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authorBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>2009-06-12 16:53:38 +1000
committerBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>2009-06-12 16:53:38 +1000
commitbc47ab0241c7c86da4f5e5f82fbca7d45387c18d (patch)
treeb9c33ae8b6de43e44cc5fcbaa3e4a15f18a5ed42 /security/commoncap.c
parent37f9ef553bed630957e025504cdcbc76f5de49d5 (diff)
parent8ebf975608aaebd7feb33d77f07ba21a6380e086 (diff)
Merge commit 'origin/master' into next
Manual merge of: arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c32
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index beac0258c2a..48b7e0228fa 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,28 @@
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
+/*
+ * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
+ * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
+ * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
+ * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
+ * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
+ * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
+ * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
+ *
+ * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
+ */
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+{
+ static int warned;
+ if (!warned) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
+ " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
+ " capabilities.\n", fname);
+ warned = 1;
+ }
+}
+
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
@@ -464,6 +486,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+ /*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
@@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
+skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit