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2009-06-15Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller
master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6 Conflicts: Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c net/core/drop_monitor.c net/core/net-traces.c
2009-06-03net: skb->dst accessorsEric Dumazet
Define three accessors to get/set dst attached to a skb struct dst_entry *skb_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb) void skb_dst_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst) void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb) This one should replace occurrences of : dst_release(skb->dst) skb->dst = NULL; Delete skb->dst field Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-06-03SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messagesEric Paris
Audit trees defined 2 new netlink messages but the netlink mapping tables for selinux permissions were not set up. This patch maps these 2 new operations to AUDIT_WRITE. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_boolStephen Smalley
On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote: > Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to > 32K in several of the utilities. > > This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer > works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11. getsebool works fine. > > sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to > be present in the other read functions. Maybe it could be removed? Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to what is available in the buffer. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19SELinux: move SELINUX_MAGIC into magic.hEric Paris
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being defined in two places and could someday get out of sync. This patch moves the declaration into magic.h so it is only done once. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-08Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
2009-05-05selinux: Fix send_sigiotask hookStephen Smalley
The CRED patch incorrectly converted the SELinux send_sigiotask hook to use the current task SID rather than the target task SID in its permission check, yielding the wrong permission check. This fixes the hook function. Detected by the ltp selinux testsuite and confirmed to correct the test failure. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30selinux: selinux_bprm_committed_creds() should wake up ->real_parent, not ↵Oleg Nesterov
->parent. We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing. But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent. Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's ->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit). Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30SELinux: Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve()David Howells
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit hook. This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30SELinux: drop secondary_ops->sysctlEric Paris
We are still calling secondary_ops->sysctl even though the capabilities module does not define a sysctl operation. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-02Permissive domain in userspace object managerKaiGai Kohei
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly. Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode, even if the global setting is enforcing mode. However, we don't have an application program interface to inform what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not. It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly. This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace. If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should allow any required actions, as the kernel doing. This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions without read_lock(&policy_rwlock). Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++------------------------- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28selinux: Remove the "compat_net" compatibility codePaul Moore
The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to finally remove it from the kernel. Further code simplifications are likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple, straight-up removal of the compat_net code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinuxPaul Moore
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-24Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
2009-03-10SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry drop no dentry printkEric Paris
Drop the printk message when an inode is found without an associated dentry. This should only happen when userspace can't be accessing those inodes and those labels will get set correctly on the next d_instantiate. Thus there is no reason to send this message. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06SELinux: new permission between tty audit and audit socketEric Paris
New selinux permission to separate the ability to turn on tty auditing from the ability to set audit rules. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06SELinux: open perm for sock filesEric Paris
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open. Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the filesystem namespace. This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission. It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to be. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-02selinux: Fix a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()Paul Moore
Rick McNeal from LSI identified a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() caused by a certain sequence of SUNRPC operations. The problem appears to be due to the lack of NULL pointer checking in the function; this patch adds the pointer checks so the function will exit safely in the cases where the socket is not completely initialized. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-23selinux: Fix the NetLabel glue code for setsockopt()Paul Moore
At some point we (okay, I) managed to break the ability for users to use the setsockopt() syscall to set IPv4 options when NetLabel was not active on the socket in question. The problem was noticed by someone trying to use the "-R" (record route) option of ping: # ping -R 10.0.0.1 ping: record route: No message of desired type The solution is relatively simple, we catch the unlabeled socket case and clear the error code, allowing the operation to succeed. Please note that we still deny users the ability to override IPv4 options on socket's which have NetLabel labeling active; this is done to ensure the labeling remains intact. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: convert the avc cache hash list to an hlistEric Paris
We do not need O(1) access to the tail of the avc cache lists and so we are wasting lots of space using struct list_head instead of struct hlist_head. This patch converts the avc cache to use hlists in which there is a single pointer from the head which saves us about 4k of global memory. Resulted in about a 1.5% decrease in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based on oprofile sampling of tbench. Although likely within the noise.... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: code readability with avc_cacheEric Paris
The code making use of struct avc_cache was not easy to read thanks to liberal use of &avc_cache.{slots_lock,slots}[hvalue] throughout. This patch simply creates local pointers and uses those instead of the long global names. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: remove unused av.decided fieldEric Paris
It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential performance win. We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space. This patch completely drops the av.decided concept. This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: more careful use of avd in avc_has_perm_noauditEric Paris
we are often needlessly jumping through hoops when it comes to avd entries in avc_has_perm_noaudit and we have extra initialization and memcpy which are just wasting performance. Try to clean the function up a bit. This patch resulted in a 13% drop in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit in my oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: remove the unused ae.usedEric Paris
Currently SELinux code has an atomic which was intended to track how many times an avc entry was used and to evict entries when they haven't been used recently. Instead we never let this atomic get above 1 and evict when it is first checked for eviction since it hits zero. This is a total waste of time so I'm completely dropping ae.used. This change resulted in about a 3% faster avc_has_perm_noaudit when running oprofile against a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: check seqno when updating an avc_nodeEric Paris
The avc update node callbacks do not check the seqno of the caller with the seqno of the node found. It is possible that a policy change could happen (although almost impossibly unlikely) in which a permissive or permissive_domain decision is not valid for the entry found. Simply pass and check that the seqno of the caller and the seqno of the node found match. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: NULL terminate al contexts from diskEric Paris
When a context is pulled in from disk we don't know that it is null terminated. This patch forecebly null terminates contexts when we pull them from disk. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: better printk when file with invalid label foundEric Paris
Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like: SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry: context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL]) returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah] Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us. Instead, on EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14SELinux: call capabilities code directoryEric Paris
For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking might be possible. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
Conflicts: fs/namei.c Manually merged per: diff --cc fs/namei.c index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE; err = exec_permission_lite(inode); if (err == -EAGAIN) - err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC); + err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, + MAY_EXEC); + if (!err) + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC); if (err) break; @@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc flag &= ~O_TRUNC; } - error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode); + error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode); if (error) return error; + - error = ima_path_check(&nd->path, ++ error = ima_path_check(path, + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + if (error) + return error; /* * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing. */ Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-02selinux: remove hooks which simply defer to capabilitiesJames Morris
Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites hooks (or in one case, replicates the function). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to shm_shmatJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connectJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_killJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimitJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove unused cred_commit hookJames Morris
Remove unused cred_commit hook from SELinux. This currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_createJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to task_create, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to file_mprotectJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_setattrJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_permissionJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_permission, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_linkJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_mknodJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_unlinkJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_linkJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to inode_link, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to sb_umountJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to sb_umount, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to sb_mountJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to sb_mount, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_credsJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_credsJames Morris
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30selinux: remove unused bprm_check_security hookJames Morris
Remove unused bprm_check_security hook from SELinux. This currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-19SELinux: Unify context mount and genfs behaviorDavid P. Quigley
Context mounts and genfs labeled file systems behave differently with respect to setting file system labels. This patch brings genfs labeled file systems in line with context mounts in that setxattr calls to them should return EOPNOTSUPP and fscreate calls will be ignored. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>
2009-01-19SELinux: Add new security mount option to indicate security label support.David P. Quigley
There is no easy way to tell if a file system supports SELinux security labeling. Because of this a new flag is being added to the super block security structure to indicate that the particular super block supports labeling. This flag is set for file systems using the xattr, task, and transition labeling methods unless that behavior is overridden by context mounts. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>