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-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c187
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c260
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c41
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c44
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c39
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c363
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c29
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c21
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_seal.c4
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_unseal.c2
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c9
12 files changed, 812 insertions, 189 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
index fe1b874084b..f3431a7e33d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ auth_rpcgss-objs := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \
obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o
rpcsec_gss_krb5-objs := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \
- gss_krb5_seqnum.o
+ gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3) += rpcsec_gss_spkm3.o
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index 2f7b867161d..f44f46f1d8e 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -42,9 +42,8 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/socket.h>
-#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
@@ -846,10 +845,8 @@ gss_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, u32 *p)
/* We compute the checksum for the verifier over the xdr-encoded bytes
* starting with the xid and ending at the end of the credential: */
- iov.iov_base = req->rq_snd_buf.head[0].iov_base;
- if (task->tk_client->cl_xprt->stream)
- /* See clnt.c:call_header() */
- iov.iov_base += 4;
+ iov.iov_base = xprt_skip_transport_header(task->tk_xprt,
+ req->rq_snd_buf.head[0].iov_base);
iov.iov_len = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)iov.iov_base;
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
@@ -857,9 +854,7 @@ gss_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, u32 *p)
*p++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
- maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
- &verf_buf, &mic);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) {
cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
} else if (maj_stat != 0) {
@@ -890,10 +885,8 @@ static u32 *
gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, u32 *p)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_msg.rpc_cred;
- struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
- gc_base);
struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
- u32 seq, qop_state;
+ u32 seq;
struct kvec iov;
struct xdr_buf verf_buf;
struct xdr_netobj mic;
@@ -914,23 +907,14 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, u32 *p)
mic.data = (u8 *)p;
mic.len = len;
- maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic, &qop_state);
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
if (maj_stat)
goto out_bad;
- switch (gss_cred->gc_service) {
- case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
- /* verifier data, flavor, length: */
- task->tk_auth->au_rslack = XDR_QUADLEN(len) + 2;
- break;
- case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
- /* verifier data, flavor, length, length, sequence number: */
- task->tk_auth->au_rslack = XDR_QUADLEN(len) + 4;
- break;
- case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
- goto out_bad;
- }
+ /* We leave it to unwrap to calculate au_rslack. For now we just
+ * calculate the length of the verifier: */
+ task->tk_auth->au_verfsize = XDR_QUADLEN(len) + 2;
gss_put_ctx(ctx);
dprintk("RPC: %4u GSS gss_validate: gss_verify_mic succeeded.\n",
task->tk_pid);
@@ -975,8 +959,7 @@ gss_wrap_req_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
- maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &integ_buf, &mic);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
status = -EIO; /* XXX? */
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
@@ -990,6 +973,113 @@ gss_wrap_req_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
}
+static void
+priv_release_snd_buf(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++)
+ __free_page(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i]);
+ kfree(rqstp->rq_enc_pages);
+}
+
+static int
+alloc_enc_pages(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+ int first, last, i;
+
+ if (snd_buf->page_len == 0) {
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ last = (snd_buf->page_base + snd_buf->page_len - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = last - first + 1 + 1;
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages
+ = kmalloc(rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num * sizeof(struct page *),
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!rqstp->rq_enc_pages)
+ goto out;
+ for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++) {
+ rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] == NULL)
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf = priv_release_snd_buf;
+ return 0;
+out_free:
+ for (i--; i >= 0; i--) {
+ __free_page(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i]);
+ }
+out:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_wrap_req_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+ kxdrproc_t encode, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, u32 *p, void *obj)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 maj_stat;
+ int status;
+ u32 *opaque_len;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ int first;
+ int pad;
+ struct kvec *iov;
+ char *tmp;
+
+ opaque_len = p++;
+ offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+ *p++ = htonl(rqstp->rq_seqno);
+
+ status = encode(rqstp, p, obj);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+
+ status = alloc_enc_pages(rqstp);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+ first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ inpages = snd_buf->pages + first;
+ snd_buf->pages = rqstp->rq_enc_pages;
+ snd_buf->page_base -= first << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ /* Give the tail its own page, in case we need extra space in the
+ * head when wrapping: */
+ if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len) {
+ tmp = page_address(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num - 1]);
+ memcpy(tmp, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base = tmp;
+ }
+ maj_stat = gss_wrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, snd_buf, inpages);
+ /* RPC_SLACK_SPACE should prevent this ever happening: */
+ BUG_ON(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen);
+ status = -EIO;
+ /* We're assuming that when GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED, the encryption was
+ * done anyway, so it's safe to put the request on the wire: */
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
+ else if (maj_stat)
+ return status;
+
+ *opaque_len = htonl(snd_buf->len - offset);
+ /* guess whether we're in the head or the tail: */
+ if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len)
+ iov = snd_buf->tail;
+ else
+ iov = snd_buf->head;
+ p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
+ pad = 3 - ((snd_buf->len - offset - 1) & 3);
+ memset(p, 0, pad);
+ iov->iov_len += pad;
+ snd_buf->len += pad;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
gss_wrap_req(struct rpc_task *task,
kxdrproc_t encode, void *rqstp, u32 *p, void *obj)
@@ -1017,6 +1107,8 @@ gss_wrap_req(struct rpc_task *task,
rqstp, p, obj);
break;
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ status = gss_wrap_req_priv(cred, ctx, encode,
+ rqstp, p, obj);
break;
}
out:
@@ -1054,8 +1146,7 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
if (xdr_buf_read_netobj(rcv_buf, &mic, mic_offset))
return status;
- maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &integ_buf,
- &mic, NULL);
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
@@ -1063,6 +1154,35 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
return 0;
}
+static inline int
+gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+ struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, u32 **p)
+{
+ struct xdr_buf *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 opaque_len;
+ u32 maj_stat;
+ int status = -EIO;
+
+ opaque_len = ntohl(*(*p)++);
+ offset = (u8 *)(*p) - (u8 *)rcv_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+ if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
+ return status;
+ /* remove padding: */
+ rcv_buf->len = offset + opaque_len;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, rcv_buf);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+ cred->cr_flags &= ~RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return status;
+ if (ntohl(*(*p)++) != rqstp->rq_seqno)
+ return status;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int
gss_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task,
kxdrproc_t decode, void *rqstp, u32 *p, void *obj)
@@ -1071,6 +1191,9 @@ gss_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task,
struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
gc_base);
struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+ u32 *savedp = p;
+ struct kvec *head = ((struct rpc_rqst *)rqstp)->rq_rcv_buf.head;
+ int savedlen = head->iov_len;
int status = -EIO;
if (ctx->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
@@ -1084,8 +1207,14 @@ gss_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task,
goto out;
break;
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ status = gss_unwrap_resp_priv(cred, ctx, rqstp, &p);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
break;
}
+ /* take into account extra slack for integrity and privacy cases: */
+ task->tk_auth->au_rslack = task->tk_auth->au_verfsize + (p - savedp)
+ + (savedlen - head->iov_len);
out_decode:
status = decode(rqstp, p, obj);
out:
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index ee6ae74cd1b..3f3d5437f02 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -139,17 +139,91 @@ buf_to_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, char *ptr, int len) {
sg->length = len;
}
+static int
+process_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int len,
+ int (*actor)(struct scatterlist *, void *), void *data)
+{
+ int i, page_len, thislen, page_offset, ret = 0;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+
+ if (offset >= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
+ offset -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
+ } else {
+ thislen = buf->head[0].iov_len - offset;
+ if (thislen > len)
+ thislen = len;
+ buf_to_sg(sg, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, thislen);
+ ret = actor(sg, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ offset = 0;
+ len -= thislen;
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (offset >= buf->page_len) {
+ offset -= buf->page_len;
+ } else {
+ page_len = buf->page_len - offset;
+ if (page_len > len)
+ page_len = len;
+ len -= page_len;
+ page_offset = (offset + buf->page_base) & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
+ i = (offset + buf->page_base) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ thislen = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - page_offset;
+ do {
+ if (thislen > page_len)
+ thislen = page_len;
+ sg->page = buf->pages[i];
+ sg->offset = page_offset;
+ sg->length = thislen;
+ ret = actor(sg, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ page_len -= thislen;
+ i++;
+ page_offset = 0;
+ thislen = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
+ } while (page_len != 0);
+ offset = 0;
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (offset < buf->tail[0].iov_len) {
+ thislen = buf->tail[0].iov_len - offset;
+ if (thislen > len)
+ thislen = len;
+ buf_to_sg(sg, buf->tail[0].iov_base + offset, thislen);
+ ret = actor(sg, data);
+ len -= thislen;
+ }
+ if (len != 0)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm = (struct crypto_tfm *)data;
+
+ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header */
s32
make_checksum(s32 cksumtype, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
- struct xdr_netobj *cksum)
+ int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksum)
{
char *cksumname;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = NULL; /* XXX add to ctx? */
struct scatterlist sg[1];
u32 code = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- int len, thislen, offset;
- int i;
switch (cksumtype) {
case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5:
@@ -169,33 +243,8 @@ make_checksum(s32 cksumtype, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
crypto_digest_init(tfm);
buf_to_sg(sg, header, hdrlen);
crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
- if (body->head[0].iov_len) {
- buf_to_sg(sg, body->head[0].iov_base, body->head[0].iov_len);
- crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
- }
-
- len = body->page_len;
- if (len != 0) {
- offset = body->page_base & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
- i = body->page_base >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
- thislen = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset;
- do {
- if (thislen > len)
- thislen = len;
- sg->page = body->pages[i];
- sg->offset = offset;
- sg->length = thislen;
- crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
- len -= thislen;
- i++;
- offset = 0;
- thislen = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
- } while(len != 0);
- }
- if (body->tail[0].iov_len) {
- buf_to_sg(sg, body->tail[0].iov_base, body->tail[0].iov_len);
- crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
- }
+ process_xdr_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+ checksummer, tfm);
crypto_digest_final(tfm, cksum->data);
code = 0;
out:
@@ -204,3 +253,154 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_checksum);
+
+struct encryptor_desc {
+ u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ int pos;
+ struct xdr_buf *outbuf;
+ struct page **pages;
+ struct scatterlist infrags[4];
+ struct scatterlist outfrags[4];
+ int fragno;
+ int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+encryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct encryptor_desc *desc = data;
+ struct xdr_buf *outbuf = desc->outbuf;
+ struct page *in_page;
+ int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+ int fraglen, ret;
+ int page_pos;
+
+ /* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+ * of page 2, tail. Anything more is a bug. */
+ BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+ desc->infrags[desc->fragno] = *sg;
+ desc->outfrags[desc->fragno] = *sg;
+
+ page_pos = desc->pos - outbuf->head[0].iov_len;
+ if (page_pos >= 0 && page_pos < outbuf->page_len) {
+ /* pages are not in place: */
+ int i = (page_pos + outbuf->page_base) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ in_page = desc->pages[i];
+ } else {
+ in_page = sg->page;
+ }
+ desc->infrags[desc->fragno].page = in_page;
+ desc->fragno++;
+ desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+ desc->pos += sg->length;
+
+ fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */
+ thislen -= fraglen;
+
+ if (thislen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv(desc->tfm, desc->outfrags, desc->infrags,
+ thislen, desc->iv);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (fraglen) {
+ desc->outfrags[0].page = sg->page;
+ desc->outfrags[0].offset = sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen;
+ desc->outfrags[0].length = fraglen;
+ desc->infrags[0] = desc->outfrags[0];
+ desc->infrags[0].page = in_page;
+ desc->fragno = 1;
+ desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+ } else {
+ desc->fragno = 0;
+ desc->fraglen = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset,
+ struct page **pages)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct encryptor_desc desc;
+
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.pos = offset;
+ desc.outbuf = buf;
+ desc.pages = pages;
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+
+ ret = process_xdr_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, encryptor, &desc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_encrypt_xdr_buf);
+
+struct decryptor_desc {
+ u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct scatterlist frags[4];
+ int fragno;
+ int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+decryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+ struct decryptor_desc *desc = data;
+ int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+ int fraglen, ret;
+
+ /* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+ * of page 2, tail. Anything more is a bug. */
+ BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+ desc->frags[desc->fragno] = *sg;
+ desc->fragno++;
+ desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+
+ fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */
+ thislen -= fraglen;
+
+ if (thislen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv(desc->tfm, desc->frags, desc->frags,
+ thislen, desc->iv);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (fraglen) {
+ desc->frags[0].page = sg->page;
+ desc->frags[0].offset = sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen;
+ desc->frags[0].length = fraglen;
+ desc->fragno = 1;
+ desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+ } else {
+ desc->fragno = 0;
+ desc->fraglen = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset)
+{
+ struct decryptor_desc desc;
+
+ /* XXXJBF: */
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+ memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.fragno = 0;
+ desc.fraglen = 0;
+ return process_xdr_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_decrypt_xdr_buf);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
index 606a8a82caf..5f1f806a0b1 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
-#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -191,43 +190,12 @@ gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) {
kfree(kctx);
}
-static u32
-gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
- struct xdr_buf *message,
- struct xdr_netobj *mic_token,
- u32 *qstate) {
- u32 maj_stat = 0;
- int qop_state;
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
-
- maj_stat = krb5_read_token(kctx, mic_token, message, &qop_state,
- KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
- if (!maj_stat && qop_state)
- *qstate = qop_state;
-
- dprintk("RPC: gss_verify_mic_kerberos returning %d\n", maj_stat);
- return maj_stat;
-}
-
-static u32
-gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
- u32 qop,
- struct xdr_buf *message,
- struct xdr_netobj *mic_token) {
- u32 err = 0;
- struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
-
- err = krb5_make_token(kctx, qop, message, mic_token, KG_TOK_MIC_MSG);
-
- dprintk("RPC: gss_get_mic_kerberos returning %d\n",err);
-
- return err;
-}
-
static struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
.gss_import_sec_context = gss_import_sec_context_kerberos,
.gss_get_mic = gss_get_mic_kerberos,
.gss_verify_mic = gss_verify_mic_kerberos,
+ .gss_wrap = gss_wrap_kerberos,
+ .gss_unwrap = gss_unwrap_kerberos,
.gss_delete_sec_context = gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos,
};
@@ -242,6 +210,11 @@ static struct pf_desc gss_kerberos_pfs[] = {
.service = RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY,
.name = "krb5i",
},
+ [2] = {
+ .pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5P,
+ .service = RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY,
+ .name = "krb5p",
+ },
};
static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
index afeeb8715a7..13f8ae97945 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -70,22 +70,13 @@
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
-static inline int
-gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) {
- /* Most of the code is block-size independent but in practice we
- * use only 8: */
- BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
- return 8 - (length & 7);
-}
-
u32
-krb5_make_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
- struct xdr_buf *text, struct xdr_netobj *token,
- int toktype)
+gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+ struct xdr_netobj *token)
{
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
s32 checksum_type;
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = NULL};
- int blocksize = 0, tmsglen;
unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
s32 now;
@@ -93,9 +84,6 @@ krb5_make_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
now = get_seconds();
- if (qop_req != 0)
- goto out_err;
-
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
@@ -111,21 +99,13 @@ krb5_make_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
goto out_err;
}
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
- blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(ctx->enc);
- tmsglen = blocksize + text->len
- + gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, blocksize + text->len);
- } else {
- tmsglen = 0;
- }
-
- token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, 22 + tmsglen);
+ token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, 22);
ptr = token->data;
- g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, 22 + tmsglen, &ptr);
+ g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, 22, &ptr);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((toktype>>8)&0xff);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (toktype&0xff);
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff);
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG&0xff);
/* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
@@ -133,17 +113,9 @@ krb5_make_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
*(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(ctx->signalg);
memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
- *(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(ctx->sealalg);
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
- /* XXX removing support for now */
- goto out_err;
- } else { /* Sign only. */
- if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, text,
- &md5cksum))
+ if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum))
goto out_err;
- }
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
index 8767fc53183..2030475d98e 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -68,21 +68,14 @@
#endif
-/* message_buffer is an input if toktype is MIC and an output if it is WRAP:
- * If toktype is MIC: read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the
- * data that the mic was supposedly taken over.
- * If toktype is WRAP: read_token is a wrap token, and message_buffer is used
- * to return the decrypted data.
- */
+/* read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the data that the mic was
+ * supposedly taken over. */
-/* XXX will need to change prototype and/or just split into a separate function
- * when we add privacy (because read_token will be in pages too). */
u32
-krb5_read_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
- struct xdr_netobj *read_token,
- struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
- int *qop_state, int toktype)
+gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
+ struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
{
+ struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
int signalg;
int sealalg;
s32 checksum_type;
@@ -100,16 +93,12 @@ krb5_read_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
read_token->len))
goto out;
- if ((*ptr++ != ((toktype>>8)&0xff)) || (*ptr++ != (toktype&0xff)))
+ if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
+ (*ptr++ != ( KG_TOK_MIC_MSG &0xff)) )
goto out;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
- /* XXX gone */
- goto out;
- }
-
/* get the sign and seal algorithms */
signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
@@ -120,14 +109,7 @@ krb5_read_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
goto out;
- if (((toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) && (sealalg != 0xffff)) ||
- ((toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) && (sealalg == 0xffff)))
- goto out;
-
- /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
- key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
-
- if ((toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) && !(sealalg == ctx->sealalg))
+ if (sealalg != 0xffff)
goto out;
/* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
@@ -154,7 +136,7 @@ krb5_read_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8,
- message_buffer, &md5cksum);
+ message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -175,9 +157,6 @@ krb5_read_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
- if (qop_state)
- *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
-
now = get_seconds();
ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..af777cf9f25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+#ifdef RPC_DEBUG
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static inline int
+gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length)
+{
+ /* Most of the code is block-size independent but currently we
+ * use only 8: */
+ BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
+ return 8 - (length & 7);
+}
+
+static inline void
+gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize)
+{
+ int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset);
+ char *p;
+ struct kvec *iov;
+
+ if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len)
+ iov = &buf->tail[0];
+ else
+ iov = &buf->head[0];
+ p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
+ iov->iov_len += padding;
+ buf->len += padding;
+ memset(p, padding, padding);
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize)
+{
+ u8 *ptr;
+ u8 pad;
+ int len = buf->len;
+
+ if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
+ pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1);
+ if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ len -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
+ if (len <= buf->page_len) {
+ int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ >>PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+ int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
+ ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last], KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
+ pad = *(ptr + offset);
+ kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ len -= buf->page_len;
+ BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len);
+ pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1);
+out:
+ /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent
+ * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need
+ * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data.
+ * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless.
+ * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server
+ * also uses length and head length together to determine the original
+ * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's
+ * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem.
+ * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and
+ * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the
+ * server to attempt to parse the padding.
+ * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism
+ * wrap/unwrap functions. */
+ if (pad > blocksize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (buf->len > pad)
+ buf->len -= pad;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void
+make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize)
+{
+ static u64 i = 0;
+ u64 *q = (u64 *)p;
+
+ /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really
+ * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in
+ * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support
+ * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt
+ * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets
+ * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring
+ * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
+ * don't care enough. */
+
+ BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
+ *q = i++;
+}
+
+/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
+ * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
+ * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
+/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
+ * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
+
+/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
+
+u32
+gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ s32 checksum_type;
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = NULL};
+ int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
+ unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
+ s32 now;
+ int headlen;
+ struct page **tmp_pages;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n");
+
+ now = get_seconds();
+
+ switch (kctx->signalg) {
+ case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
+ checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
+ break;
+ default:
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->signalg %d not"
+ " supported\n", kctx->signalg);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
+ kctx->sealalg);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(kctx->enc);
+ gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
+ plainlen = blocksize + buf->len - offset;
+
+ headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen) -
+ (buf->len - offset);
+
+ ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ /* shift data to make room for header. */
+ /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
+ /* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */
+ memmove(ptr + headlen, ptr, buf->head[0].iov_len - offset);
+ buf->head[0].iov_len += headlen;
+ buf->len += headlen;
+ BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
+
+ g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen, &ptr);
+
+
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff);
+ *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff);
+
+ /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
+ msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24;
+ /* XXXJBF: */ BUG_ON(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset + headlen != msg_start + blocksize);
+
+ *(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(kctx->signalg);
+ memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
+ *(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(kctx->sealalg);
+
+ make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize);
+
+ /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
+ tmp_pages = buf->pages;
+ buf->pages = pages;
+ if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, buf,
+ offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum))
+ goto out_err;
+ buf->pages = tmp_pages;
+
+ switch (kctx->signalg) {
+ case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
+ if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
+ md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
+ goto out_err;
+ memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16,
+ md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH,
+ KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH);
+
+ dprintk("RPC: make_seal_token: cksum data: \n");
+ print_hexl((u32 *) (krb5_hdr + 16), KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ kfree(md5cksum.data);
+
+ /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
+ * and encrypt at the same time: */
+ if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
+ kctx->seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize,
+ pages))
+ goto out_err;
+
+ kctx->seq_send++;
+
+ return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE);
+out_err:
+ if (md5cksum.data) kfree(md5cksum.data);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+ struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+ int signalg;
+ int sealalg;
+ s32 checksum_type;
+ struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = NULL};
+ s32 now;
+ int direction;
+ s32 seqnum;
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ int bodysize;
+ u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ void *data_start, *orig_start;
+ int data_len;
+ int blocksize;
+
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
+
+ ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
+ buf->len - offset))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
+ (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
+
+ /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
+
+ signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
+ sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+
+ /* Sanity checks */
+
+ if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sealalg == 0xffff)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
+ key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
+
+ if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
+ but few enough that we can try them all. */
+
+ if ((kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
+ (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
+ (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
+ signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
+ ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* compute the checksum of the message */
+
+ /* initialize the the cksum */
+ switch (signalg) {
+ case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
+ checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (signalg) {
+ case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
+ ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf,
+ ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
+ md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
+
+ now = get_seconds();
+
+ ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+ if (now > kctx->endtime)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* do sequencing checks */
+
+ ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+ if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
+ &seqnum)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
+ (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
+ * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
+
+ blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(kctx->enc);
+ data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize;
+ orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+ data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
+ memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
+ buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
+ buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start);
+
+ ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+out:
+ if (md5cksum.data) kfree(md5cksum.data);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
index 9dfb68377d6..b048bf672da 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h>
@@ -251,13 +250,11 @@ gss_import_sec_context(const void *input_token, size_t bufsize,
u32
gss_get_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle,
- u32 qop,
struct xdr_buf *message,
struct xdr_netobj *mic_token)
{
return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
->gss_get_mic(context_handle,
- qop,
message,
mic_token);
}
@@ -267,16 +264,34 @@ gss_get_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle,
u32
gss_verify_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle,
struct xdr_buf *message,
- struct xdr_netobj *mic_token,
- u32 *qstate)
+ struct xdr_netobj *mic_token)
{
return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
->gss_verify_mic(context_handle,
message,
- mic_token,
- qstate);
+ mic_token);
}
+u32
+gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+ int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf,
+ struct page **inpages)
+{
+ return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_wrap(ctx_id, offset, buf, inpages);
+}
+
+u32
+gss_unwrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+ int offset,
+ struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+ return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+ ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, buf);
+}
+
+
/* gss_delete_sec_context: free all resources associated with context_handle.
* Note this differs from the RFC 2744-specified prototype in that we don't
* bother returning an output token, since it would never be used anyway. */
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
index 6c97d61baa9..39b3edc1469 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
@@ -224,18 +224,13 @@ gss_delete_sec_context_spkm3(void *internal_ctx) {
static u32
gss_verify_mic_spkm3(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
struct xdr_buf *signbuf,
- struct xdr_netobj *checksum,
- u32 *qstate) {
+ struct xdr_netobj *checksum)
+{
u32 maj_stat = 0;
- int qop_state = 0;
struct spkm3_ctx *sctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
dprintk("RPC: gss_verify_mic_spkm3 calling spkm3_read_token\n");
- maj_stat = spkm3_read_token(sctx, checksum, signbuf, &qop_state,
- SPKM_MIC_TOK);
-
- if (!maj_stat && qop_state)
- *qstate = qop_state;
+ maj_stat = spkm3_read_token(sctx, checksum, signbuf, SPKM_MIC_TOK);
dprintk("RPC: gss_verify_mic_spkm3 returning %d\n", maj_stat);
return maj_stat;
@@ -243,15 +238,15 @@ gss_verify_mic_spkm3(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
static u32
gss_get_mic_spkm3(struct gss_ctx *ctx,
- u32 qop,
struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
- struct xdr_netobj *message_token) {
+ struct xdr_netobj *message_token)
+{
u32 err = 0;
struct spkm3_ctx *sctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
dprintk("RPC: gss_get_mic_spkm3\n");
- err = spkm3_make_token(sctx, qop, message_buffer,
+ err = spkm3_make_token(sctx, message_buffer,
message_token, SPKM_MIC_TOK);
return err;
}
@@ -264,8 +259,8 @@ static struct gss_api_ops gss_spkm3_ops = {
};
static struct pf_desc gss_spkm3_pfs[] = {
- {RPC_AUTH_GSS_SPKM, 0, RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE, "spkm3"},
- {RPC_AUTH_GSS_SPKMI, 0, RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY, "spkm3i"},
+ {RPC_AUTH_GSS_SPKM, RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE, "spkm3"},
+ {RPC_AUTH_GSS_SPKMI, RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY, "spkm3i"},
};
static struct gss_api_mech gss_spkm3_mech = {
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_seal.c
index 25339868d46..148201e929d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_seal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_seal.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
*/
u32
-spkm3_make_token(struct spkm3_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
+spkm3_make_token(struct spkm3_ctx *ctx,
struct xdr_buf * text, struct xdr_netobj * token,
int toktype)
{
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ spkm3_make_token(struct spkm3_ctx *ctx, int qop_req,
dprintk("RPC: spkm3_make_token\n");
now = jiffies;
- if (qop_req != 0)
- goto out_err;
if (ctx->ctx_id.len != 16) {
dprintk("RPC: spkm3_make_token BAD ctx_id.len %d\n",
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_unseal.c
index 65ce81bf0bc..c3c0d958610 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_unseal.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ u32
spkm3_read_token(struct spkm3_ctx *ctx,
struct xdr_netobj *read_token, /* checksum */
struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, /* signbuf */
- int *qop_state, int toktype)
+ int toktype)
{
s32 code;
struct xdr_netobj wire_cksum = {.len =0, .data = NULL};
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index e3308195374..e4ada15ed85 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -566,8 +566,7 @@ gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
return SVC_OK;
- if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum, NULL)
- != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
return SVC_DENIED;
}
@@ -604,7 +603,7 @@ gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
- maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, 0, &verf_data, &mic);
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return -1;
*p++ = htonl(mic.len);
@@ -710,7 +709,7 @@ unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
goto out;
if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
goto out;
- maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic, NULL);
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto out;
if (ntohl(svc_getu32(&buf->head[0])) != seq)
@@ -1012,7 +1011,7 @@ svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
}
mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
- if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, 0, &integ_buf, &mic))
+ if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
goto out_err;
svc_putu32(resv, htonl(mic.len));
memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,