From b8dfe498775de912116f275680ddb57c8799d9ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 17:31:52 +0100 Subject: netfilter: factorize ifname_compare() We use same not trivial helper function in four places. We can factorize it. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 23 ++--------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv6') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 34af7bb8df5..e59662b3b5b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -89,25 +89,6 @@ ip6t_ext_hdr(u8 nexthdr) (nexthdr == IPPROTO_DSTOPTS) ); } -static unsigned long ifname_compare(const char *_a, const char *_b, - const unsigned char *_mask) -{ - const unsigned long *a = (const unsigned long *)_a; - const unsigned long *b = (const unsigned long *)_b; - const unsigned long *mask = (const unsigned long *)_mask; - unsigned long ret; - - ret = (a[0] ^ b[0]) & mask[0]; - if (IFNAMSIZ > sizeof(unsigned long)) - ret |= (a[1] ^ b[1]) & mask[1]; - if (IFNAMSIZ > 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) - ret |= (a[2] ^ b[2]) & mask[2]; - if (IFNAMSIZ > 3 * sizeof(unsigned long)) - ret |= (a[3] ^ b[3]) & mask[3]; - BUILD_BUG_ON(IFNAMSIZ > 4 * sizeof(unsigned long)); - return ret; -} - /* Returns whether matches rule or not. */ /* Performance critical - called for every packet */ static inline bool @@ -138,7 +119,7 @@ ip6_packet_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, return false; } - ret = ifname_compare(indev, ip6info->iniface, ip6info->iniface_mask); + ret = ifname_compare_aligned(indev, ip6info->iniface, ip6info->iniface_mask); if (FWINV(ret != 0, IP6T_INV_VIA_IN)) { dprintf("VIA in mismatch (%s vs %s).%s\n", @@ -147,7 +128,7 @@ ip6_packet_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, return false; } - ret = ifname_compare(outdev, ip6info->outiface, ip6info->outiface_mask); + ret = ifname_compare_aligned(outdev, ip6info->outiface, ip6info->outiface_mask); if (FWINV(ret != 0, IP6T_INV_VIA_OUT)) { dprintf("VIA out mismatch (%s vs %s).%s\n", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f9352ae2253a97b07b34dcf16ffa3b4ca12c558 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 19:26:35 +0100 Subject: netfilter: {ip,ip6,arp}_tables: fix incorrect loop detection Commit e1b4b9f ([NETFILTER]: {ip,ip6,arp}_tables: fix exponential worst-case search for loops) introduced a regression in the loop detection algorithm, causing sporadic incorrectly detected loops. When a chain has already been visited during the check, it is treated as having a standard target containing a RETURN verdict directly at the beginning in order to not check it again. The real target of the first rule is then incorrectly treated as STANDARD target and checked not to contain invalid verdicts. Fix by making sure the rule does actually contain a standard target. Based on patch by Francis Dupont Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/ipv6') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index e59662b3b5b..e89cfa3a8f2 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -517,7 +517,9 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; - if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, + IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && + t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " "negative verdict (%i)\n", t->verdict); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a400c30edb1958ceb53c4b8ce78989189b36df47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Holger Eitzenberger Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2009 21:53:39 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: calculate per-protocol nlattr size Signed-off-by: Holger Eitzenberger Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c | 6 ++++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv6') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c index e6852f61721..2a15c2d66c6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c @@ -342,6 +342,11 @@ static int ipv6_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[], return 0; } + +static int ipv6_nlattr_tuple_size(void) +{ + return nla_policy_len(ipv6_nla_policy, CTA_IP_MAX + 1); +} #endif struct nf_conntrack_l3proto nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6 __read_mostly = { @@ -353,6 +358,7 @@ struct nf_conntrack_l3proto nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6 __read_mostly = { .get_l4proto = ipv6_get_l4proto, #if defined(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_MODULE) .tuple_to_nlattr = ipv6_tuple_to_nlattr, + .nlattr_tuple_size = ipv6_nlattr_tuple_size, .nlattr_to_tuple = ipv6_nlattr_to_tuple, .nla_policy = ipv6_nla_policy, #endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c index 165b256a6fa..032fdf41500 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c @@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ static int icmpv6_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[], return 0; } + +static int icmpv6_nlattr_tuple_size(void) +{ + return nla_policy_len(icmpv6_nla_policy, CTA_PROTO_MAX + 1); +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL @@ -299,6 +304,7 @@ struct nf_conntrack_l4proto nf_conntrack_l4proto_icmpv6 __read_mostly = .error = icmpv6_error, #if defined(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_MODULE) .tuple_to_nlattr = icmpv6_tuple_to_nlattr, + .nlattr_tuple_size = icmpv6_nlattr_tuple_size, .nlattr_to_tuple = icmpv6_nlattr_to_tuple, .nla_policy = icmpv6_nla_policy, #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 71f6f6dfdf7c7a67462386d9ea05c1095a89c555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesper Nilsson Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 00:17:45 -0700 Subject: ipv6: Plug sk_buff leak in ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c) Commit 778d80be52699596bf70e0eb0761cf5e1e46088d (ipv6: Add disable_ipv6 sysctl to disable IPv6 operaion on specific interface) seems to have introduced a leak of sk_buff's for ipv6 traffic, at least in some configurations where idev is NULL, or when ipv6 is disabled via sysctl. The problem is that if the first condition of the if-statement returns non-NULL, it returns an skb with only one reference, and when the other conditions apply, execution jumps to the "out" label, which does not call kfree_skb for it. To plug this leak, change to use the "drop" label instead. (this relies on it being ok to call kfree_skb on NULL) This also allows us to avoid calling rcu_read_unlock here, and removes the only user of the "out" label. Signed-off-by: Jesper Nilsson Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv6') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c index f171e8dbac9..8f04bd9da27 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c @@ -75,8 +75,7 @@ int ipv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct packet_type *pt if ((skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL || !idev || unlikely(idev->cnf.disable_ipv6)) { IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS); - rcu_read_unlock(); - goto out; + goto drop; } memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm)); @@ -147,7 +146,6 @@ err: drop: rcu_read_unlock(); kfree_skb(skb); -out: return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3