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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig.debug1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c7
6 files changed, 32 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f65c2744d57..e73ddc382a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1276,13 +1276,17 @@ config SECCOMP
If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL
+ bool
+
config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
- depends on X86_64 && EXPERIMENTAL && BROKEN
+ depends on X86_64
+ select CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL
help
- This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
- feature puts, at the beginning of critical functions, a canary
- value on the stack just before the return address, and validates
+ This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
+ feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+ the stack just before the return address, and validates
the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
@@ -1290,15 +1294,8 @@ config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically
- detected and for those versions, this configuration option is ignored.
-
-config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL
- bool "Use stack-protector for all functions"
- depends on CC_STACKPROTECTOR
- help
- Normally, GCC only inserts the canary value protection for
- functions that use large-ish on-stack buffers. By enabling
- this option, GCC will be asked to do this for ALL functions.
+ detected and for those versions, this configuration option is
+ ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup)
source kernel/Kconfig.hz
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 2a3dfbd5e67..95fe606cb9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ config DIRECT_GBPAGES
config DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
bool "Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature"
depends on DEBUG_RODATA
+ default y
help
This option enables a testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA
feature as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index f5631da585b..58ea55ce242 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ else
stackp := $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh
stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) := $(shell $(stackp) \
- "$(CC)" -fstack-protector )
+ "$(CC)" "-fstack-protector -DGCC_HAS_SP" )
stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL) += $(shell $(stackp) \
"$(CC)" -fstack-protector-all )
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 0d41f0343dc..50632e16d01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
CFLAGS_vsyscall_64.o := $(PROFILING) -g0 $(nostackp)
CFLAGS_hpet.o := $(nostackp)
CFLAGS_tsc.o := $(nostackp)
+CFLAGS_paravirt.o := $(nostackp)
obj-y := process_$(BITS).o signal_$(BITS).o entry_$(BITS).o
obj-y += traps.o irq_$(BITS).o dumpstack_$(BITS).o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index cd8c0ed02b7..749d5f888d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <linux/stackprotector.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -102,6 +103,17 @@ static inline void play_dead(void)
void cpu_idle(void)
{
current_thread_info()->status |= TS_POLLING;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack
+ * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have
+ * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating
+ * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the
+ * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever
+ * trigger):
+ */
+ boot_init_stack_canary();
+
/* endless idle loop with no priority at all */
while (1) {
tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(1);
@@ -640,7 +652,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) +
THREAD_SIZE - PDA_STACKOFFSET);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
- write_pda(stack_canary, next_p->stack_canary);
/*
* Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at
* offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 3f2b8962cbd..d18ea136d8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
unsigned long address;
int write, si_code;
int fault;
+ unsigned long *stackend;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long flags;
#endif
@@ -850,6 +853,10 @@ no_context:
show_fault_oops(regs, error_code, address);
+ stackend = end_of_stack(tsk);
+ if (*stackend != STACK_END_MAGIC)
+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted\n");
+
tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;