diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/audit.h | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/binfmts.h | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cred.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/key.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 103 |
5 files changed, 48 insertions, 92 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 0b2fcb698a6..e8ce2c4c7ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -508,22 +508,6 @@ static inline int audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) return 0; } -/* - * ieieeeeee, an audit function without a return code! - * - * This function might fail! I decided that it didn't matter. We are too late - * to fail the syscall and the information isn't REQUIRED for any purpose. It's - * just nice to have. We should be able to look at past audit logs to figure - * out this process's current cap set along with the fcaps from the PATH record - * and use that to come up with the final set. Yeah, its ugly, but all the info - * is still in the audit log. So I'm not going to bother mentioning we failed - * if we couldn't allocate memory. - * - * If someone changes their mind they could create the aux record earlier and - * then search here and use that earlier allocation. But I don't wanna. - * - * -Eric - */ static inline int audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 7394b5b349f..6cbfbe29718 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -35,16 +35,20 @@ struct linux_binprm{ struct mm_struct *mm; unsigned long p; /* current top of mem */ unsigned int sh_bang:1, - misc_bang:1; + misc_bang:1, + cred_prepared:1,/* true if creds already prepared (multiple + * preps happen for interpreters) */ + cap_effective:1;/* true if has elevated effective capabilities, + * false if not; except for init which inherits + * its parent's caps anyway */ #ifdef __alpha__ unsigned int taso:1; #endif unsigned int recursion_depth; struct file * file; - int e_uid, e_gid; - kernel_cap_t cap_post_exec_permitted; - bool cap_effective; - void *security; + struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */ + int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */ + unsigned int per_clear; /* bits to clear in current->personality */ int argc, envc; char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */ char * interp; /* Name of the binary really executed. Most @@ -101,7 +105,7 @@ extern int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm * bprm, int executable_stack); extern int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int copy_strings_kernel(int argc,char ** argv,struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *binprm); +extern void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs); extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new); extern void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *); diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index eaf6fa695a0..8edb4d1d542 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ struct thread_group_cred { struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */ struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */ }; - -extern void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred); #endif /* @@ -144,6 +142,7 @@ struct cred { extern void __put_cred(struct cred *); extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long); extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); +extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void); extern int commit_creds(struct cred *); extern void abort_creds(struct cred *); diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 69ecf0934b0..21d32a142c0 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ extern ctl_table key_sysctls[]; * the userspace interface */ extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred); -extern int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk); extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk); extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk); extern void key_init(void); @@ -294,7 +293,6 @@ extern void key_init(void); #define make_key_ref(k, p) NULL #define key_ref_to_ptr(k) NULL #define is_key_possessed(k) 0 -#define exec_keys(t) do { } while(0) #define key_fsuid_changed(t) do { } while(0) #define key_fsgid_changed(t) do { } while(0) #define key_init() do { } while(0) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 68be1125144..56a0eed6567 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe); +extern int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); @@ -110,7 +109,7 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr; struct sched_param; struct request_sock; -/* bprm_apply_creds unsafe reasons */ +/* bprm->unsafe reasons */ #define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE 1 #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE 2 #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP 4 @@ -154,36 +153,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * * Security hooks for program execution operations. * - * @bprm_alloc_security: - * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @bprm->security field. - * The security field is initialized to NULL when the bprm structure is - * allocated. - * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified. - * Return 0 if operation was successful. - * @bprm_free_security: - * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified. - * Deallocate and clear the @bprm->security field. - * @bprm_apply_creds: - * Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed - * by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security) - * and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook. - * Since this function may return an error, in which case the process will - * be killed. However, it can leave the security attributes of the - * process unchanged if an access failure occurs at this point. - * bprm_apply_creds is called under task_lock. @unsafe indicates various - * reasons why it may be unsafe to change security state. - * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. - * @bprm_post_apply_creds: - * Runs after bprm_apply_creds with the task_lock dropped, so that - * functions which cannot be called safely under the task_lock can - * be used. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on - * the process such as closing open file descriptors to which access - * is no longer granted if the attributes were changed. - * Note that a security module might need to save state between - * bprm_apply_creds and bprm_post_apply_creds to store the decision - * on whether the process may proceed. - * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. - * @bprm_set_security: + * @bprm_set_creds: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for @@ -196,15 +166,30 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_check_security: - * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will - * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in - * the preceding set_security call. The primary difference from - * set_security is that the argv list and envp list are reliably - * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times - * during a single execve; and in each pass set_security is called - * first. + * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will + * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the + * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is + * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This + * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each + * pass set_creds is called first. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + * @bprm_committing_creds: + * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being + * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials + * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by + * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. + * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such + * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be + * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately + * before commit_creds(). + * @bprm_committed_creds: + * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a + * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials + * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the + * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state + * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal + * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds(). * @bprm_secureexec: * Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec" * is required. The flag is passed in the auxiliary table @@ -1301,13 +1286,11 @@ struct security_operations { int (*settime) (struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz); int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); - int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); - void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); - int (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe); - void (*bprm_post_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); - int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + void (*bprm_committing_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); + void (*bprm_committed_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm); int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb); void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb); @@ -1569,12 +1552,10 @@ int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz); int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages); int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages); -int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe); -void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb); void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb); @@ -1812,32 +1793,22 @@ static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); } -static inline int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ } - -static inline int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) +static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return cap_bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); + return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); } -static inline void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return; + return 0; } -static inline int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return cap_bprm_set_security(bprm); } -static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return 0; } static inline int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |