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2008-10-13vfs: Use const for kernel parser tableSteven Whitehouse
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble. This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm since then. Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (24 commits) integrity: special fs magic As pointed out by Jonathan Corbet, the timer must be deleted before ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible The tpm_dev_release function is only called for platform devices, not pnp Protect tpm_chip_list when transversing it. Renames num_open to is_open, as only one process can open the file at a time. Remove the BKL calls from the TPM driver, which were added in the overall netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security struct selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute() ...
2008-10-13tty: Redo current tty lockingAlan Cox
Currently it is sometimes locked by the tty mutex and sometimes by the sighand lock. The latter is in fact correct and now we can hand back referenced objects we can fix this up without problems around sleeping functions. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13tty: Make get_current_tty use a krefAlan Cox
We now return a kref covered tty reference. That ensures the tty structure doesn't go away when you have a return from get_current_tty. This is not enough to protect you from most of the resources being freed behind your back - yet. [Updated to include fixes for SELinux problems found by Andrew Morton and an s390 leak found while debugging the former] Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13integrity: special fs magicMimi Zohar
Discussion on the mailing list questioned the use of these magic values in userspace, concluding these values are already exported to userspace via statfs and their correct/incorrect usage is left up to the userspace application. - Move special fs magic number definitions to magic.h - Add magic.h include Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-11Merge branch 'master' of ↵James Morris
git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_next into next
2008-10-10netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass ↵Paul Moore
full contexts This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security structPaul Moore
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which while highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead when used. This patch attempts to mitigate some of that overhead by caching the NetLabel security attribute struct within the SELinux socket security structure. This should help eliminate the need to recreate the NetLabel secattr structure for each packet resulting in less overhead. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpointPaul Moore
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which while highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead when used. This patch attempts to solve that by applying NetLabel socket labels when sockets are connect()'d. This should alleviate the per-packet NetLabel labeling for all connected sockets (yes, it even works for connected DGRAM sockets). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packetPaul Moore
This patch builds upon the new NetLabel address selector functionality by providing the NetLabel KAPI and CIPSO engine support needed to enable the new packet-based labeling. The only new addition to the NetLabel KAPI at this point is shown below: * int netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr) ... and is designed to be called from a Netfilter hook after the packet's IP header has been populated such as in the FORWARD or LOCAL_OUT hooks. This patch also provides the necessary SELinux hooks to support this new functionality. Smack support is not currently included due to uncertainty regarding the permissions needed to expand the Smack network access controls. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence countsPaul Moore
NetLabel has always had a list of backpointers in the CIPSO DOI definition structure which pointed to the NetLabel LSM domain mapping structures which referenced the CIPSO DOI struct. The rationale for this was that when an administrator removed a CIPSO DOI from the system all of the associated NetLabel LSM domain mappings should be removed as well; a list of backpointers made this a simple operation. Unfortunately, while the backpointers did make the removal easier they were a bit of a mess from an implementation point of view which was making further development difficult. Since the removal of a CIPSO DOI is a realtively rare event it seems to make sense to remove this backpointer list as the optimization was hurting us more then it was helping. However, we still need to be able to track when a CIPSO DOI definition is being used so replace the backpointer list with a reference count. In order to preserve the current functionality of removing the associated LSM domain mappings when a CIPSO DOI is removed we walk the LSM domain mapping table, removing the relevant entries. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()Paul Moore
Smack needs to call netlbl_skbuff_err() to let NetLabel do the necessary protocol specific error handling. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2008-10-10selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()Paul Moore
At some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() which are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems. This patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()Paul Moore
Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not always be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error when the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct" thing to do. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore
It turns out that checking to see if skb->sk is NULL is not a very good indicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have skb->sk set to NULL. Fix this by not only checking the skb->sk field but also the IP[6]CB(skb)->flags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag. While we are at it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should resulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we might no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Correctly handle IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets in all casesPaul Moore
We did the right thing in a few cases but there were several areas where we determined a packet's address family based on the socket's address family which is not the right thing to do since we can get IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets. This patch fixes these problems by either taking the address family directly from the packet. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-10selinux: Cleanup the NetLabel glue codePaul Moore
We were doing a lot of extra work in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() what wasn't necessary so this patch removes that code. It also removes the redundant second argument to selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid() which allows us to simplify a few other functions. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-04selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()Paul Moore
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior, including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help prevent future problems. Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-04selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()Paul Moore
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior, including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help prevent future problems. Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-30selinux: use default proc sid on symlinksStephen Smalley
As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks. This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example. This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories. ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference. Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-27file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_niceSerge E. Hallyn
This reduces the kernel size by 289 bytes. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-21Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
Conflicts: MAINTAINERS Thanks for breaking my tree :-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-12Update selinux info in MAINTAINERS and Kconfig help textStephen Smalley
Update the SELinux entry in MAINTAINERS and drop the obsolete information from the selinux Kconfig help text. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-04SELinux: memory leak in security_context_to_sid_coreEric Paris
Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors. security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case. This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started making extensive use of this function. In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created along the way. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-02devcgroup: fix race against rmdir()Li Zefan
During the use of a dev_cgroup, we should guarantee the corresponding cgroup won't be deleted (i.e. via rmdir). This can be done through css_get(&dev_cgroup->css), but here we can just get and use the dev_cgroup under rcu_read_lock. And also remove checking NULL dev_cgroup, it won't be NULL since a task always belongs to a cgroup. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-08-29SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignmentKaiGai Kohei
The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITYEric Paris
Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the full LSM needs to be built to build this fs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
2008-08-20security: add/fix security kernel-docRandy Dunlap
Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook. Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation. Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-15selinux: Unify for- and while-loop styleVesa-Matti Kari
Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the same source file). Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()David Howells
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-07selinux: conditional expression type validation was off-by-oneVesa-Matti Kari
expr_isvalid() in conditional.c was off-by-one and allowed invalid expression type COND_LAST. However, it is this header file that needs to be fixed. That way the if-statement's disjunction's second component reads more naturally, "if expr type is greater than the last allowed value" ( rather than using ">=" in conditional.c): if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-05smack: limit privilege by labelCasey Schaufler
There have been a number of requests to make the Smack LSM enforce MAC even in the face of privilege, either capability based or superuser based. This is not universally desired, however, so it seems desirable to make it optional. Further, at least one legacy OS implemented a scheme whereby only processes running with one particular label could be exempt from MAC. This patch supports these three cases. If /smack/onlycap is empty (unset or null-string) privilege is enforced in the normal way. If /smack/onlycap contains a label only processes running with that label may be MAC exempt. If the label in /smack/onlycap is the star label ("*") the semantics of the star label combine with the privilege restrictions to prevent any violations of MAC, even in the presence of privilege. Again, this will be independent of the privilege scheme. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-05SELinux: Fix a potentially uninitialised variable in SELinux hooksDavid Howells
Fix a potentially uninitialised variable in SELinux hooks that's given a pointer to the network address by selinux_parse_skb() passing a pointer back through its argument list. By restructuring selinux_parse_skb(), the compiler can see that the error case need not set it as the caller will return immediately. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-05SELinux: trivial, remove unneeded local variableVesa-Matti J Kari
Hello, Remove unneeded local variable: struct avtab_node *newnode Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-05SELinux: Trivial minor fixes that change C null character styleVesa-Matti J Kari
Trivial minor fixes that change C null character style. Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-05make selinux_write_opts() staticAdrian Bunk
This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_write_opts() static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-30SELinux: /proc/mounts should show what it canEric Paris
Given a hosed SELinux config in which a system never loads policy or disables SELinux we currently just return -EINVAL for anyone trying to read /proc/mounts. This is a configuration problem but we can certainly be more graceful. This patch just ignores -EINVAL when displaying LSM options and causes /proc/mounts display everything else it can. If policy isn't loaded the obviously there are no options, so we aren't really loosing any information here. This is safe as the only other return of EINVAL comes from security_sid_to_context_core() in the case of an invalid sid. Even if a FS was mounted with a now invalidated context that sid should have been remapped to unlabeled and so we won't hit the EINVAL and will work like we should. (yes, I tested to make sure it worked like I thought) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-26Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits) [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling [PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely [PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap [PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h [PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open [PATCH] f_count may wrap around [PATCH] dup3 fix [PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate() [PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi() [PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent() [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al. [PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup [PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission() [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup [patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup [patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change [patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup [patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok() [PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation ...
2008-07-26Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6Linus Torvalds
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: netns: fix ip_rt_frag_needed rt_is_expired netfilter: nf_conntrack_extend: avoid unnecessary "ct->ext" dereferences netfilter: fix double-free and use-after free netfilter: arptables in netns for real netfilter: ip{,6}tables_security: fix future section mismatch selinux: use nf_register_hooks() netfilter: ebtables: use nf_register_hooks() Revert "pkt_sched: sch_sfq: dump a real number of flows" qeth: use dev->ml_priv instead of dev->priv syncookies: Make sure ECN is disabled net: drop unused BUG_TRAP() net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON drivers/net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON
2008-07-26[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_changeMiklos Szeredi
The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and fsnotify_change(). This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change(). That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file. [Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for noticing.] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26[PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitlyAl Viro
... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags" bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26selinux: use nf_register_hooks()Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-07-26tracehook: tracehook_tracer_taskRoland McGrath
This adds the tracehook_tracer_task() hook to consolidate all forms of "Who is using ptrace on me?" logic. This is used for "TracerPid:" in /proc and for permission checks. We also clean up the selinux code the called an identical accessor. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25devcgroup: code cleanupLi Zefan
- clean up set_majmin() - use simple_strtoul() to parse major/minor [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix simple_strtoul() usage] [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix warnings] Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCUPavel Emelyanov
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading from one. This is OK, but can be better. Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for /dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to 20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock doesn't seem very good. Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions checking under the rcu_read_lock. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25cgroup files: convert devcgroup_access_write() into a cgroup write_string() ↵Paul Menage
handler This patch converts devcgroup_access_write() from a raw file handler into a handler for the cgroup write_string() method. This allows some boilerplate copying/locking/checking to be removed and simplifies the cleanup path, since these functions are performed by the cgroups framework before calling the handler. Signed-off-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24security: filesystem capabilities no longer experimentalAndrew G. Morgan
Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for configuring filesystem capabilities. Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24security: protect legacy applications from executing with insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan
When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file, it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a fail-safe permission check. For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for them, see: http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still (ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-15Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present"James Morris
This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9. From Eric Paris: "Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"