From ea2dfb3733d53ac98b17756435d1f99e25490357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2007 17:01:19 -0400 Subject: SCTP: properly clean up fragment and ordering queues during FWD-TSN. When we recieve a FWD-TSN (meaning the peer has abandoned the data), we need to clean up any partially received messages that may be hanging out on the re-assembly or re-ordering queues. This is a MUST requirement that was not properly done before. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 3 ++ net/sctp/ulpqueue.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index d9fad4f6ffc..1907318e70f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -1130,6 +1130,9 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type, /* Move the Cumulattive TSN Ack ahead. */ sctp_tsnmap_skip(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, cmd->obj.u32); + /* purge the fragmentation queue */ + sctp_ulpq_reasm_flushtsn(&asoc->ulpq, cmd->obj.u32); + /* Abort any in progress partial delivery. */ sctp_ulpq_abort_pd(&asoc->ulpq, GFP_ATOMIC); break; diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c index 34eb977a204..fa0ba2a5564 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c @@ -659,6 +659,46 @@ done: return retval; } +/* + * Flush out stale fragments from the reassembly queue when processing + * a Forward TSN. + * + * RFC 3758, Section 3.6 + * + * After receiving and processing a FORWARD TSN, the data receiver MUST + * take cautions in updating its re-assembly queue. The receiver MUST + * remove any partially reassembled message, which is still missing one + * or more TSNs earlier than or equal to the new cumulative TSN point. + * In the event that the receiver has invoked the partial delivery API, + * a notification SHOULD also be generated to inform the upper layer API + * that the message being partially delivered will NOT be completed. + */ +void sctp_ulpq_reasm_flushtsn(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, __u32 fwd_tsn) +{ + struct sk_buff *pos, *tmp; + struct sctp_ulpevent *event; + __u32 tsn; + + if (skb_queue_empty(&ulpq->reasm)) + return; + + skb_queue_walk_safe(&ulpq->reasm, pos, tmp) { + event = sctp_skb2event(pos); + tsn = event->tsn; + + /* Since the entire message must be abandoned by the + * sender (item A3 in Section 3.5, RFC 3758), we can + * free all fragments on the list that are less then + * or equal to ctsn_point + */ + if (TSN_lte(tsn, fwd_tsn)) { + __skb_unlink(pos, &ulpq->reasm); + sctp_ulpevent_free(event); + } else + break; + } +} + /* Helper function to gather skbs that have possibly become * ordered by an an incoming chunk. */ @@ -794,7 +834,7 @@ static struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpq_order(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, /* Helper function to gather skbs that have possibly become * ordered by forward tsn skipping their dependencies. */ -static inline void sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq) +static inline void sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, __u16 sid) { struct sk_buff *pos, *tmp; struct sctp_ulpevent *cevent; @@ -813,31 +853,40 @@ static inline void sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq) csid = cevent->stream; cssn = cevent->ssn; - if (cssn != sctp_ssn_peek(in, csid)) + /* Have we gone too far? */ + if (csid > sid) break; - /* Found it, so mark in the ssnmap. */ - sctp_ssn_next(in, csid); + /* Have we not gone far enough? */ + if (csid < sid) + continue; + + /* see if this ssn has been marked by skipping */ + if (!SSN_lt(cssn, sctp_ssn_peek(in, csid))) + break; __skb_unlink(pos, &ulpq->lobby); - if (!event) { + if (!event) /* Create a temporary list to collect chunks on. */ event = sctp_skb2event(pos); - __skb_queue_tail(&temp, sctp_event2skb(event)); - } else { - /* Attach all gathered skbs to the event. */ - __skb_queue_tail(&temp, pos); - } + + /* Attach all gathered skbs to the event. */ + __skb_queue_tail(&temp, pos); } /* Send event to the ULP. 'event' is the sctp_ulpevent for * very first SKB on the 'temp' list. */ - if (event) + if (event) { + /* see if we have more ordered that we can deliver */ + sctp_ulpq_retrieve_ordered(ulpq, event); sctp_ulpq_tail_event(ulpq, event); + } } -/* Skip over an SSN. */ +/* Skip over an SSN. This is used during the processing of + * Forwared TSN chunk to skip over the abandoned ordered data + */ void sctp_ulpq_skip(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, __u16 sid, __u16 ssn) { struct sctp_stream *in; @@ -855,7 +904,7 @@ void sctp_ulpq_skip(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, __u16 sid, __u16 ssn) /* Go find any other chunks that were waiting for * ordering and deliver them if needed. */ - sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(ulpq); + sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(ulpq, sid); return; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From ab3e5e7b65dde661f5eb86b445496c5967283333 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2007 16:51:42 -0400 Subject: SCTP: Assign stream sequence numbers to the entire message Currently we only assign the sequence number to a packet that we are about to transmit. This however breaks the Partial Reliability extensions, because it's possible for us to never transmit a packet, i.e. it expires before we get to send it. In such cases, if the message contained multiple SCTP fragments, and we did manage to send the first part of the message, the Stream sequence numbers would get into invalid state and cause receiver to stall. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 51c4d7fef1d..2b1129a7a94 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1174,25 +1174,36 @@ out: */ void sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(struct sctp_chunk *chunk) { + struct sctp_datamsg *msg; + struct sctp_chunk *lchunk; + struct sctp_stream *stream; __u16 ssn; __u16 sid; if (chunk->has_ssn) return; - /* This is the last possible instant to assign a SSN. */ - if (chunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED) { - ssn = 0; - } else { - sid = ntohs(chunk->subh.data_hdr->stream); - if (chunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_LAST_FRAG) - ssn = sctp_ssn_next(&chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out, sid); - else - ssn = sctp_ssn_peek(&chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out, sid); - } + /* All fragments will be on the same stream */ + sid = ntohs(chunk->subh.data_hdr->stream); + stream = &chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out; - chunk->subh.data_hdr->ssn = htons(ssn); - chunk->has_ssn = 1; + /* Now assign the sequence number to the entire message. + * All fragments must have the same stream sequence number. + */ + msg = chunk->msg; + list_for_each_entry(lchunk, &msg->chunks, frag_list) { + if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED) { + ssn = 0; + } else { + if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_LAST_FRAG) + ssn = sctp_ssn_next(stream, sid); + else + ssn = sctp_ssn_peek(stream, sid); + } + + lchunk->subh.data_hdr->ssn = htons(ssn); + lchunk->has_ssn = 1; + } } /* Helper function to assign a TSN if needed. This assumes that both -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8d614ade511fef11f992d6a73e538d33b3b81f12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2007 13:55:47 +0800 Subject: SCTP: Fix sctp_addto_chunk() to add pad with correct length At function sctp_addto_chunk(), it do pad before add payload to chunk if chunk length is not 4-byte alignment. But it do pad with a bad length. This patch fixed this probleam. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 2b1129a7a94..93df833f34f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data) void *target; void *padding; int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length); - int padlen = chunklen % 4; + int padlen = WORD_ROUND(chunklen) - chunklen; padding = skb_put(chunk->skb, padlen); target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 00f1c2df2a1c4903f4daa1333bafeb6dcbc9591d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2007 15:50:01 +0800 Subject: SCTP: Fix to encode PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause correctly PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause in ABORT is bad encode when make abort chunk. When SCTP encode ABORT chunk with PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause, it just add the error messages to PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause, the rest four bytes(struct sctp_paramhdr) is just add to the chunk, not change the length of error cause. This cause the ABORT chunk to be a bad format. The chunk is like this: ABORT chunk Chunk type: ABORT (6) Chunk flags: 0x00 Chunk length: 72 (*1) Protocol violation cause Cause code: Protocol violation (0x000d) Cause length: 62 (*2) Cause information: 5468652063756D756C61746976652074736E2061636B2062... Cause padding: 0000 [Needless] 00030010 Chunk Length(*1) = 72 but Cause length(*2) only 62, not include the extend 4 bytes. ((72 - sizeof(chunk_hdr)) = 68) != (62 +3) / 4 * 4 Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 4 +-- 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 93df833f34f..adc5e593472 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = { * abort chunk. */ void sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code, - const void *payload, size_t paylen) + size_t paylen) { sctp_errhdr_t err; __u16 len; @@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ void sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code, len = sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen; err.length = htons(len); chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t), &err); - sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, paylen, payload); } /* 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1) @@ -780,8 +779,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_no_data( /* Put the tsn back into network byte order. */ payload = htonl(tsn); - sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NO_DATA, (const void *)&payload, - sizeof(payload)); + sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NO_DATA, sizeof(payload)); + sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(payload), (const void *)&payload); /* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints * @@ -823,7 +822,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_user(const struct sctp_association *asoc, goto err_copy; } - sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT, payload, paylen); + sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT, paylen); + sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload); if (paylen) kfree(payload); @@ -850,15 +850,17 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_violation( struct sctp_paramhdr phdr; retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen - + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)); if (!retval) goto end; - sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, payload, paylen); + sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, paylen + + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)); phdr.type = htons(chunk->chunk_hdr->type); phdr.length = chunk->chunk_hdr->length; - sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), &phdr); + sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload); + sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), &phdr); end: return retval; @@ -955,7 +957,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error(const struct sctp_association *asoc, if (!retval) goto nodata; - sctp_init_cause(retval, cause_code, payload, paylen); + sctp_init_cause(retval, cause_code, paylen); + sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload); nodata: return retval; @@ -1143,6 +1146,25 @@ void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data) return target; } +/* Append bytes to the end of a parameter. Will panic if chunk is not big + * enough. + */ +void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data) +{ + void *target; + int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length); + + target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len); + + memcpy(target, data, len); + + /* Adjust the chunk length field. */ + chunk->chunk_hdr->length = htons(chunklen + len); + chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb); + + return target; +} + /* Append bytes from user space to the end of a chunk. Will panic if * chunk is not big enough. * Returns a kernel err value. @@ -1477,7 +1499,8 @@ no_hmac: __be32 n = htonl(usecs); sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE, - &n, sizeof(n)); + sizeof(n)); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(n), &n); *error = -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE; } else *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM; @@ -1567,7 +1590,8 @@ static int sctp_process_missing_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, report.num_missing = htonl(1); report.type = paramtype; sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_MISS_PARAM, - &report, sizeof(report)); + sizeof(report)); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(report), &report); } /* Stop processing this chunk. */ @@ -1585,7 +1609,7 @@ static int sctp_process_inv_mandatory(const struct sctp_association *asoc, *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, 0); if (*errp) - sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM, NULL, 0); + sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM, 0); /* Stop processing this chunk. */ return 0; @@ -1606,9 +1630,10 @@ static int sctp_process_inv_paramlength(const struct sctp_association *asoc, *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, payload_len); if (*errp) { - sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, error, - sizeof(error)); - sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param); + sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, + sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(error), error); + sctp_addto_param(*errp, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param); } return 0; @@ -1629,9 +1654,10 @@ static int sctp_process_hn_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, if (!*errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len); - if (*errp) - sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED, - param.v, len); + if (*errp) { + sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED, len); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, len, param.v); + } /* Stop processing this chunk. */ return 0; @@ -1683,10 +1709,13 @@ static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); - if (*errp) + if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, - param.v, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), + param.v); + } break; case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP: @@ -1701,8 +1730,10 @@ static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, - param.v, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); + sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), + param.v); } else { /* If there is no memory for generating the ERROR * report as specified, an ABORT will be triggered diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 71cad56dd73..350d4765472 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)); if (abort) { - sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, NULL, 0); + sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, 0); sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort)); } @@ -3392,7 +3392,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)); if (abort) { - sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, NULL, 0); + sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, 0); sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort)); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d99fa42963a5ae394cf1df9d5bb739eb378a189b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2007 11:19:24 +0800 Subject: SCTP: Use net_ratelimit to suppress error messages print too fast When multi bundling SHUTDOWN-ACK message is received in ESTAB state, this will cause "sctp protocol violation state" message print many times. If SHUTDOWN-ACK is bundled 300 times in one packet, message will be print 300 times. The same problem also exists when received unexpected HEARTBEAT-ACK message which is bundled message times. This patch used net_ratelimit() to suppress error messages print too fast. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 5 +++-- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index 1907318e70f..8d789008349 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -1013,8 +1013,9 @@ static int sctp_side_effects(sctp_event_t event_type, sctp_subtype_t subtype, break; case SCTP_DISPOSITION_VIOLATION: - printk(KERN_ERR "sctp protocol violation state %d " - "chunkid %d\n", state, subtype.chunk); + if (net_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_ERR "sctp protocol violation state %d " + "chunkid %d\n", state, subtype.chunk); break; case SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOT_IMPL: diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 350d4765472..276e26d3d7d 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -1032,19 +1032,21 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* This should never happen, but lets log it if so. */ if (unlikely(!link)) { if (from_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "%s association %p could not find address " - NIP6_FMT "\n", - __FUNCTION__, - asoc, - NIP6(from_addr.v6.sin6_addr)); + if (net_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "%s association %p could not find address " + NIP6_FMT "\n", + __FUNCTION__, + asoc, + NIP6(from_addr.v6.sin6_addr)); } else { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "%s association %p could not find address " - NIPQUAD_FMT "\n", - __FUNCTION__, - asoc, - NIPQUAD(from_addr.v4.sin_addr.s_addr)); + if (net_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "%s association %p could not find address " + NIPQUAD_FMT "\n", + __FUNCTION__, + asoc, + NIPQUAD(from_addr.v4.sin_addr.s_addr)); } return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2772b495efe341a02c867bc3a03d7362bd336832 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2007 14:24:30 +0900 Subject: SCTP: Pick the correct port when binding to 0. sctp_bindx() allows the use of unspecified port. The problem is that every address we bind to ends up selecting a new port if the user specified port 0. This patch allows re-use of the already selected port when the port from bindx was 0. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/socket.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 01c6364245b..de792122672 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len) * The function sctp_get_port_local() does duplicate address * detection. */ + addr->v4.sin_port = htons(snum); if ((ret = sctp_get_port_local(sk, addr))) { if (ret == (long) sk) { /* This endpoint has a conflicting address. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc75689a4c4eb94b2fd7e3870347b9237ab39503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2007 19:30:25 +0900 Subject: SCTP: Uncomfirmed transports can't become Inactive Do not set Unconfirmed transports to Inactive state. This may result in an inactive association being destroyed since we start counting errors on "inactive" transports against the association. This was found at the SCTP interop event. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/associola.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c index 498edb0cd4e..2ad1caf1ea4 100644 --- a/net/sctp/associola.c +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c @@ -727,7 +727,12 @@ void sctp_assoc_control_transport(struct sctp_association *asoc, break; case SCTP_TRANSPORT_DOWN: - transport->state = SCTP_INACTIVE; + /* if the transort was never confirmed, do not transition it + * to inactive state. + */ + if (transport->state != SCTP_UNCONFIRMED) + transport->state = SCTP_INACTIVE; + spc_state = SCTP_ADDR_UNREACHABLE; break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d0ce92910bc04e107b2f3f2048f07e94f570035d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2007 19:37:46 +0900 Subject: SCTP: Do not retransmit chunks that are newer then rtt. When performing a retransmit, do not include the chunk if it was sent less then 1 rtt ago. The reason is that we may receive the SACK very soon and wouldn't retransmit. Suggested by Randy Stewart. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/outqueue.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c index 992f361084b..28f4fe77cee 100644 --- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c @@ -421,6 +421,13 @@ void sctp_retransmit_mark(struct sctp_outq *q, */ if ((fast_retransmit && (chunk->fast_retransmit > 0)) || (!fast_retransmit && !chunk->tsn_gap_acked)) { + /* If this chunk was sent less then 1 rto ago, do not + * retransmit this chunk, but give the peer time + * to acknowlege it. + */ + if ((jiffies - chunk->sent_at) < transport->rto) + continue; + /* RFC 2960 6.2.1 Processing a Received SACK * * C) Any time a DATA chunk is marked for -- cgit v1.2.3 From 498d63071ef378e201979e441aefcc6565702ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2007 14:03:58 -0400 Subject: SCTP: Correctly disable listening when backlog is 0. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index de792122672..33354602ae8 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -5203,6 +5203,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_seqpacket_listen(struct sock *sk, int backlog) sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep); sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED; + return 0; } /* Return if we are already listening. */ @@ -5250,6 +5251,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_stream_listen(struct sock *sk, int backlog) sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep); sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED; + return 0; } if (sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 609ee4679b8a0831257552dd2b0e54f509ba0c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2007 03:10:59 +0900 Subject: SCTP: Abort on COOKIE-ECHO if backlog is exceeded. Currently we abort on the INIT chunk we our backlog is currenlty exceeded. Delay this about untill COOKIE-ECHO to give the user time to accept the socket. Also, make sure that we treat sk_max_backlog of 0 as no connections allowed. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 276e26d3d7d..177528ed3e1 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -264,7 +264,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; struct sctp_packet *packet; sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; - struct sock *sk; int len; /* 6.10 Bundling @@ -285,16 +284,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, if (ep == sctp_sk((sctp_get_ctl_sock()))->ep) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - sk = ep->base.sk; - /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations - * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an - * ABORT. - */ - if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) || - (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && - sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))) - return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification * Tag. */ @@ -590,6 +579,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_ulpevent *ev, *ai_ev = NULL; int error = 0; struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p; + struct sock *sk; /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. @@ -605,6 +595,15 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations + * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an + * ABORT. + */ + sk = ep->base.sk; + if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) || + (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))) + return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we * are in good shape. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From cb243a1a9fef4aaff262a5dd14f987070d37229b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2007 13:55:58 +0800 Subject: SCTP: Fix to handle invalid parameter length correctly If an INIT with invalid parameter length look like this: Parameter Type : 1 Parameter Length: 800 and not contain any payload, SCTP will ignore this parameter and send back a INIT-ACK. This patch is fix to handle this invalid parameter length correctly. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index adc5e593472..79856c92452 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, * VIOLATION error. We build the ERROR chunk here and let the normal * error handling code build and send the packet. */ - if (param.v < (void*)chunk->chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) { + if (param.v != (void*)chunk->chunk_end) { sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3