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path: root/include/linux/prctl.h
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2009-10-04HWPOISON: Clean up PR_MCE_KILL interfaceAndi Kleen
While writing the manpage I noticed some shortcomings in the current interface. - Define symbolic names for all the different values - Boundary check the kill mode values - For symmetry add a get interface too. This allows library code to get/set the current state. - For consistency define a PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT value Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2009-09-24Merge branch 'hwpoison' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6 * 'hwpoison' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6: (21 commits) HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page on btrfs HWPOISON: Add simple debugfs interface to inject hwpoison on arbitary PFNs HWPOISON: Add madvise() based injector for hardware poisoned pages v4 HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page for NFS HWPOISON: Enable .remove_error_page for migration aware file systems HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 HWPOISON: Add PR_MCE_KILL prctl to control early kill behaviour per process HWPOISON: shmem: call set_page_dirty() with locked page HWPOISON: Define a new error_remove_page address space op for async truncation HWPOISON: Add invalidate_inode_page HWPOISON: Refactor truncate to allow direct truncating of page v2 HWPOISON: check and isolate corrupted free pages v2 HWPOISON: Handle hardware poisoned pages in try_to_unmap HWPOISON: Use bitmask/action code for try_to_unmap behaviour HWPOISON: x86: Add VM_FAULT_HWPOISON handling to x86 page fault handler v2 HWPOISON: Add poison check to page fault handling HWPOISON: Add basic support for poisoned pages in fault handler v3 HWPOISON: Add new SIGBUS error codes for hardware poison signals HWPOISON: Add support for poison swap entries v2 HWPOISON: Export some rmap vma locking to outside world ...
2009-09-21perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance EventsIngo Molnar
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-16HWPOISON: Add PR_MCE_KILL prctl to control early kill behaviour per processAndi Kleen
This allows processes to override their early/late kill behaviour on hardware memory errors. Typically applications which are memory error aware is better of with early kill (see the error as soon as possible), all others with late kill (only see the error when the error is really impacting execution) There's a global sysctl, but this way an application can set its specific policy. We're using two bits, one to signify that the process stated its intention and that I also made the prctl future proof by enforcing the unused arguments are 0. The state is inherited to children. Note this makes us officially run out of process flags on 32bit, but the next patch can easily add another field. Manpage patch will be supplied separately. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2008-12-11perf counters: add prctl interface to disable/enable countersIngo Molnar
Add a way for self-monitoring tasks to disable/enable counters summarily, via a prctl: PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_DISABLE 31 PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_ENABLE 32 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-05hrtimer: create a "timer_slack" field in the task structArjan van de Ven
We want to be able to control the default "rounding" that is used by select() and poll() and friends. This is a per process property (so that we can have a "nice" like program to start certain programs with a looser or stricter rounding) that can be set/get via a prctl(). For this purpose, a field called "timer_slack_ns" is added to the task struct. In addition, a field called "default_timer_slack"ns" is added so that tasks easily can temporarily to a more/less accurate slack and then back to the default. The default value of the slack is set to 50 usec; this is significantly less than 2.6.27's average select() and poll() timing error but still allows the kernel to group timers somewhat to preserve power behavior. Applications and admins can override this via the prctl() Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
2008-04-28capabilities: implement per-process securebitsAndrew G. Morgan
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-19generic, x86: add prctl commands PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSCErik Bosman
This patch adds prctl commands that make it possible to deny the execution of timestamp counters in userspace. If this is not implemented on a specific architecture, prctl will return -EINVAL. ned-off-by: Erik Bosman <ejbosman@cs.vu.nl> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-02-05capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding setSerge E. Hallyn
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP. This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements, CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them. One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container. The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI, and exec() does not constrain pI'. So to really start a shell with no way of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD); cap_t cap = cap_get_proc(); cap_value_t caparray[1]; caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD; cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP); cap_set_proc(cap); cap_free(cap); The following test program will get and set the bounding set (but not pI). For instance ./bset get (lists capabilities in bset) ./bset drop cap_net_raw (starts shell with new bset) (use capset, setuid binary, or binary with file capabilities to try to increase caps) ************************************************************ cap_bound.c ************************************************************ #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 #endif #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 #endif int usage(char *me) { printf("Usage: %s get\n", me); printf(" %s drop <capability>\n", me); return 1; } #define numcaps 32 char *captable[numcaps] = { "cap_chown", "cap_dac_override", "cap_dac_read_search", "cap_fowner", "cap_fsetid", "cap_kill", "cap_setgid", "cap_setuid", "cap_setpcap", "cap_linux_immutable", "cap_net_bind_service", "cap_net_broadcast", "cap_net_admin", "cap_net_raw", "cap_ipc_lock", "cap_ipc_owner", "cap_sys_module", "cap_sys_rawio", "cap_sys_chroot", "cap_sys_ptrace", "cap_sys_pacct", "cap_sys_admin", "cap_sys_boot", "cap_sys_nice", "cap_sys_resource", "cap_sys_time", "cap_sys_tty_config", "cap_mknod", "cap_lease", "cap_audit_write", "cap_audit_control", "cap_setfcap" }; int getbcap(void) { int comma=0; unsigned long i; int ret; printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps); printf("capability bounding set:"); for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) { ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i); if (ret < 0) perror("prctl"); else if (ret==1) printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]); } printf("\n"); return 0; } int capdrop(char *str) { unsigned long i; int found=0; for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) { if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) { found=1; break; } } if (!found) return 1; if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) { perror("prctl"); return 1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc<2) return usage(argv[0]); if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0) return getbcap(); if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3) return usage(argv[0]); if (capdrop(argv[2])) { printf("unknown capability\n"); return 1; } return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL); } ************************************************************ [serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16move seccomp from /proc to a prctlAndrea Arcangeli
This reduces the memory footprint and it enforces that only the current task can enable seccomp on itself (this is a requirement for a strightforward [modulo preempt ;) ] TIF_NOTSC implementation). Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2006-06-09[PATCH] Add a prctl to change the endianness of a process.Anton Blanchard
This new prctl is intended for changing the execution mode of the processor, on processors that support both a little-endian mode and a big-endian mode. It is intended for use by programs such as instruction set emulators (for example an x86 emulator on PowerPC), which may find it convenient to use the processor in an alternate endianness mode when executing translated instructions. Note that this does not imply the existence of a fully-fledged ABI for both endiannesses, or of compatibility code for converting system calls done in the non-native endianness mode. The program is expected to arrange for all of its system call arguments to be presented in the native endianness. Switching between big and little-endian mode will require some care in constructing the instruction sequence for the switch. Generally the instructions up to the instruction that invokes the prctl system call will have to be in the old endianness, and subsequent instructions will have to be in the new endianness. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2005-04-16Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!