[SCSI] Merge branch 'linus'

Conflicts:
	drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c

fixed up conflict between req->data_len accessors and mptsas driver updates.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

7 files changed, 100 insertions, 88 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 1e082bb987b..ff513ff737f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -22,18 +22,9 @@ static int ima_audit;
 static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
-	int rc, result = 0;
-	char *op = "ima_audit";
-	char *cause;
 
-	rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
-	if (rc || audit > 1)
-		result = 1;
-	else
-		ima_audit = audit;
-	cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled";
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
-			    op, cause, result, 0);
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+		ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
@@ -50,23 +41,14 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
 	audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
-			 current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+			 current->pid, current_cred()->uid,
 			 audit_get_loginuid(current),
 			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
-	switch (audit_msgno) {
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
-		break;
-	default:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
-	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
+	audit_log_string(ab, op);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
+	audit_log_string(ab, cause);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
 	if (fname) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 50d572b74ca..63003a63aae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 {
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		return;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 /*
  * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
  */
-int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 {
 	struct hash_desc desc;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ffbe259700b..6bfc7eaebfd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  *	implemenents security file system for reporting
  *	current measurement list and IMA statistics
  */
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
@@ -84,8 +85,8 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	 * against concurrent list-extension
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	qe = list_entry(rcu_dereference(qe->later.next),
-			struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next,
+			    struct ima_queue_entry, later);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	(*pos)++;
 
@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
  */
 int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
 {
+	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
+	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
+		return -EACCES;
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
 		return 0;
 	return -EBUSY;
@@ -315,7 +319,7 @@ static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.release = ima_release_policy
 };
 
-int ima_fs_init(void)
+int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
 	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
@@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ int ima_fs_init(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
-					    S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR,
+					    S_IWUSR,
 					    ima_dir, NULL,
 					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index ec79f1ee992..b8dd693f879 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
 }
 
-void ima_iintcache_init(void)
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
 {
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 0b0bb8c978c..a40da7ae590 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int ima_used_chip;
  * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
  * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
  */
-static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ err_out:
 			    audit_cause, result, 0);
 }
 
-int ima_init(void)
+int __init ima_init(void)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f4e7266f5ae..6f611874d10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -29,20 +29,8 @@ int ima_initialized;
 char *ima_hash = "sha1";
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
-	const char *op = "hash_setup";
-	const char *hash = "sha1";
-	int result = 0;
-	int audit_info = 0;
-
-	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
-		hash = "md5";
-		ima_hash = str;
-	} else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) {
-		hash = "invalid_hash_type";
-		result = 1;
-	}
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash,
-			    result, audit_info);
+	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+		ima_hash = "md5";
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
@@ -128,10 +116,6 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
-		pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename);
-		return rc;
-	}
 	iint->opencount++;
 	iint->readcount++;
 
@@ -141,6 +125,15 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static void ima_update_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, int mask)
+{
+	iint->opencount++;
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+		iint->writecount++;
+	else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
+		iint->readcount++;
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
@@ -156,10 +149,10 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
  * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
  */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask, int update_counts)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -173,11 +166,8 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
 		return 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	iint->opencount++;
-	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
-		iint->writecount++;
-	else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
-		iint->readcount++;
+	if (update_counts)
+		ima_update_counts(iint, mask);
 
 	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
 	if (rc < 0)
@@ -196,7 +186,19 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
 		struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
 		struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
 
-		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred);
+		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
+				   current_cred());
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			int audit_info = 0;
+
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+					    dentry->d_name.name,
+					    "add_measurement",
+					    "dentry_open failed",
+					    1, audit_info);
+			file = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
 	}
 out:
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ out:
 	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
 	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
@@ -234,7 +237,16 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
+/*
+ * ima_opens_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
+ * - for nfsd exported files.
+ *
+ * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
+ * imbalance messages.
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -246,8 +258,14 @@ static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	iint->opencount++;
+	if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		iint->readcount++;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		iint->writecount++;
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
 
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
@@ -272,18 +290,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
- *
- * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
-{
-	opencount_get(file);
-	return;
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b5291ad5ef5..e1278399b34 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -45,24 +45,30 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 };
 
-/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+/*
+ * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
  */
+
+/*
+ * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage.  Measures all files
+ * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root.  Dangerous because
+ * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
+ * and running executables.
+ */
 static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
-	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
-	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
-	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
@@ -71,6 +77,14 @@ static struct list_head *ima_measure;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
 
+static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ima_use_tcb = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		int rc;
+		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid, sid;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -109,7 +123,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 			break;
@@ -119,7 +133,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							AUDIT_EQUAL,
+							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 		default:
@@ -164,11 +178,17 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
  * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
  * the new measure_policy_rules.
  */
-void ima_init_policy(void)
+void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, entries;
+
+	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+	if (ima_use_tcb)
+		entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
+	else
+		entries = 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
 	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
 }
@@ -227,7 +247,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
-					   AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+					   Audit_equal, args,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	return result;
 }