From 01102e7ca2e71ec0c300d41a1f3e594235b733ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2007 14:27:03 -0700 Subject: [NETFILTER]: ipt_ULOG: use put_unaligned Use put_unaligned to fix warnings about unaligned accesses. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c index a26404dbe21..9acc018766f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Harald Welte "); @@ -236,9 +237,9 @@ static void ipt_ulog_packet(unsigned int hooknum, /* copy hook, prefix, timestamp, payload, etc. */ pm->data_len = copy_len; - pm->timestamp_sec = skb->tstamp.off_sec; - pm->timestamp_usec = skb->tstamp.off_usec; - pm->mark = skb->mark; + put_unaligned(skb->tstamp.off_sec, &pm->timestamp_sec); + put_unaligned(skb->tstamp.off_usec, &pm->timestamp_usec); + put_unaligned(skb->mark, &pm->mark); pm->hook = hooknum; if (prefix != NULL) strncpy(pm->prefix, prefix, sizeof(pm->prefix)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 09fe3ef46c5a2cc65d173df9518013e208eb3ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Morton Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2007 14:45:32 -0700 Subject: [PKTGEN]: Add try_to_freeze() The pktgen module prevents suspend-to-disk. Fix. Acked-by: "Michal Piotrowski" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/pktgen.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 74a9a32b906..4b01496dc33 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -3333,6 +3334,8 @@ static int pktgen_thread_worker(void *arg) t->control &= ~(T_REMDEV); } + try_to_freeze(); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 279e172a580d415b83eba4f9fbbc77b08e546553 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerome Borsboom Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2007 16:12:47 -0700 Subject: [VLAN]: Allow VLAN interface on top of bridge interface When a VLAN interface is created on top of a bridge interface and netfilter is enabled to see the bridged packets, the packets can be corrupted when passing through the netfilter code. This is caused by the VLAN driver not setting the 'protocol' and 'nh' members of the sk_buff structure. In general, this is no problem as the VLAN interface is mostly connected to a physical ethernet interface which does not use the 'protocol' and 'nh' members. For a bridge interface, however, these members do matter. Signed-off-by: Jerome Borsboom Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan_dev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c index 2fc8fe2cb36..b6e0eea1e39 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c @@ -380,6 +380,9 @@ int vlan_dev_hard_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, } else { vhdr->h_vlan_encapsulated_proto = htons(len); } + + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_8021Q); + skb->nh.raw = skb->data; } /* Before delegating work to the lower layer, enter our MAC-address */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 661697f728d75302e1f661a58db2fcba71d5cbc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joy Latten Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2007 16:14:35 -0700 Subject: [IPSEC] XFRM_USER: kernel panic when large security contexts in ACQUIRE When sending a security context of 50+ characters in an ACQUIRE message, following kernel panic occurred. kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781! cpu 0x3: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000421bb2e0] pc: c00000000033b074: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x240/0x2c8 lr: c00000000033b014: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x1e0/0x2c8 sp: c0000000421bb560 msr: 8000000000029032 current = 0xc00000000fce8f00 paca = 0xc000000000464b00 pid = 2303, comm = ping kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781! enter ? for help 3:mon> t [c0000000421bb650] c00000000033538c .km_query+0x6c/0xec [c0000000421bb6f0] c000000000337374 .xfrm_state_find+0x7f4/0xb88 [c0000000421bb7f0] c000000000332350 .xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xc4/0x21c [c0000000421bb8d0] c0000000003326e8 .xfrm_lookup+0x1a0/0x5b0 [c0000000421bba00] c0000000002e6ea0 .ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xb4 [c0000000421bbaa0] c0000000003106d8 .ip4_datagram_connect+0x218/0x374 [c0000000421bbbd0] c00000000031bc00 .inet_dgram_connect+0xac/0xd4 [c0000000421bbc60] c0000000002b11ac .sys_connect+0xd8/0x120 [c0000000421bbd90] c0000000002d38d0 .compat_sys_socketcall+0xdc/0x214 [c0000000421bbe30] c00000000000869c syscall_exit+0x0/0x40 --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 0000000007f0ca9c SP (fc0ef8f0) is in userspace We are using size of security context from xfrm_policy to determine how much space to alloc skb and then putting security context from xfrm_state into skb. Should have been using size of security context from xfrm_state to alloc skb. Following fix does that Signed-off-by: Joy Latten Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index e81e2fb3d42..816e3690b60 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -272,9 +272,8 @@ static int attach_encap_tmpl(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl **encapp, struct rtattr *u_a } -static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx) { - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx = xp->security; int len = 0; if (xfrm_ctx) { @@ -2170,7 +2169,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *xt, len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr); len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_acquire)); - len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp)); + len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(x->security)); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type)); #endif @@ -2280,7 +2279,7 @@ static int xfrm_exp_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, struct km_eve len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr); len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire)); - len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp)); + len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp->security)); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type)); #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 612f09e8495ba656032f89147ab999ef2be9c360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2007 16:18:02 -0700 Subject: [IPV6] SNMP: Fix {In,Out}NoRoutes statistics. A packet which is being discarded because of no routes in the forwarding path should not be counted as OutNoRoutes but as InNoRoutes. Additionally, on this occasion, a packet whose destinaion is not valid should be counted as InAddrErrors separately. Based on patch from Mitsuru Chinen . Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/route.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index ad9b285692b..aebb4e2d5ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -1766,13 +1766,22 @@ int ipv6_route_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg) * Drop the packet on the floor */ -static inline int ip6_pkt_drop(struct sk_buff *skb, int code) -{ - int type = ipv6_addr_type(&skb->nh.ipv6h->daddr); - if (type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY || type == IPV6_ADDR_RESERVED) - IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INADDRERRORS); - - IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES); +static inline int ip6_pkt_drop(struct sk_buff *skb, int code, + int ipstats_mib_noroutes) +{ + int type; + switch (ipstats_mib_noroutes) { + case IPSTATS_MIB_INNOROUTES: + type = ipv6_addr_type(&skb->nh.ipv6h->daddr); + if (type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY || type == IPV6_ADDR_RESERVED) { + IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INADDRERRORS); + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES: + IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), ipstats_mib_noroutes); + break; + } icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0, skb->dev); kfree_skb(skb); return 0; @@ -1780,26 +1789,26 @@ static inline int ip6_pkt_drop(struct sk_buff *skb, int code) static int ip6_pkt_discard(struct sk_buff *skb) { - return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_NOROUTE); + return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_NOROUTE, IPSTATS_MIB_INNOROUTES); } static int ip6_pkt_discard_out(struct sk_buff *skb) { skb->dev = skb->dst->dev; - return ip6_pkt_discard(skb); + return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_NOROUTE, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES); } #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES static int ip6_pkt_prohibit(struct sk_buff *skb) { - return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED); + return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, IPSTATS_MIB_INNOROUTES); } static int ip6_pkt_prohibit_out(struct sk_buff *skb) { skb->dev = skb->dst->dev; - return ip6_pkt_prohibit(skb); + return ip6_pkt_drop(skb, ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES); } static int ip6_pkt_blk_hole(struct sk_buff *skb) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 49688c843101ba6275756505e81af45ef50f87d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2007 16:37:54 -0700 Subject: [NETFILTER] arp_tables: Fix unaligned accesses. There are two device string comparison loops in arp_packet_match(). The first one goes byte-by-byte but the second one tries to be clever and cast the string to a long and compare by longs. The device name strings in the arp table entries are not guarenteed to be aligned enough to make this value, so just use byte-by-byte for both cases. Based upon a report by . Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 5170f5c75f9..57b0221f9e2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -166,13 +166,9 @@ static inline int arp_packet_match(const struct arphdr *arphdr, return 0; } - for (i = 0, ret = 0; i < IFNAMSIZ/sizeof(unsigned long); i++) { - unsigned long odev; - memcpy(&odev, outdev + i*sizeof(unsigned long), - sizeof(unsigned long)); - ret |= (odev - ^ ((const unsigned long *)arpinfo->outiface)[i]) - & ((const unsigned long *)arpinfo->outiface_mask)[i]; + for (i = 0, ret = 0; i < IFNAMSIZ; i++) { + ret |= (outdev[i] ^ arpinfo->outiface[i]) + & arpinfo->outiface_mask[i]; } if (FWINV(ret != 0, ARPT_INV_VIA_OUT)) { -- cgit v1.2.3