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authorSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>2008-12-03 13:17:33 -0600
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-12-08 09:16:27 +1100
commit7657d90497f98426af17f0ac633a9b335bb7a8fb (patch)
tree6344dc4715a85383f6492a4102ae406c6b86d79d /kernel
parentc37bbb0fdcc01610fd55604eb6927210a1d20044 (diff)
user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
While ideally CLONE_NEWUSER will eventually require no privilege, the required permission checks are currently not there. As a result, CLONE_NEWUSER has the same effect as a setuid(0)+setgroups(1,"0"). While we already require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, requiring CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID seems appropriate. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 1dd89451fae..e3a85b33107 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1344,7 +1344,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
/* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is
* complete
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+ !capable(CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
}