5 files changed, 28 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index a057e3311aa..b6061fa29da 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -785,6 +785,10 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	key_check(keyring);
 
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		goto error_2;
+
 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 
 	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d65a180f888..bffa924c1f8 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 /*
  * search the given keyring only (no recursion)
  * - keyring must be locked by caller
+ * - caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring
  */
 key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			       const struct key_type *ktype,
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index f6940618e34..217a0bef3c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ error:
  */
 int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
 	struct key *keyring;
 	char buf[20];
 	int ret;
 
+	might_sleep();
+
 	if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
 		sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
 
@@ -183,12 +184,12 @@ int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		}
 
 		/* attach keyring */
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+		spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 		if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
 			tsk->signal->process_keyring = keyring;
 			keyring = NULL;
 		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 
 		key_put(keyring);
 	}
@@ -207,38 +208,37 @@ error:
 static int install_session_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				   struct key *keyring)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
 	struct key *old;
 	char buf[20];
-	int ret;
+
+	might_sleep();
 
 	/* create an empty session keyring */
 	if (!keyring) {
 		sprintf(buf, "_ses.%u", tsk->tgid);
 
 		keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, 1, NULL);
-		if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
-			goto error;
-		}
+		if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+			return PTR_ERR(keyring);
 	}
 	else {
 		atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
 	}
 
 	/* install the keyring */
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
-	old = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring);
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+	old = tsk->signal->session_keyring;
 	rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->signal->session_keyring, keyring);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 
-	ret = 0;
+	/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
+	 * on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
+	if (old) {
+		synchronize_rcu();
+		key_put(old);
+	}
 
-	/* we're using RCU on the pointer */
-	synchronize_rcu();
-	key_put(old);
-error:
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 
 } /* end install_session_keyring() */
 
@@ -311,7 +311,6 @@ void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
  */
 int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
 	struct key *old;
 
 	/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
@@ -323,10 +322,10 @@ int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	key_put(old);
 
 	/* discard the process keyring from a newly exec'd task */
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 	old = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
 	tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 
 	key_put(old);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 640d0bfdbc6..84047f69f9c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 
 	if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
 		if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
-			*scontext += strlen(*scontext);
+			*scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index dfab6c88669..abe99d88137 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		int i;
 
 		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 				return ctx->ctx_sid;
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		 *  Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp.
 		 */
 		for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 
 			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
 				goto accept;