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- Currently after path_lookup succeed we dot't have any guarantie what
it is DIR. This must be explicitly demanded.
- path_lookup can't return negative dentry, So inode check is useless.
Signed-off-by: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Dmitriy Monakhov wrote:
> if path_lookup() return non zero code we don't have to worry about
> 'nd' parameter, but ecryptfs_read_super does path_release(&nd) after
> path_lookup has failed, and dentry counter becomes negative
Do not do a path_release after a path_lookup error.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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eCryptfs is gobbling a lot of stack in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set()
because it allocates a temporary memory-hungry ecryptfs_key_record struct.
This patch introduces a new kmem_cache for that struct and converts
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() to use it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for
now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the
lower file.
[akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an
lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region.
This patch set implements two new mount options:
ecryptfs_xattr_metadata
- When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic
metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather
than the header.
When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB
reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at
least 12KB in size. This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user
creates a lot of small files. By storing the data in the extended
attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space.
As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as
multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store
all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space
constraints. However, the majority of users will only ever associate one
key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the
xattr region.
This option should be used with caution. I want to emphasize that the
xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be
rendered permanently unrecoverable. The last thing I want is for a user to
forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover
that their backups are worthless.
ecryptfs_encrypted_view
- When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a
view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were
stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored
in the header or in the extended attributes.
No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want
to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files. As of
right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr. There is
no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future
versions.
Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to
back up the metadata file along with the files. The semantics of eCryptfs
have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted
data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given
eCryptfs file is the key. That is what has always been emphasized about
eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect. Providing the
encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein
they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files,
regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the
scenes.
This patch:
Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when
xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount
options.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that
contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the
previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request
packets from the userspace daemon.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace eCryptfs specific code & calls with the more generic fsstack
equivalents and remove the eCryptfs specific functions.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Update cipher block encryption code to the new crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Clean up the crypto initialization code; let the crypto API take care of the
key size checks.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Use the special_file() macro to check whether an inode is special instead of
open-coding it.
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux. It is derived from
Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating
stacked filesystems. eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key
management and policy features. eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the
header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between
hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need
to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the
encrypted file itself.
[akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates]
[pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates]
[rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes]
[akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven]
Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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