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* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open
* dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0;
it should get -EMFILE instead.
Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl().
Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF.
Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want.
* switch to new helpers:
user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path)
user_path(pathname, &path)
user_lpath(pathname, &path)
user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory)
The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one.
* remove nameidata in callers.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path.
Get rid of the few that do not.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes
into notify_change(). Checks for immutable and append-only files are
always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see
permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in
notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok().
This should be completely equivalent.
CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS
* MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution
* fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why
chdir() needs that.
* now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be
removed; it has no business being in nameidata.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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long overdue...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having
it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution. LOOKUP_CHDIR
is killed by that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being
immutable, so no need to repeat it.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
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Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is
checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that
it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0.
Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the
case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect
of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing
securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is
configured.)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for
the user mappings.
This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one.
Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here.
This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't
backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts.
There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from
dentry_open() calls.
This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of
bugs. It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or
mnt_writer count imbalances.
I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the
stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it.
[hch: made it conditional on a debug option.
But it's still a little bit too ugly]
[hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because
it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy
anyway. This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly()
directly.
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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chown/chmod,etc... don't call permission in the same way that the normal
"open for write" calls do. They still write to the filesystem, so bump the
write count during these operations.
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This is the first really tricky patch in the series. It elevates the writer
count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write.
We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open()
is used as well to create filps. This will cover even those cases, while a
call in may_open() would not have.
There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei().
See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount,
fail r/w open()' race.
Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create
struct files. Make sure that these users elevate the mnt
writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need
to make sure they're balanced.
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts
over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations. It
needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is
created gets __fput()'d.
This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky
as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that
mount write count was taken. That makes it a bad interface.
All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the
nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei().
So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over
to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open(). It
also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process.
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open()
return filps. This will ensure that we properly release
mount write counts which were taken for the filp in
may_open().
This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags
calculation into fs/namei.c. We'll shortly be moving
the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this
gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get
at them when we need them.
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs. The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.
Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.
More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function. This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else. It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise. A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.
[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct
path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use
because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked
_UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25. This patch is their final
departure from the Linux kernel tree.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from
disk inside drivers. Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but
several drivers still were using this. Since a few years we have a
request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way.
Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some
time.... however with commit c2b1239a9f22f19c53543b460b24507d0e21ea0c the
last user is now gone.
This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a
very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the
process file descriptor table.... which then can be tampered with from
other threads for example. For those who don't want the firmware loader,
filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security
issue.
The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're
really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The early LFS work that Linux uses favours EFBIG in various places. SuSv3
specifically uses EOVERFLOW for this as noted by Michael (Bug 7253)
[EOVERFLOW]
The named file is a regular file and the size of the file cannot be
represented correctly in an object of type off_t. We should therefore
transition to the proper error return code
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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It is possible that another process could acquire a new file lease right
after break_lease() is called during a truncate, but before lease-granting
is disabled by the subsequent get_write_access(). Merely switching the
order of the break_lease() and get_write_access() calls prevents this race.
Signed-off-by: David M. Richter <richterd@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The fallocate syscall returns ENOSYS in case the filesystem does not support
the operation and expects the userlevel code to fill in. This is good in
concept.
The problem is that the libc code for old kernels should be able to
distinguish the case where the syscall is not at all available vs not
functioning for a specific mount point. As is this is not possible and we
always have to invoke the syscall even if the kernel doesn't support it.
I suggest the following patch. Using EOPNOTSUPP is IMO the right thing to do.
Cc: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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fallocate() is a new system call being proposed here which will allow
applications to preallocate space to any file(s) in a file system.
Each file system implementation that wants to use this feature will need
to support an inode operation called ->fallocate().
Applications can use this feature to avoid fragmentation to certain
level and thus get faster access speed. With preallocation, applications
also get a guarantee of space for particular file(s) - even if later the
the system becomes full.
Currently, glibc provides an interface called posix_fallocate() which
can be used for similar cause. Though this has the advantage of working
on all file systems, but it is quite slow (since it writes zeroes to
each block that has to be preallocated). Without a doubt, file systems
can do this more efficiently within the kernel, by implementing
the proposed fallocate() system call. It is expected that
posix_fallocate() will be modified to call this new system call first
and incase the kernel/filesystem does not implement it, it should fall
back to the current implementation of writing zeroes to the new blocks.
ToDos:
1. Implementation on other architectures (other than i386, x86_64,
and ppc). Patches for s390(x) and ia64 are already available from
previous posts, but it was decided that they should be added later
once fallocate is in the mainline. Hence not including those patches
in this take.
2. Changes to glibc,
a) to support fallocate() system call
b) to make posix_fallocate() and posix_fallocate64() call fallocate()
Signed-off-by: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com>
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Part two in the O_CLOEXEC saga: adding support for file descriptors received
through Unix domain sockets.
The patch is once again pretty minimal, it introduces a new flag for recvmsg
and passes it just like the existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flag. I think this bit
is not used otherwise but the networking people will know better.
This new flag is not recognized by recvfrom and recv. These functions cannot
be used for that purpose and the asymmetry this introduces is not worse than
the already existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT situations.
The patch must be applied on the patch which introduced O_CLOEXEC. It has to
remove static from the new get_unused_fd_flags function but since scm.c cannot
live in a module the function still hasn't to be exported.
Here's a test program to make sure the code works. It's so much longer than
the actual patch...
#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
# define O_CLOEXEC 02000000
#endif
#ifndef MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC
# define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000
#endif
int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc > 1)
{
int fd = atol (argv[1]);
printf ("child: fd = %d\n", fd);
if (fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == 0 || errno != EBADF)
{
puts ("file descriptor valid in child");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
struct sockaddr_un sun;
strcpy (sun.sun_path, "./testsocket");
sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
char databuf[] = "hello";
struct iovec iov[1];
iov[0].iov_base = databuf;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof (databuf);
union
{
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char bytes[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (int))];
} buf;
struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = iov, .msg_iovlen = 1,
.msg_control = buf.bytes,
.msg_controllen = sizeof (buf) };
struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN (sizeof (int));
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
pid_t child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
error (1, errno, "fork");
if (child == 0)
{
int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0)
error (1, errno, "socket");
if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0)
error (1, errno, "bind");
if (listen (sock, SOMAXCONN) < 0)
error (1, errno, "listen");
int conn = accept (sock, NULL, NULL);
if (conn == -1)
error (1, errno, "accept");
*(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = sock;
if (sendmsg (conn, &msg, MSG_NOSIGNAL) < 0)
error (1, errno, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}
/* For a test suite this should be more robust like a
barrier in shared memory. */
sleep (1);
int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0)
error (1, errno, "socket");
if (connect (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0)
error (1, errno, "connect");
unlink (sun.sun_path);
*(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = -1;
if (recvmsg (sock, &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) < 0)
error (1, errno, "recvmsg");
int fd = *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg);
if (fd == -1)
error (1, 0, "no descriptor received");
char fdname[20];
snprintf (fdname, sizeof (fdname), "%d", fd);
execl ("/proc/self/exe", argv[0], fdname, NULL);
puts ("execl failed");
return 1;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix fastcall inconsistency noted by Michael Buesch]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The problem is as follows: in multi-threaded code (or more correctly: all
code using clone() with CLONE_FILES) we have a race when exec'ing.
thread #1 thread #2
fd=open()
fork + exec
fcntl(fd,F_SETFD,FD_CLOEXEC)
In some applications this can happen frequently. Take a web browser. One
thread opens a file and another thread starts, say, an external PDF viewer.
The result can even be a security issue if that open file descriptor
refers to a sensitive file and the external program can somehow be tricked
into using that descriptor.
Just adding O_CLOEXEC support to open() doesn't solve the whole set of
problems. There are other ways to create file descriptors (socket,
epoll_create, Unix domain socket transfer, etc). These can and should be
addressed separately though. open() is such an easy case that it makes not
much sense putting the fix off.
The test program:
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
# define O_CLOEXEC 02000000
#endif
int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
if (argc > 1)
{
fd = atol (argv[1]);
printf ("child: fd = %d\n", fd);
if (fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == 0 || errno != EBADF)
{
puts ("file descriptor valid in child");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
fd = open ("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
printf ("in parent: new fd = %d\n", fd);
char buf[20];
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%d", fd);
execl ("/proc/self/exe", argv[0], buf, NULL);
puts ("execl failed");
return 1;
}
[kyle@parisc-linux.org: parisc fix]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@parisc-linux.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
.. to match what we do on write(). This way, people who write to files
by using [f]truncate + writable mmap have the same semantics as if they
were using the write() family of system calls.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.
Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets. The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).
In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.
Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal. This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset. As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
This patch changes struct file to use struct path instead of having
independent pointers to struct dentry and struct vfsmount, and converts all
users of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} in fs/ to use f_path.{dentry,mnt}.
Additionally, it adds two #define's to make the transition easier for users of
the f_dentry and f_vfsmnt.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
Fix the locking of signal->tty.
Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.
(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)
Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).
It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.
(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
invocations)
[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
We're shortly going to be adding a bunch more permission checks in these
functions. That requires adding either a bunch of new if() conditions, or
some gotos. This patch collapses existing if()s and uses gotos instead to
prepare for the upcoming changes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
* fs/open.c is getting bit crowdy
* preparation to lutimes(2)
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
The problem is that close() syscalls can call a file system's flush
handler, which in turn might sleep interruptibly and ultimately pass back
an -ERESTARTSYS return value. This happens for files backed by an
interruptible NFS mount under nfs_file_flush() when a large file has just
been written and nfs_wait_bit_interruptible() detects that there is a
signal pending.
I have a test case where the "strace" command is used to attach to a
process sleeping in such a close(). Since the SIGSTOP is forced onto the
victim process (removing it from the thread's "blocked" mask in
force_sig_info()), the RPC wait is interrupted and the close() is
terminated early.
But the file table entry has already been cleared before the flush handler
was called. Thus, when the syscall is restarted, the file descriptor
appears closed and an EBADF error is returned (which is wrong). What's
worse, there is the hypothetical case where another thread of a
multi-threaded application might have reused the file descriptor, in which
case that file would be mistakenly closed.
The bottom line is that close() syscalls are not restartable, and thus
-ERESTARTSYS return values should be mapped to -EINTR. This is consistent
with the close(2) manual page. The fix is below.
Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
In the "operation does permission checking" model used by fuse, chdir
permission is not checked, since there's no chdir method.
For this case set a lookup flag, which will be passed to ->permission(), so
fuse can distinguish it from permission checks for other operations.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
In the course of trying to track down a bug where a file mtime was not
being updated correctly, it was discovered that the m/ctime updates were
not quite being handled correctly for ftruncate() calls.
Quoth SUSv3:
open(2):
If O_TRUNC is set and the file did previously exist, upon
successful completion, open() shall mark for update the st_ctime
and st_mtime fields of the file.
truncate(2):
Upon successful completion, if the file size is changed, this
function shall mark for update the st_ctime and st_mtime fields
of the file, and the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits of the file mode
may be cleared.
ftruncate(2):
Upon successful completion, if fildes refers to a regular file,
the ftruncate() function shall mark for update the st_ctime and
st_mtime fields of the file and the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits of
the file mode may be cleared. If the ftruncate() function is
unsuccessful, the file is unaffected.
The open(O_TRUNC) and truncate cases were being handled correctly, but the
ftruncate case was being handled like the truncate case. The semantics of
truncate and ftruncate don't quite match, so ftruncate needs to be handled
slightly differently.
The attached patch addresses this issue for ftruncate(2).
My thanx to Stephen Tweedie and Trond Myklebust for their help in
understanding the situation and semantics.
Signed-off-by: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Cc: "Stephen C. Tweedie" <sct@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
Pass the POSIX lock owner ID to the flush operation.
This is useful for filesystems which don't want to store any locking state
in inode->i_flock but want to handle locking/unlocking POSIX locks
internally. FUSE is one such filesystem but I think it possible that some
network filesystems would need this also.
Also add a flag to indicate that a POSIX locking request was generated by
close(), so filesystems using the above feature won't send an extra locking
request in this case.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock
pointer.
This complements the get_sb() patch. That reduced the significance of
sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there. However, NFS does
require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation. This permits
the root in the vfsmount to be used instead.
linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build
successfully.
Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
When an audit event involves changes to a directory entry, include
a PATH record for the directory itself. A few other notable changes:
- fixed audit_inode_child() hooks in fsnotify_move()
- removed unused flags arg from audit_inode()
- added audit log routines for logging a portion of a string
Here's some sample output.
before patch:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1149821605.320:26): arch=40000003 syscall=39 success=yes exit=0 a0=bf8d3c7c a1=1ff a2=804e1b8 a3=bf8d3c7c items=1 ppid=739 pid=800 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c255
type=CWD msg=audit(1149821605.320:26): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1149821605.320:26): item=0 name="foo" parent=164068 inode=164010 dev=03:00 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_t:s0
after patch:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): arch=40000003 syscall=39 success=yes exit=0 a0=bfdd9c7c a1=1ff a2=804e1b8 a3=bfdd9c7c items=2 ppid=714 pid=777 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c255
type=CWD msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): item=0 name="/root" inode=164068 dev=03:00 mode=040750 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0
type=PATH msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): item=1 name="foo" inode=164010 dev=03:00 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
