aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/proc
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>2006-06-27 02:53:50 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-06-27 17:32:38 -0700
commite6e5494cb23d1933735ee47cc674ffe1c4afed6f (patch)
treec8945bb3ae5bec38693d801fb589d22d48d6f8eb /fs/proc
parentd5fb34261dcd32c9cb3b28121fdc46308db513a1 (diff)
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/task_mmu.c30
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 0137ec4c136..0a163a4f776 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ struct mem_size_stats
unsigned long private_dirty;
};
+__attribute__((weak)) const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats *mss)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
@@ -158,22 +163,23 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
seq_path(m, file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, "\n");
} else {
- if (mm) {
- if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
+ const char *name = arch_vma_name(vma);
+ if (!name) {
+ if (mm) {
+ if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) {
- pad_len_spaces(m, len);
- seq_puts(m, "[heap]");
- } else {
- if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
- vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
-
- pad_len_spaces(m, len);
- seq_puts(m, "[stack]");
+ name = "[heap]";
+ } else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
+ vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
+ name = "[stack]";
}
+ } else {
+ name = "[vdso]";
}
- } else {
+ }
+ if (name) {
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
- seq_puts(m, "[vdso]");
+ seq_puts(m, name);
}
}
seq_putc(m, '\n');