diff options
author | Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | 2008-11-20 09:03:38 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | 2008-11-20 09:03:38 +0100 |
commit | 90accd6fabf9b2fa2705945a4c601877a75d43bf (patch) | |
tree | d393cb54f0228b1313139e4e14adf4f5cf236b59 /security | |
parent | b43d196c4d3fe46d6dda7c987c47792612b80b1b (diff) | |
parent | ee2f6cc7f9ea2542ad46070ed62ba7aa04d08871 (diff) |
Merge branch 'linus' into x86/memory-corruption-check
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 |
6 files changed, 23 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 399bfdb9e2d..3976613db82 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -279,10 +279,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct vfs_cap_data vcaps; struct inode *inode; - if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) { - bprm_clear_caps(bprm); + bprm_clear_caps(bprm); + + if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) return 0; - } dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); inode = dentry->d_inode; diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index b39f5c2e2c4..239098f0fd7 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); +extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk); extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 5be6d018759..45b240af6db 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { /* * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID */ -static int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) +int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct user_struct *user = tsk->user; struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index ba32ca6469b..abea08f87fe 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op); + ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_alloc; + /* allocate a new session keyring */ sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 255b08559b2..c0acfa7177e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -198,14 +198,23 @@ int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages) { + WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL); return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); } int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { + WARN_ON(mm == NULL); return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); } +int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages) +{ + /* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL, + for this specific case that is fine */ + return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); +} + int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(bprm); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3e3fde7c1d2..f85597a4d73 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2126,14 +2126,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files) tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { file_list_lock(); - file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); - if (file) { + if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { + struct inode *inode; + /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list); + inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { drop_tty = 1; |