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authorJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>2006-12-04 20:22:39 -0500
committerTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>2006-12-06 10:46:46 -0500
commit39a21dd1b0eec3f5eac84ee42bda5ab4915098ae (patch)
tree9dff827542f01a22fbb5742c367c5483e927a378 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss
parentca54f896454852f0bc8d50e6e4c55d9defedbd0a (diff)
rpcgss: krb5: clean up some goto's, etc.
Remove some unnecessary goto labels; clean up some return values; etc. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss')
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c10
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c45
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c68
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
index c187f7f1520..f3f42a4465c 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
if (ctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && ctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: ctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
ctx->sealalg);
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, 22);
@@ -109,11 +109,11 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16,
md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH,
KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH);
@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
if ((krb5_make_seq_num(ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
return ((ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE);
-out_err:
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
index 62807ac1e2c..75a75a6d133 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -85,69 +85,56 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
s32 seqnum;
unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data;
int bodysize;
- u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
dprintk("RPC: krb5_read_token\n");
if (g_verify_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
read_token->len))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
(*ptr++ != ( KG_TOK_MIC_MSG &0xff)) )
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
- /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
-
signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
/* Sanity checks */
if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (sealalg != 0xffff)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- ret = make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- ret = krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
- md5cksum.data, 16);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, 16))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
now = get_seconds();
- ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
if (now > ctx->endtime)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
/* do sequencing checks */
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
- &seqnum)))
- goto out;
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, &seqnum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out:
- return ret;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
index 6d508d77adf..63b06ee2d54 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
kctx->sealalg);
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
@@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
buf->pages = pages;
if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, buf,
offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
buf->pages = tmp_pages;
if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16,
md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH,
KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH);
@@ -196,15 +196,13 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
* and encrypt at the same time: */
if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize,
pages))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE);
-out_err:
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
u32
@@ -220,7 +218,6 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
s32 seqnum;
unsigned char *ptr;
int bodysize;
- u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
void *data_start, *orig_start;
int data_len;
int blocksize;
@@ -230,11 +227,11 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
buf->len - offset))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
(*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) )
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
@@ -246,18 +243,18 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
/* Sanity checks */
if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (sealalg == 0xffff)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
but few enough that we can try them all. */
@@ -266,45 +263,39 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
(kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- ret = make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf,
- ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf,
+ ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
- md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
+ md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
now = get_seconds();
- ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
if (now > kctx->endtime)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
/* do sequencing checks */
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
- &seqnum)))
- goto out;
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
+ &seqnum))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
* better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
@@ -317,11 +308,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start);
- ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out:
- return ret;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}