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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig18
-rw-r--r--security/security.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c33
4 files changed, 21 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 25ffe1b9dc9..5dfc206748c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -104,6 +104,24 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+ int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ default 0
+ help
+ This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+ from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+ can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+ For most users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is
+ reasonable and should cause no problems. Programs which use vm86
+ functionality would either need additional permissions from either
+ the LSM or the capabilities module or have this protection disabled.
+
+ This value can be changed after boot using the
+ /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
+
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b6c57a6b2ff..d15e56cbaad 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
struct security_operations *security_ops; /* Initialized to NULL */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr; /* 0 means no protection */
+
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 23137c17f91..837ce420d2f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
-int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values);
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fced6bccee7..f3741860121 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2246,39 +2246,6 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
}
/**
- * security_get_policycaps - Query the loaded policy for its capabilities
- * @len: the number of capability bits
- * @values: the capability bit array
- *
- * Description:
- * Get an array of the policy capabilities in @values where each entry in
- * @values is either true (1) or false (0) depending the policy's support of
- * that feature. The policy capabilities are defined by the
- * POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_* enums. The size of the array is stored in @len and it
- * is up to the caller to free the array in @values. Returns zero on success,
- * negative values on failure.
- *
- */
-int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values)
-{
- int rc = -ENOMEM;
- unsigned int iter;
-
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
-
- *values = kcalloc(POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (*values == NULL)
- goto out;
- for (iter = 0; iter < POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++)
- (*values)[iter] = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, iter);
- *len = POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX;
-
-out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
* security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
* @req_cap: capability
*