diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/kernel.h | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 63 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/softlockup.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 67 |
6 files changed, 101 insertions, 82 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index 8c3aca7cb34..7ed9e070a6e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -282,6 +282,8 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_callin(void) cpu_set(cpuid, cpu_callin_map); } +static int __cpuinitdata unsafe_smp; + /* * Activate a secondary processor. */ @@ -397,7 +399,7 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) goto valid_k7; /* If we get here, not a certified SMP capable AMD system. */ - add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP); + unsafe_smp = 1; } valid_k7: @@ -414,12 +416,10 @@ static void __cpuinit smp_checks(void) * Don't taint if we are running SMP kernel on a single non-MP * approved Athlon */ - if (tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP) { - if (num_online_cpus()) - printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD" - "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n"); - else - tainted &= ~TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP; + if (unsafe_smp && num_online_cpus() > 1) { + printk(KERN_INFO "WARNING: This combination of AMD" + "processors is not suitable for SMP.\n"); + add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP); } } diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 75d81f157d2..e971c55f45a 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -235,9 +235,10 @@ extern int oops_in_progress; /* If set, an oops, panic(), BUG() or die() is in extern int panic_timeout; extern int panic_on_oops; extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; -extern int tainted; extern const char *print_tainted(void); -extern void add_taint(unsigned); +extern void add_taint(unsigned flag); +extern int test_taint(unsigned flag); +extern unsigned long get_taint(void); extern int root_mountflags; /* Values used for system_state */ @@ -250,16 +251,16 @@ extern enum system_states { SYSTEM_SUSPEND_DISK, } system_state; -#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE (1<<0) -#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE (1<<1) -#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP (1<<2) -#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD (1<<3) -#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK (1<<4) -#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE (1<<5) -#define TAINT_USER (1<<6) -#define TAINT_DIE (1<<7) -#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE (1<<8) -#define TAINT_WARN (1<<9) +#define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE 0 +#define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE 1 +#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP 2 +#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD 3 +#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK 4 +#define TAINT_BAD_PAGE 5 +#define TAINT_USER 6 +#define TAINT_DIE 7 +#define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE 8 +#define TAINT_WARN 9 extern void dump_stack(void) __cold; diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 9db11911e04..dd9ac6ad5cb 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod) static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag) { add_taint(flag); - mod->taints |= flag; + mod->taints |= (1U << flag); } /* @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static const char vermagic[] = VERMAGIC_STRING; static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *symname) { #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD - if (!(tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)) + if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)) printk("%s: no version for \"%s\" found: kernel tainted.\n", mod->name, symname); add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); @@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static unsigned long resolve_symbol(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const unsigned long *crc; ret = find_symbol(name, &owner, &crc, - !(mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE), true); + !(mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)), true); if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret)) { /* use_module can fail due to OOM, or module initialization or unloading */ @@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license) license = "unspecified"; if (!license_is_gpl_compatible(license)) { - if (!(tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)) + if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints " "kernel.\n", mod->name, license); add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); @@ -2552,9 +2552,9 @@ static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf) mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING) { buf[bx++] = '('; - if (mod->taints & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE) + if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)) buf[bx++] = 'P'; - if (mod->taints & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE) + if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)) buf[bx++] = 'F'; /* * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added. diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 12c5a0a6c89..028013f7afd 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/kallsyms.h> int panic_on_oops; -int tainted; +static unsigned long tainted_mask; static int pause_on_oops; static int pause_on_oops_flag; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); @@ -159,31 +159,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic); * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint(). */ +struct tnt { + u8 bit; + char true; + char false; +}; + +static const struct tnt tnts[] = { + { TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' }, + { TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' }, + { TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' }, + { TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' }, + { TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' }, + { TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' }, + { TAINT_USER, 'U', ' ' }, + { TAINT_DIE, 'D', ' ' }, + { TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ' }, + { TAINT_WARN, 'W', ' ' }, +}; + const char *print_tainted(void) { - static char buf[20]; - if (tainted) { - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c", - tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G', - tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_DIE ? 'D' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ? 'A' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_WARN ? 'W' : ' '); - } - else + static char buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tnts) + sizeof("Tainted: ") + 1]; + + if (tainted_mask) { + char *s; + int i; + + s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: "); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tnts); i++) { + const struct tnt *t = &tnts[i]; + *s++ = test_bit(t->bit, &tainted_mask) ? + t->true : t->false; + } + *s = 0; + } else snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted"); return(buf); } +int test_taint(unsigned flag) +{ + return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint); + +unsigned long get_taint(void) +{ + return tainted_mask; +} + void add_taint(unsigned flag) { debug_locks = 0; /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */ - tainted |= flag; + set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); diff --git a/kernel/softlockup.c b/kernel/softlockup.c index cb838ee93a8..3953e4aed73 100644 --- a/kernel/softlockup.c +++ b/kernel/softlockup.c @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static void check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks(int this_cpu) * If the system crashed already then all bets are off, * do not report extra hung tasks: */ - if ((tainted & TAINT_DIE) || did_panic) + if (test_taint(TAINT_DIE) || did_panic) return; read_lock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index cfc5295f1e8..ec88fcc9a0d 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern int max_lock_depth; #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); -static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, +static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); #endif @@ -379,10 +379,9 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .procname = "tainted", - .data = &tainted, - .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .maxlen = sizeof(long), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint, + .proc_handler = &proc_taint, }, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP @@ -2228,49 +2227,39 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, NULL,NULL); } -#define OP_SET 0 -#define OP_AND 1 -#define OP_OR 2 - -static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, - int *valp, - int write, void *data) -{ - int op = *(int *)data; - if (write) { - int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp; - switch(op) { - case OP_SET: *valp = val; break; - case OP_AND: *valp &= val; break; - case OP_OR: *valp |= val; break; - } - } else { - int val = *valp; - if (val < 0) { - *negp = -1; - *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val; - } else { - *negp = 0; - *lvalp = (unsigned long)val; - } - } - return 0; -} - /* - * Taint values can only be increased + * Taint values can only be increased + * This means we can safely use a temporary. */ -static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, +static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - int op; + struct ctl_table t; + unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint(); + int err; if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - op = OP_OR; - return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos, - do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op); + t = *table; + t.data = &tmptaint; + err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + if (write) { + /* + * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive + * to everyone's atomic.h for this + */ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) { + if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1) + add_taint(i); + } + } + + return err; } struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param { |