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-rw-r--r--crypto/digest.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/tcrypt.c28
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c8
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c28
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/padlock-sha.c9
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/talitos.c54
-rw-r--r--include/asm-x86/i387.h32
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/hash.h18
8 files changed, 153 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/digest.c b/crypto/digest.c
index ac0919460d1..5d3f1303da9 100644
--- a/crypto/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/digest.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int crypto_init_digest_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
struct ahash_tfm *crt = &tfm->crt_ahash;
struct digest_alg *dalg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_digest;
- if (dalg->dia_digestsize > crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm))
+ if (dalg->dia_digestsize > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
return -EINVAL;
crt->init = digest_async_init;
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 59821a22d75..66368022e0b 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -481,21 +481,31 @@ next_one:
for (k = 0, temp = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
printk(KERN_INFO "page %u\n", k);
- q = &axbuf[IDX[k]];
- hexdump(q, template[i].tap[k]);
+ q = &xbuf[IDX[k]];
+
+ n = template[i].tap[k];
+ if (k == template[i].np - 1)
+ n += enc ? authsize : -authsize;
+ hexdump(q, n);
printk(KERN_INFO "%s\n",
- memcmp(q, template[i].result + temp,
- template[i].tap[k] -
- (k < template[i].np - 1 || enc ?
- 0 : authsize)) ?
+ memcmp(q, template[i].result + temp, n) ?
"fail" : "pass");
- for (n = 0; q[template[i].tap[k] + n]; n++)
- ;
+ q += n;
+ if (k == template[i].np - 1 && !enc) {
+ if (memcmp(q, template[i].input +
+ temp + n, authsize))
+ n = authsize;
+ else
+ n = 0;
+ } else {
+ for (n = 0; q[n]; n++)
+ ;
+ }
if (n) {
printk("Result buffer corruption %u "
"bytes:\n", n);
- hexdump(&q[template[i].tap[k]], n);
+ hexdump(q, n);
}
temp += template[i].tap[k];
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c
index f7feae4ebb5..128202e18fc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/i387.h>
#define PFX KBUILD_MODNAME ": "
@@ -67,16 +68,23 @@ enum {
* Another possible performance boost may come from simply buffering
* until we have 4 bytes, thus returning a u32 at a time,
* instead of the current u8-at-a-time.
+ *
+ * Padlock instructions can generate a spurious DNA fault, so
+ * we have to call them in the context of irq_ts_save/restore()
*/
static inline u32 xstore(u32 *addr, u32 edx_in)
{
u32 eax_out;
+ int ts_state;
+
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
asm(".byte 0x0F,0xA7,0xC0 /* xstore %%edi (addr=%0) */"
:"=m"(*addr), "=a"(eax_out)
:"D"(addr), "d"(edx_in));
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
return eax_out;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c
index 54a2a166e56..bf2917d197a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <asm/i387.h>
#include "padlock.h"
/* Control word. */
@@ -141,6 +142,12 @@ static inline void padlock_reset_key(void)
asm volatile ("pushfl; popfl");
}
+/*
+ * While the padlock instructions don't use FP/SSE registers, they
+ * generate a spurious DNA fault when cr0.ts is '1'. These instructions
+ * should be used only inside the irq_ts_save/restore() context
+ */
+
static inline void padlock_xcrypt(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
void *control_word)
{
@@ -205,15 +212,23 @@ static inline u8 *padlock_xcrypt_cbc(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
+
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
aes_crypt(in, out, ctx->E, &ctx->cword.encrypt);
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
}
static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
+
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
aes_crypt(in, out, ctx->D, &ctx->cword.decrypt);
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
}
static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
@@ -244,12 +259,14 @@ static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
ctx->E, &ctx->cword.encrypt,
@@ -257,6 +274,7 @@ static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
return err;
}
@@ -268,12 +286,14 @@ static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
ctx->D, &ctx->cword.decrypt,
@@ -281,7 +301,7 @@ static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
-
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
return err;
}
@@ -314,12 +334,14 @@ static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
u8 *iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, ctx->E,
@@ -329,6 +351,7 @@ static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
return err;
}
@@ -340,12 +363,14 @@ static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
+ int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key();
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
padlock_xcrypt_cbc(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
ctx->D, walk.iv, &ctx->cword.decrypt,
@@ -354,6 +379,7 @@ static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/padlock-sha.c b/drivers/crypto/padlock-sha.c
index 40d5680fa01..a7fbadebf62 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/padlock-sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/padlock-sha.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <asm/i387.h>
#include "padlock.h"
#define SHA1_DEFAULT_FALLBACK "sha1-generic"
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static void padlock_do_sha1(const char *in, char *out, int count)
* PadLock microcode needs it that big. */
char buf[128+16];
char *result = NEAREST_ALIGNED(buf);
+ int ts_state;
((uint32_t *)result)[0] = SHA1_H0;
((uint32_t *)result)[1] = SHA1_H1;
@@ -109,9 +111,12 @@ static void padlock_do_sha1(const char *in, char *out, int count)
((uint32_t *)result)[3] = SHA1_H3;
((uint32_t *)result)[4] = SHA1_H4;
+ /* prevent taking the spurious DNA fault with padlock. */
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc8" /* rep xsha1 */
: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
: "c"(count), "a"(0));
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, 5);
}
@@ -123,6 +128,7 @@ static void padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count)
* PadLock microcode needs it that big. */
char buf[128+16];
char *result = NEAREST_ALIGNED(buf);
+ int ts_state;
((uint32_t *)result)[0] = SHA256_H0;
((uint32_t *)result)[1] = SHA256_H1;
@@ -133,9 +139,12 @@ static void padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count)
((uint32_t *)result)[6] = SHA256_H6;
((uint32_t *)result)[7] = SHA256_H7;
+ /* prevent taking the spurious DNA fault with padlock. */
+ ts_state = irq_ts_save();
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0" /* rep xsha256 */
: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
: "c"(count), "a"(0));
+ irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, 8);
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index 681c15f4208..ee827a7f7c6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ struct talitos_private {
unsigned int exec_units;
unsigned int desc_types;
+ /* SEC Compatibility info */
+ unsigned long features;
+
/* next channel to be assigned next incoming descriptor */
atomic_t last_chan;
@@ -133,6 +136,9 @@ struct talitos_private {
struct hwrng rng;
};
+/* .features flag */
+#define TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT 0x00000001
+
/*
* map virtual single (contiguous) pointer to h/w descriptor pointer
*/
@@ -785,7 +791,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_encrypt_done(struct device *dev,
/* copy the generated ICV to dst */
if (edesc->dma_len) {
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
- edesc->dst_nents + 1];
+ edesc->dst_nents + 2];
sg = sg_last(areq->dst, edesc->dst_nents);
memcpy((char *)sg_virt(sg) + sg->length - ctx->authsize,
icvdata, ctx->authsize);
@@ -814,7 +820,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_decrypt_done(struct device *dev,
/* auth check */
if (edesc->dma_len)
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
- edesc->dst_nents + 1];
+ edesc->dst_nents + 2];
else
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[0];
@@ -921,10 +927,30 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct ipsec_esp_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->src, sg_count, cryptlen,
&edesc->link_tbl[0]);
if (sg_count > 1) {
+ struct talitos_ptr *link_tbl_ptr =
+ &edesc->link_tbl[sg_count-1];
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
desc->ptr[4].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
desc->ptr[4].ptr = cpu_to_be32(edesc->dma_link_tbl);
dma_sync_single_for_device(ctx->dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ /* If necessary for this SEC revision,
+ * add a link table entry for ICV.
+ */
+ if ((priv->features &
+ TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT) &&
+ (edesc->desc.hdr & DESC_HDR_MODE0_ENCRYPT) == 0) {
+ link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = 0;
+ link_tbl_ptr++;
+ link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN;
+ link_tbl_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(authsize);
+ sg = sg_last(areq->src, edesc->src_nents ? : 1);
+ link_tbl_ptr->ptr = cpu_to_be32(
+ (char *)sg_dma_address(sg)
+ + sg->length - authsize);
+ }
} else {
/* Only one segment now, so no link tbl needed */
desc->ptr[4].ptr = cpu_to_be32(sg_dma_address(areq->src));
@@ -944,12 +970,11 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct ipsec_esp_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
desc->ptr[5].ptr = cpu_to_be32(sg_dma_address(areq->dst));
} else {
struct talitos_ptr *link_tbl_ptr =
- &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents];
- struct scatterlist *sg;
+ &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents + 1];
desc->ptr[5].ptr = cpu_to_be32((struct talitos_ptr *)
edesc->dma_link_tbl +
- edesc->src_nents);
+ edesc->src_nents + 1);
if (areq->src == areq->dst) {
memcpy(link_tbl_ptr, &edesc->link_tbl[0],
edesc->src_nents * sizeof(struct talitos_ptr));
@@ -957,14 +982,10 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct ipsec_esp_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->dst, sg_count, cryptlen,
link_tbl_ptr);
}
+ /* Add an entry to the link table for ICV data */
link_tbl_ptr += sg_count - 1;
-
- /* handle case where sg_last contains the ICV exclusively */
- sg = sg_last(areq->dst, edesc->dst_nents);
- if (sg->length == ctx->authsize)
- link_tbl_ptr--;
-
link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = 0;
+ sg_count++;
link_tbl_ptr++;
link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN;
link_tbl_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(authsize);
@@ -973,7 +994,7 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct ipsec_esp_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
link_tbl_ptr->ptr = cpu_to_be32((struct talitos_ptr *)
edesc->dma_link_tbl +
edesc->src_nents +
- edesc->dst_nents + 1);
+ edesc->dst_nents + 2);
desc->ptr[5].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
dma_sync_single_for_device(ctx->dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
@@ -1040,12 +1061,12 @@ static struct ipsec_esp_edesc *ipsec_esp_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *areq,
/*
* allocate space for base edesc plus the link tables,
- * allowing for a separate entry for the generated ICV (+ 1),
+ * allowing for two separate entries for ICV and generated ICV (+ 2),
* and the ICV data itself
*/
alloc_len = sizeof(struct ipsec_esp_edesc);
if (src_nents || dst_nents) {
- dma_len = (src_nents + dst_nents + 1) *
+ dma_len = (src_nents + dst_nents + 2) *
sizeof(struct talitos_ptr) + ctx->authsize;
alloc_len += dma_len;
} else {
@@ -1104,7 +1125,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
/* stash incoming ICV for later cmp with ICV generated by the h/w */
if (edesc->dma_len)
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
- edesc->dst_nents + 1];
+ edesc->dst_nents + 2];
else
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[0];
@@ -1480,6 +1501,9 @@ static int talitos_probe(struct of_device *ofdev,
goto err_out;
}
+ if (of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,sec3.0"))
+ priv->features |= TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT;
+
priv->head_lock = kmalloc(sizeof(spinlock_t) * priv->num_channels,
GFP_KERNEL);
priv->tail_lock = kmalloc(sizeof(spinlock_t) * priv->num_channels,
diff --git a/include/asm-x86/i387.h b/include/asm-x86/i387.h
index 96fa8449ff1..6d3b2106341 100644
--- a/include/asm-x86/i387.h
+++ b/include/asm-x86/i387.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/sigcontext.h>
@@ -236,6 +237,37 @@ static inline void kernel_fpu_end(void)
preempt_enable();
}
+/*
+ * Some instructions like VIA's padlock instructions generate a spurious
+ * DNA fault but don't modify SSE registers. And these instructions
+ * get used from interrupt context aswell. To prevent these kernel instructions
+ * in interrupt context interact wrongly with other user/kernel fpu usage, we
+ * should use them only in the context of irq_ts_save/restore()
+ */
+static inline int irq_ts_save(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we are in process context, we are ok to take a spurious DNA fault.
+ * Otherwise, doing clts() in process context require pre-emption to
+ * be disabled or some heavy lifting like kernel_fpu_begin()
+ */
+ if (!in_interrupt())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS) {
+ clts();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void irq_ts_restore(int TS_state)
+{
+ if (TS_state)
+ stts();
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline void save_init_fpu(struct task_struct *tsk)
diff --git a/include/crypto/hash.h b/include/crypto/hash.h
index d12498ec8a4..ee48ef8fb2e 100644
--- a/include/crypto/hash.h
+++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
@@ -101,6 +101,24 @@ static inline int crypto_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
return crt->digest(req);
}
+static inline int crypto_ahash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct ahash_tfm *crt = crypto_ahash_crt(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
+ return crt->init(req);
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_ahash_update(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct ahash_tfm *crt = crypto_ahash_crt(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
+ return crt->update(req);
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_ahash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+ struct ahash_tfm *crt = crypto_ahash_crt(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
+ return crt->final(req);
+}
+
static inline void ahash_request_set_tfm(struct ahash_request *req,
struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
{