT8)&pEid->Octet[0];
+
+
+
+	// set default value
+	*count = 0;
+
+	// Check length
+	if ((len <= 0) || (pEid->Len != len))
+	{
+		DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is invalid\n", __func__));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	// Check WPA or WPA2
+	if (pEid->Eid == IE_WPA)
+	{
+		PRSNIE	pRsnie = (PRSNIE)pBuf;
+		UINT16 ucount;
+
+		if (len < sizeof(RSNIE))
+	{
+			DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA\n", __func__));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		// Get the count of pairwise cipher
+		ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+		if (ucount > 2)
+		{
+			DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n",
+											__func__, ucount));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		// Get the group cipher
+		if (type == GROUP_SUITE)
+		{
+			*count = 1;
+			return pRsnie->mcast;
+		}
+		// Get the pairwise cipher suite
+		else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE)
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+										__func__, ucount));
+			*count = ucount;
+			return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
+	}
+
+		offset = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
+
+	}
+	else if (pEid->Eid == IE_RSN)
+	{
+		PRSNIE2	pRsnie = (PRSNIE2)pBuf;
+		UINT16 ucount;
+
+		isWPA2 = TRUE;
+
+		if (len < sizeof(RSNIE2))
+		{
+			DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA2\n", __func__));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		// Get the count of pairwise cipher
+		ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+		if (ucount > 2)
+		{
+			DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n",
+											__func__, ucount));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		// Get the group cipher
+		if (type == GROUP_SUITE)
+		{
+			*count = 1;
+			return pRsnie->mcast;
+		}
+		// Get the pairwise cipher suite
+		else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE)
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+										__func__, ucount));
+			*count = ucount;
+			return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
+		}
+
+		offset = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
+
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : Unknown IE (%d)\n", __func__, pEid->Eid));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	// skip group cipher and pairwise cipher suite
+	pBuf += offset;
+	len -= offset;
+
+	if (len < sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH))
+	{
+		DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length of RSNIE is too short\n", __func__));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	// pointer to AKM count
+	pAkm = (PRSNIE_AUTH)pBuf;
+
+	// Get the count of pairwise cipher
+	acount = cpu2le16(pAkm->acount);
+	if (acount > 2)
+    {
+		DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of AKM is invlaid\n",
+										__func__, acount));
+		return NULL;
+    }
+
+	// Get the AKM suite
+	if (type == AKM_SUITE)
+    {
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of AKM is %d\n",
+									__func__, acount));
+		*count = acount;
+		return pAkm->auth[0].oui;
+    }
+	offset = sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (acount - 1));
+
+	pBuf += offset;
+	len -= offset;
+
+	// The remaining length must larger than (RSN-Capability(2) + PMKID-Count(2) + PMKID(16~))
+	if (len >= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2 + LEN_PMKID))
+    {
+		// Skip RSN capability and PMKID-Count
+		pBuf += (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+		len -= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+
+		// Get PMKID
+		if (type == PMKID_LIST)
+            {
+			*count = 1;
+			return pBuf;
+            }
+    }
+	else
+	{
+		DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : it can't get any more information beyond AKM \n", __func__));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	*count = 0;
+	//DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The type(%d) doesn't support \n", __func__, type));
+	return NULL;
+
+}
+
+VOID WpaShowAllsuite(
+	IN	PUINT8	rsnie,
+	IN	UINT	rsnie_len)
+{
+	PUINT8 pSuite = NULL;
+	UINT8 count;
+
+	hex_dump("RSNIE", rsnie, rsnie_len);
+
+	// group cipher
+	if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, GROUP_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+	{
+		hex_dump("group cipher", pSuite, 4*count);
+	}
+
+	// pairwise cipher
+	if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PAIRWISE_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+	{
+		hex_dump("pairwise cipher", pSuite, 4*count);
+	}
+
+	// AKM
+	if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, AKM_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+	{
+		hex_dump("AKM suite", pSuite, 4*count);
+	}
+
+	// PMKID
+	if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PMKID_LIST, &count)) != NULL)
+	{
+		hex_dump("PMKID", pSuite, LEN_PMKID);
+	}
+
+}
+
+VOID RTMPInsertRSNIE(
+	IN PUCHAR pFrameBuf,
+	OUT PULONG pFrameLen,
+	IN PUINT8 rsnie_ptr,
+	IN UINT8  rsnie_len,
+	IN PUINT8 pmkid_ptr,
+	IN UINT8  pmkid_len)
+{
+	PUCHAR	pTmpBuf;
+	ULONG	TempLen = 0;
+	UINT8	extra_len = 0;
+	UINT16	pmk_count = 0;
+	UCHAR	ie_num;
+	UINT8	total_len = 0;
+    UCHAR	WPA2_OUI[3]={0x00,0x0F,0xAC};
+
+	pTmpBuf = pFrameBuf;
+
+	/* PMKID-List Must larger than 0 and the multiple of 16. */
+	if (pmkid_len > 0 && ((pmkid_len & 0x0f) == 0))
+	{
+		extra_len = sizeof(UINT16) + pmkid_len;
+
+		pmk_count = (pmkid_len >> 4);
+		pmk_count = cpu2le16(pmk_count);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_WARN, ("%s : The length is PMKID-List is invalid (%d), so don't insert it.\n",
+									__func__, pmkid_len));
+	}
+
+	if (rsnie_len != 0)
+    {
+		ie_num = IE_WPA;
+		total_len = rsnie_len;
+
+		if (NdisEqualMemory(rsnie_ptr + 2, WPA2_OUI, sizeof(WPA2_OUI)))
+	{
+			ie_num = IE_RSN;
+			total_len += extra_len;
+	}
+
+		/* construct RSNIE body */
+		MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf,			&TempLen,
+						  1,				&ie_num,
+						  1,				&total_len,
+						  rsnie_len,		rsnie_ptr,
+						  END_OF_ARGS);
+
+		pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+		*pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
+
+		if (ie_num == IE_RSN)
+	{
+			/* Insert PMKID-List field */
+			if (extra_len > 0)
+		{
+				MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf,					&TempLen,
+								  2,						&pmk_count,
+								  pmkid_len,				pmkid_ptr,
+								  END_OF_ARGS);
+
+				pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+				*pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
+		}
+	}
+	}
 
-	os_free_mem(NULL, R);
+	return;
 }